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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the criminalisation in international law of violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in internal armed conflict. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case is analysed. The 
Decision confirms the customary development of the law of war crimes to 
include the criminality in international law of offences committed in internal 
armed conflict. 
Thus the emphasis is on proceedings before the Ad Hoc International Tribunals. 
The thesis describes the customary development of the law of war crimes by 
highlighting the method employed by Judges and the Prosecutor to allow for the 
maximum reach of the law. A major limitation they have encountered is that, 
though offences in internal conflict now entail individual criminal responsibility in 
international law, the disparate treatment of violations in internal conflicts versus 
violations in international conflicts has not been superseded. This treatment has 
consequences for the elements of the definition of war crimes: the character of 
the conflict remains an element of the crime even though it is indifferent to moral 
fault. In this connection, the strategies employed by the Prosecutor to avoid 
engaging in contentious and lengthy conflict classification are reviewed. 
The disparate treatment of violations in internal and international conflicts is 
traced to the 'two-box' approach to international humanitarian law, which in tum 
stems from states' choice to be less restricted in their conduct in an internal 
armed conflict than they would be in an international conflict. This work 
recognises the limits posed by the law as it stands today: the recurrent theme 
throughout the thesis is the paramount importance of the principle of non-
retroactive application of criminal law. 
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Introduction 
This thesis attempts to clarify the international legal regime on war crimes as 
these are understood after the Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case. This Decision 
by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed the 
criminalisation in customary law of violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in internal armed conflict. This thesis will focus on this development 
and on the implications of the Tadic Decision for the law of war crimes. 
The investigation focuses on the proceedings before the Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals and on the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Though 
the principal actors in establishing customary international law are states, 
through their practice including participation in multilateral treaties, the 
processes of the International Tribunals and the negotiations of the ICC Statute 
have provided exceptional opportunities for the crystallisation of customary law. 
When reference is made to the 'International Tribunals', this must be understood 
to include the practice of the Prosecutor in addition to the decisions and 
judgements of the courts. 
Chapter 1 sets out the parameters of the inquiry to be undertaken. It seeks to 
establish the importance for the criminalisation of conduct as an ingredient in the 
rule of international law, as distinct from some standard of moral evaluation of 
widely condemned conduct. Nonetheless, the difficulties in the way of 
establishing clear and coherent criminal standards in the decentralised 
international legal system are acknowledged. The balance between the role of 
legislator and judge may have to be struck rather differently in the international 
legal system than it would in a domestic legal order. 
Part One of the thesis constitutes of one chapter. It focuses on the customary 
development of international humanitarian law applicable to internal conflicts. It 
then turns to the Tadic Decision for confirmation of this development, and 
analyses the arguments of the Presiding Judge that allowed the ICTY to assert 
jurisdiction over offences committed in internal conflicts. 
Part Two goes on to elucidate the implications for the law of war crimes of the 
Tadic Decision, in two separate chapters. Chapter 3 reviews grave breaches in 
particular to determine what are the obstacles to their application to conduct 
occurring in internal armed conflict. This chapter also looks at charges brought 
under violations of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and at the lack of convictions 
on these charges. In contrasting grave breaches and violations of common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, the chapter explains the 'two box' approach 
to international humanitarian law. 
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the implications of the Tadic Decision for the 
substantive law. It concentrates on the prosecutorial method following the 
Decision insofar as it focuses on the strategies adopted by the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY to avoid the necessity of conflict classification. It also 
looks at how the ICC Statute confirms the process of criminalisation of violations 
of international humanitarian law in internal conflict insofar as it pronounces 
them war crimes. The ICC Statute provides further evidence that the 'two-box' 
approach to violations of international humanitarian law has not been 
superseded. 
Chapter 5 returns to the 'two-box' approach to demonstrate that it has resulted 
in an approach to culpability which may turn on the characterisation of the 
conflict (as an element of the crime), which carries no moral significance. It 
attempts to determine why this is so. It looks at the activities of the Prosecutor 
again, this time at strategies that seek to rely on judicial notice to avoid the 
character of the conflict being put in issue again and again. This chapter is 
followed by the conclusion. 
Chapter 1: On International Criminal Law 
1.1 Introduction: the scope of international criminal law 
International criminal law constitutes the wider setting in which war crimes are 
inscribed. The purpose of the following chapter is to establish the parameters 
for the present enquiry. Therefore, in this chapter I will comment upon selected 
aspects of international criminal law that are relevant to this thesis. 
Prior to the creation by the Security Council of the ICTY in 1993 and of the ICTR 
Rwanda in 1994,'' international criminal law could only relate to the substantive 
definition of international offences. There was little else: in the absence of 
International Tribunals with a criminal jurisdiction, international criminal law was 
missing a body of international criminal procedure, an international forum and 
consequently a means to develop the law other than through national courts. 
There was no such thing as an international criminal system. National courts, 
on the other hand, did and do belong in a complete system of law. 
Hence international offences could only be tried by national courts. Two 
consequences stem from the need to rely on national courts: first, the relation 
between the international criminal standard and the domestic of the state 
becomes of great significance. Secondly, reliance on national courts meant that 
international criminal law as a discipline evolved in a manner far from 
systematic. This must be coupled with the absence of a central legislator in the 
international system. International criminal law develops in an erratic manner 
through the means at the disposal of international law: treaty and custom, and 
their enforcement by national courts of the states, severally. 
In view of this inconsistent evolution, scholars amalgamated under the name of 
'International Criminal Law' a series of topics that were only incidentally 
connected.^ For this reason, the coherence of the discipline of international 
criminal law has often been questioned. The connection between the topics that 
^ S/RES/827(1993) and S/RES/955(1994) respectively. 
^ American Bar Association Task Force, 'Report of the ABA Task Force on Teaching 
International Criminal Law' (1994) 5 Crim. LF 91. 
compose it is very loose: 'the unity imposed is purely phenomenological'.^ Even 
the reality of the discipline has been called into question.'' Therefore to 
determine the scope and content of international criminal law is not an easy 
task. 
In order to make sense of the discipline it is useful to recall Bassiouni's classic 
distinction. He distinguishes criminal aspects of international law, which deal 
'essentially, if not exclusively with substantive international criminal law or 
international crimes' from international aspects of municipal criminal law.^ The 
latter consist of 'questions of jurisdiction over crime, the choice of law in criminal 
cases and the recognition of foreign penal judgements'.^ From this distinction it 
is possible to observe that all sorts are included under the name of 'international 
criminal law': not only would it include the definition of substantive offences, but 
also matters of interstate co-operation and assistance. It is necessary to 
determine what is relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Matters essentially of 
interstate co-operation and assistance are out of the scope of the enquiry. The 
main focus of this thesis rests in the definition of substantive offences. 
According to Wise, the definition of substantive offences integrates intemational 
criminal law stricto sensu.^ 
In any event, with the creation of the two Ad Hoc International Tribunals and the 
Statute for an International Criminal Court^ it is possible to speak about 
international criminal law. There is evidence of the existence of a system, 
however embryonic, of international criminal law. As part of this system, there 
now actually exists a means to develop the law. This is important for the sake of 
this thesis. Moreover Wise is of the opinion that, 'in its strictest possible sense, 
international criminal law would be the law applicable in an international criminal 
court'.^ However, I find this definition too limited for it is restricted to those 
^ E. Wise, Terrorism and the Problems of an International Criminal Court' in J. Dugard 
and C. van den Wyngaerts (eds), International Criminal Law and Procedure (Dartmouth: 
Aldershot, 1996), 47. 
^ G. Schwarzenberger, 'The Problem of an International Criminal Law' (1950) 3 CLP 
263. 
^ M. C. Bassiouni, 'The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law' 
in J. Dugard and C. van den Wyngaert n.3, 329. 
^n.3, 41. 
^ ibid 44. 
^ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNDoc.A/CONF.183/9*(17 July 
1999, as corrected by the proc6s-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999). 
^ n.3, 44. 
crimes that come within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal or Court. 
Yet, aside form the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court there exist a 
number of other international offences, both customary and conventional. The 
law to be applied in an International Criminal Court would definitely constitute 
international criminal law, but, in my opinion, not exclusively. 
In addition this restrictive definition disregards that the need to rely on national 
prosecutions has not disappeared, and will not disappear in the event of a 
permanent International Criminal Court. A deficient international system 
characterised by a lack of central enforcement means that the indirect 
enforcement through national courts remains essential. Indirect enforcement 
poses a problem that will be illustrated below as to the correct analysis of the 
obligation. This indirect enforcement accounts in many cases for the lack of 
practice. 
The question remains as to, if there is 'the inevitable need to rely on national 
prosecutions',^° what is the reasoning behind the establishment of International 
Tribunals. 'Why are individuals punished by intemational procedures for 
violations of international criminal law?''''' Richard Goldstone, the former 
Prosecutor for the ICTY affirmed that 'without international enforcement, there 
might as well not be international criminal law'.''^ Hence, ultimately the need for 
international criminal law itself is questioned. As regards war crimes, the object 
of the present enquiry, it is possible to anticipate the advantage of trying these 
offences before International Tribunals. As Plattner observes, 'the risk would 
remain of only those who fought for the lost cause being prosecuted, and seems 
to be inherent in any mechanism creating an international penal responsibility for 
acts committed in situations of armed conflict, as long as repressive measures 
are applied by national organs.'''^ For the moment I will use international 
criminal law in the sense of a body of law integrated by the intemational 
definition of criminal offences. This will be my working definition. 
°^ C. Warbrick, 'The United Nations System: a Place for Criminal Courts?' (1995) 5 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 237, 240. 
ibid 242. 
Cited in M. P. Scharf, 'The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic: an Appraisal of the First 
International War Crimes Trial since Nuremberg' (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 861, 
882. 
D. Plattner, 'The Penal Repression of Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Non- International Armed Conflicts' (1990) no.30 IRRC (printed version) 
409, 417. 
1.2 International crimes 
This thesis will focus on the definition of international offences, so it is necessary 
to ask who can commit those offences. It has been suggested that there is 
more than one way 'of understanding the relevant subject of international 
criminal law'.^"* In this connection we must distinguish between crimes of states 
and crimes of individuals. The former do not come within the scope of the 
present enquiry. We are interested in them only insofar as they bear any 
relation to crimes of individuals. 
A) Crimes of states. 
The crime of state is a modality of international responsibility of states 
considered by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility. The ILC drew the distinction between a crime of state and 
a delict. The delict represented the usual mode of state responsibility. 
The standard model is a bilateral, delictual rule, carrying an obligation of 
reparation. The primary right, the new right in the event of a violation of 
the primary right and the right to take measures to enforce those rights, 
typically belong in one State and operate against another state'.""^ 
Delictual responsibility will be relevant in relation to human rights violations and 
to the unwillingness by states to carry out other obligations under intemational 
law, as explained below in the context of the obligation to try or extradite for 
some international offences. 
On the other hand, the notion of crime of states was previously defined in 
section 2 of Article 19 of the ILC Draft Code on State Responsibility. Section 3 
provided some examples. 
G. Simpson, 'War Crimes: a Critical Introduction' in T. L. McCormack and G. S. 
Simpson (eds), The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches (Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1997), 17. 
^^n.10, 238. 
An international crime may result, inter alia, from: 
a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting 
aggression; 
b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for 
safeguarding the right of self- determination of peoples, such as that 
prohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination; 
c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of 
essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as that 
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid; 
d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those 
prohibiting massive pollution of the environment or of the seas.""^ 
The interest in this section lied in that some of these crimes also constitute 
crimes of individuals. The relationship between the two types of criminal 
responsibility (of states and of individuals) must be analysed carefully. The 
question, however, boils down to whether we accept the notion of crimes of 
state. 
In connection to the suggested relation between crimes of states and crimes of 
individuals. Pellet talks in terms of 'the transparency of the state that committed 
a crime. This means that when an international crime is committed, not only the 
state itself is responsible, but also the natural persons who decided, committed, 
planned (...) and so on, such a crime'.''^ He suggests that this transparency is 
actually one of the characteristics of a crime of state. I do not entirely agree with 
the way he discusses this relation. First, it is necessary to specify the particular 
'crime' of state in order to determine whether it does involve individual criminal 
responsibility. Secondly, it is submitted that this transparency would be 
reversing the principle that the act of state doctrine cannot be applied where 
international offences are concerned. This would be a direct consequence of 
determining the criminal responsibility of the state in the first place and only after 
that of the individual. It is the opinion of this author that crimes of individuals 
®^ Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty- Eight Session, 
GAOR 51^' Session, UNDoc.A/51/10 (6 May- 26 July 1996). 
8 
should be left out of the discussion on state criminality, as they can be 
determined independently of any hypothetical state criminality. Using crimes of 
individuals as an asset to support the notion of crime of state seems to be doing 
either mode of criminal responsibility no good. 
As to whether we accept the idea of a crime of state, notwithstanding the more 
technical problems posed by the definition as found in the ILC's Draft Code,""® 
there are also a number of conceptual obstacles to the notion of crime of state 
itself. The absence of a mental element poses considerable problems: strict 
liability crimes are very rare, and in the absence of those there is a need for 
intention as the basis for ascribing criminality. The commission often requires 
an element of intention or moral turpitude that states as corporate bodies may 
not possess'.""^ On the contrary Meron sees a precedent for assigning intention 
to corporate entities like the state in the criminalisation of acts of corporations. 
Determining the intent of the corporation, 'was achieved through imputing to the 
corporation not only the acts, but also the mental state, of its employees'.^° 
Yet this constitutes precisely the biggest objection in relation to crimes of states. 
'Ascribing criminal responsibility to legal persons runs the risk of imposing costs 
on individuals who do not share the notion of responsibility which is at the root of 
the justification for criminal sanction.'^^ In addition Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals have been justified in that they prevent the collective guilt of entire 
populations. A development that would mean the criminalisation of whole 
populations as nationals of a criminal state seems to run counter-productive to 
this aim. It seems quite clear that there is no possible advantage that is worth 
risking the collectivisation of guilt. Irrespective of any arguments, however, for 
the purpose of this thesis the most important fact is that the notion of crime of 
state is still at an embryonic stage. It does not at this stage reflect state practice 
and therefore we should not consider it as such. 
Alain Pellet, 'Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!" (1999) 10 EJIL 425, 432. 
®^ ibid 428-430. Also D. W. Bowett, 'Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the 
International Law Commission on State Responsibility' 9 (1998) EJIL 163. 
^^n.14, 17. 
^° T. Meron, 'Is International Law Moving towards Criminalization?' (1998) 9 EJIL 18, 20. 
C. Warbrick, 'Crimes Against International Law: Setting the Agenda' in P. J. Cullen 
and W. C. Gilmore (eds). Crime Sans Frontiers: International and European Legal 
Approaches (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 6. 
At date of submission, the controversial notion of crimes of states had been removed, 
it did not appear in the Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committees 
on Second Reading, ILC 52"^ ^ Session, A/CN.4/L.600 (11 August 2000). 
The discussion on crimes of state is useful, though, in the sense that it questions 
the relationship between the regime of state responsibility and international 
criminal law. This is so because in the regime (as yet to crystallise) on crimes of 
states, states are the subjects of the obligation. In international criminal law, the 
obligation is directed to individuals (with due caveats to follow). But if in the face 
of a conventional obligation to prosecute or extradite an individual suspected of 
committing a specific crime against international law a state does not do as 
much, the state would not be committing a crime. Instead it would incur in state 
responsibility. Hence the marked difference as to whom is the subject of the 
obligation under international law. It is however enough to determine at this 
stage that 'the rule of state responsibility provides some basis for the duty to 
punish violators'. 
B) Crimes of individuals. 
Offences in international law involve the criminal responsibility of the individual. 
The analysis of the responsibility of the individual in international law raises legal 
problems because there is a contradiction between the fact that individuals are 
not subjects of international law and the same individuals' international criminal 
responsibility. 
This contradiction can become of some importance in such cases as those of 
Adolf Eichmann and Dusko Tadic. 'In principle locus standi in Public 
International Law is limited to states and certain international institutions,'^"^ 
which raises concern when an individual is being tried for international offences, 
in particular in relation to complaints arising from the way the defendant has 
been brought to trial. Argentina made Israel answer for the abduction of 
Eichmann, but the obligation of reparation was owed to the Argentinean state 
and in this instance did not entail the return of the defendant. Furthermore, it 
has only been possible recently and in front of an international tribunal for the 
individual to challenge the manner in which he was brought to t r i a l . T h i s was 
so in the Tadic case. 
" M. Bothe, War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conflicts' (1994) 24 Israel YB MR 
241, 248. 
H. McCoubrey and N. D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1992), 329. 
S. C. Neff, 'Past ar 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda' in P. J. Cullen. and W. C. Gilmore (eds) n.21, 59. 
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Hence international criminal law is faced with a difficulty in determining who are 
its subjects. There are two approaches; first, it is suggested that international 
criminal law poses obligations directly on individuals in that there is a direct 
visitation of criminal responsibility on the individual. The contrary view maintains 
that, because the individual is not stnctly speaking a subject in intemational law, 
he is addressed only through the state. In actual practice, both answers are 
correct to an extent. It is useful to introduce at this point 'a non- technical 
distinction between crimes by international law and crimes against international 
law'.^^ 
In crimes by international law the obligation is posed on the state to criminalise 
conduct in its domestic law, irrespective of whether this conduct is also criminal 
in international law. Usually this obligation is posed on states by way of treaty. 
In respect of these crimes the traditional doctrine of mediatisation stays true, 
because the individual is only indirectly addressed through the state. Yet is it 
'that the duty of trial and punishment -incurred by the Contracting States as 
such-is the sole obligation created by the treaties, and the individual is only 
indirectly affected by this obligation as an object of the conduct of the state?'" 
This might not always be the case; a treaty can pose an obligation on states to 
criminalise but can also establish that the given conduct constitutes a cnme 
against international law (eg Genocide Convention). In this event the criminality 
of the conduct is prescribed by international law, therefore the individual is the 
direct recipient of obligations. The subsidiary obligation to criminalise the 
conduct in domestic law, on the other hand, falls on the state. The relation 
between the international criminal standard and domestic law is analysed below. 
For crimes against international law, international law envisages individual 
criminal responsibility. Were a crime constitutes a crime against international 
law, the subject is the individual directly; there is a 'direct visitation of 
international criminal responsibility' on the individual.^® These are usually (but 
not necessarily) crimes under customary international law, rather than by treaty; 
yet the possibility of having a treaty that makes conduct criminal in international 
®^ C. Warbrick, E. Martin-Salgado and N. Goodwin, 'The Pinochet Cases in the United 
Kingdom' (1999) 2 YIHL 91, 107. 
Depends on the obligations created by the treaty. Y. Dinstein, 'International Criminal 
Law' (1975) 5 Israel YB HR 55, 79. 
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law is not ruled out. In the case of customary law crimes only Intemational 
Tribunals have the capacity to try them; most states need to enact legislation -
statutes of transformation in domestic law- before national courts can try these 
crimes. An exception to this rule is found in those legal systems that directly 
adopt international customary law into national law. However such an adoption 
can raise concerns in relation to the principle of legality for national courts, in 
particular to the degree of specificity involved in customary law.^^ On the other 
hand if states decide to enact laws to enable them to try crimes against 
international law, it is necessary to look at the national standard so as to 
determine if it reflects the international definition of the crime.^° It might not 
mirror it exactly. The final caveat is the one mentioned previously in relation to 
treaties that establish the individual criminal responsibility for a given conduct in 
international law but also pose on states the obligation to criminalise the said 
conduct in domestic law. 
Schwarzenberger is of the opinion that all international crimes are crimes by 
international law, and that outside of the obligation posed on states to 
criminalise in their domestic laws, there exists no such thing as an international 
s t a n d a r d . W i t h the benefit of hindsight, we can inquire that if there is no 
international standard, what is it that the Ad Hoc International Tribunals apply? 
In any case and for the purposes of this thesis, we are particularly interested in 
crimes against international law. In addition, this thesis will concentrate on the 
application of the law by the Ad Hoc International Tribunals. As will be 
illustrated throughout, Ad Hoc International Tribunals have ascertained the 
customary law character of the crimes as a preliminary issue to trying a 
defendant of these charges. For this reason, the main focus of this thesis will be 
on crimes under customary law. 
n.24, 330. 
Discussed in section 1.4 and n.52. 
^° L. S. Wexler, 'The interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of 
Cassation: from Touvierto Barbie and Back Again' (1994) 32 Columbia JTL 289. 
n.4, 268. 
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1.3 Recognising a crime against international law 
The purpose of this section is to find out whether features common to crimes 
against international law exist that permit their identification. Identifying a 
particular conduct as a crime against international law also enables to 
distinguish it from ordinary crimes. The importance of differentiating between 
ordinary crimes and crimes against international law is illustrated below. Three 
issues are considered to attempt to identify crimes against international law. 
These are the content of the conduct, the criminality of the conduct and the type 
of jurisdiction that is attached to these crimes. 
A) The content of the criminal conduct. 
The issue is whether crimes against international law crimes share common 
substantive traits. It is widely believed that crimes against international law 
constitute serious violations of human rights. Though this might generally be so, 
there are some exceptions, like counterfeiting, which has 'nothing to do with a 
violation of human rights as such'.^^ Another opinion holds that crimes against 
international law share the trait that they regulate matters on which states have 
a strong interest. This is a correct view, since it devolves to the practice of 
states. The answer therefore is that crimes against international law do not 
necessarily share any common traits in their content. Rather the common traits, 
if at all present, are incidental. 'The practice of states is the conclusive 
determinant in the creation of international law (including international criminal 
law), and not the desirability of stamping out obnoxious patterns of human 
b e h a v i o u r ' . I t is important to bear this in mind. The temptation to apply a 'bad 
man' definition instead of relying on categories of crimes rooted in state practice 
is strong for crimes against international law, where the conduct in question will 
be heinous. However, if the aim is to avoid the retroactive application of criminal 
law, then defendants must be tried on the basis of identified criminal categories, 
and not on abstract notions of justice. 
B) Individual criminal responsibility 
It is one thing to say that a given conduct constitutes a breach of international 
law, and a very different one to say that it constitutes a crime against 
international law. The problem is 'how to distinguish between norms that merely 
^2 n.27, 76. 
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prohibit conduct and those that also impose individual criminal responsibility on 
the violators (...) it is simply not sufficient that treaties or customary intemational 
law proscribe certain types of conduct. The prohibited conduct must also lead to 
individual criminal responsibility of the violators'.^'* 
The distinction indicated previously must be borne in mind: crimes by 
international law do not necessarily involve a conduct that is criminal IN 
international law. Whether they do will be determined by reference to the terms 
of the treaty. The problem found in treaties is that they tend to use neutral 
terminology because of the political connotations of the word 'crime'. The 
Geneva Conventions, for example, talk in terms of grave breaches rather than of 
c r i m e s . O n the other hand crimes against international law prescribe the 
international criminal responsibility of the individual. In both types of crimes, 
therefore, we will have to refer back to the source of the criminal standard, which 
again implies the need to rely on state practice. The problem is that the 
criminality for a given conduct cannot be assumed, but needs to be proven by 
reference to the practice of states. 
In this manner the a priori determination of criminality is not exempt from 
difficulties. Does this uncertainty violate the principle of legality? Though there 
is a danger that this might be the case, the present state of affairs must not be 
overstated. First, most of the conduct that constitutes a crime against 
international law will constitute a crime under national law at the time of the 
offence. This will to an extent guarantee a fair outcome for the individual 
defendant. It will constitute a crime either under the domestic law enacting the 
crime against international law, or under provisions of General Criminal Law.^^ 
'Indeed most violations of the laws of war also violate rules of general criminal 
ibid 67. 
n.20, 23-24. 
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Conventions): Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Second Geneva Convention), Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Third Geneva Convention), Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention). In Article 85 of Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts of 1977 (Additional Protocol I) the connection is finally 
made between grave breaches and war crimes. 
^^Eg genocide and crimes against humanity be murder or conspiracy to murder. 
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law'.^^ Yet we have to appreciate whether treating crimes against international 
law like ordinary crimes is desirable. The Statutes of the International Tribunals 
seem to think otherwise, perhaps in relation to the different aims that war crimes 
(in a broad sense) trials serve.^^ For it is not a matter of the penalty but of 
calling things by their name. In this sense, distinguishing crimes against 
international law from ordinary crimes serves a function. 
In addition, the importance of distinguishing crimes against international law 
from ordinary crimes cannot be overstated in the cases that concern this thesis. 
It is very probable that any violation of the laws of war committed in the context 
of an internal armed conflict will constitute a crime in the domestic law. The 
government may want to employ general criminal law to deal with the rebels. 
Yet in internal armed conflicts precisely the opposite is being considered: in this 
respect 'the essential problem involved in these provisions is that of possible 
justification'.^^ Justifications may be provided for in the law applicable in internal 
armed conflict that would exempt the rebel- contender from criminal 
responsibility. For example, killing a member of the armed forces would in itself 
not constitute an unlawful action, and could not therefore be tried for murder. 
The difficulty of a priori determining international criminality is also attenuated 
because it might also be the case that these crimes violate international 
agreements. For example, the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Decision resolved 
that the contending parties in Yugoslavia had contracted agreements to apply 
certain provisions of international humanitarian law."*" 'This was a sufficient 
answer to any claim of retrospectivity about the UN Security Council's decision 
on the Tribunals judgement'.'*'' However the Appeals Chamber did not stop at 
this reasoning but argued about the applicable customary law. Why did it go 
into so much trouble? Greenwood believes that the Appeals Chamber 'took the 
opportunity of the first case to come before it to explore the whole of the 
n.23, 242. 
See Article 10(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute). The ICTY Statute is contained in the Annex to the 
Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the fomner Yugoslavia Pursuant to Par. 2 of 
S/RES/808 (1993)) UN Doc. S/25704 (Report of the Secretary-General). 
n.23, 243. 
^° Tadic Decision par. 143-44. 
n.10, 258. 
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substantive law applicable to internal armed conflict'."*^ I support the view that 
the Appeals Chamber went into such great length because it was not enough 
that the law had been implemented among the parties, but it was necessary to 
demonstrate that these violations of international agreements attached the 
requisite criminality. It was also necessary to demonstrate that the ICTY had 
jurisdiction over these offences.''^ 
C). Jurisdiction and the content of the obligation on the state. 
Again the question remains whether we can assume that all crimes against 
international law attach a duty or a right of universal jurisdiction. In talking about 
universal jurisdiction we are referring to judicial jurisdiction. However, in the 
case of crimes by international law, where the obligation is posed on the State to 
criminalise conduct in domestic law, it will concern legislative jurisdiction. In the 
case of piracy, on the other hand, the jurisdiction entailed is enforcement 
jurisdiction, to seize the pirates and apply executive measures to them. In fact 
some crimes involve all three, like grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
Important as the question of universal jurisdiction remains, it is necessary to 
realise that in most cases these crimes will be addressed on the basis of 
territorial jurisdiction. This is even the case for the Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals (not the ICC) where the conduct is tried on a territorial basis; the only 
difference is that it is tried by an Intemational Tribunal in a different place. In 
respect of the jurisdiction of the ICTR junsdiction, the principle of active 
personality is also relevant, for Rwanda's nationals committing crimes in the 
territory of neighbouring states are subjected to the tribunal's jurisdiction.'*'* In 
any case, none of the International Tribunals, including the ICC, work on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction. 
However, determining judicial jurisdiction only involves difficulties in relation to 
national courts; International Tribunals have their junsdiction (substantive, 
territorial and temporal) ascertained in their Statutes. Hence we can say that 
universal jurisdiction is an issue -because International Tribunals already have 
their jurisdiction defined in their statutes, and none of them has universal 
42 C. Greenwood, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case' (1996) 7 EJIL 
265, 277. 
Section 2.1. 
Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR 
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jurisdiction- only for national courts. This is compounded by the deficiency of 
the international system that has to rely on indirect enforcement through national 
prosecution. In this way, the answer to what jurisdiction applies to the given 
crime will only be found by reference to the source of the criminal standard. If it 
is by treaty then these questions can be answered more easily than in the case 
of a customary law crime. Therefore the focus in this case returns once more to 
the practice of states. 
Hence there is no common feature that, identified a priori, can identify a crime 
against international law. 'The only basis which now exists is empirical or 
experiential; conventional and customary international law implicitly or explicitly 
establish that a given act is part of international criminal law'."*^ Besides 'no 
institution of the international community of states exists to answer this question 
other than the States themselves, severally'."*^ As mentioned previously this 
thesis will focus on crimes under customary law, in particular on their treatment 
by the Ad Hoc International Tribunals. As reflected in the Statutes of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, these crimes will be genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The limitation mentioned previously, the absence of recourse to orderly 
treaty-making, results in a certain degree of overlap between war crimes and 
crimes against humanity that will be indicated throughout this work. 
1.4 The criminal standard in international law 
It is of some consequence to understand the relationship between the 
international criminal standard and the domestic law of a given state. The 
importance of this relationship resides, as indicated previously, in that even 
when a permanent international court comes about, the bulk of prosecutions will 
be undertaken by domestic courts. It is important to understand this relationship 
in order to be realistic as to what domestic courts can do. 
Simpson, handling a broad concept of war crimes, contends that 'the classical 
war crimes trials both prior to and since 1945 have generally occurred in 




domestic settings under national rather than international law'.'*'' To understand 
how this is the case it is useful to recall the distinction between crimes against 
international law and crimes by international law. The latter derive from the 
inevitable need to rely on national prosecutions: 'this causes states sometimes 
to forbear criminalising conduct in international law, and to create an obligation 
on states to criminalise the conduct in their own law'.'*® Crimes by intemational 
law do not necessarily entail an international criminal standard, as the obligation 
posed on states is to criminalise this conduct in national law. Still it can be the 
case that the treaty that obliges states to criminalise conduct can include a 
definition of the proscribed conduct, presumably the definition to be enacted in 
domestic law. States can incur in international responsibility if the fail to carry 
out their international obligations. It might be advisable therefore to enact 
legislation that mirrors treaty definitions exactly, in order to make it watertight. 
In crimes against international law, the question remains as to what extent does 
the definition of the crime enacted in domestic law reflect international 
criminality. States may think it is in their interest to enact laws to enable them to 
prosecute these crimes irrespective of a treaty obligation to do so. When there 
exists no duty to criminalise, if international law envisages the criminality of a 
given conduct, then there is the power to criminalise it in domestic law. States 
can however decide to adopt a definition different to the international 
prescription. So it will therefore be necessary to consider what is being applied, 
whether an international definition or a parallel definition in domestic law. 
Whether national courts, for the purpose of prosecuting crimes against 
international law, are considered 'organs of the international community applying 
international criminal law and bringing it home to the individual, who is directly 
subjected to international obligations"*^ is for 'the national legal system' to 
resolve.^° Equally if they are to be regarded merely as 'organs of the domestic 
order, the international crime being given a parallel, national existence'.^^ 
In relation to crimes against international law, it has already been mentioned that 
they are for the most part customary law crimes. The international criminal 






that consider customary international law as part of the law of the land will need 
no specific enactment of the definition of the crime. However, due to the 
vagueness inherent in customary law crimes, their prosecution can violate the 
principle of legality in two different ways. First, it might not be so clear that the 
wrongful conduct attaches individual criminal responsibility in international law. 
Secondly, national courts in trying customary law crimes will face issues of 
specificity. 'Establishing that conduct is criminal in customary international law is 
beset by the uncertainties of the customary law process. This is a matter of 
particular concern if recourse is to be had to national courts, whose principles of 
legality might not be satisfied by the vagueness of the products of customary 
international law.'^^ Precisely because they are complete systems of law, lack of 
specificity might be more problematic for national courts. International 
Tribunals, on the other hand, may find it easier, indeed necessary to be less 
stringent on the need for specificity. In either case, one of the challenges posed 
in relation to crimes against international law is 'to define with sufficient precision 
to satisfy the principle of legality'.^^ In this sense customary international law is 
more problematic. An additional problem and very real obstacle for national 
courts, though, is that 'many states do not have national laws in place that allow 
them to prosecute offenders'. 
1.5 The sources of international criminal law 
International criminal law belongs to international law. Therefore its sources 
cannot differ from the sources of international law. These are to be found listed 
in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. They are 
a) international conventions 
b) international custom 
c) general principles of law 
d) subsidiarily, judicial decisions and the teachings of qualified publicists 
ibid 3. 
n.26, 98. This was the point raised by Lord Slynn in R v. Bow Street Metropolitan 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and other intervening) 
[1998] 4 / \ / /E f?897. 
n.21, 9. 
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International law criminalises conduct by way of treaty or of custom. Yet general 
principles of law are also of significance in international criminal law. They are 
particularly relevant for deciding matters relating to the general part of Criminal 
Law, such as A77eA7S rea and actus reus. They also have an incidence in 
deciding procedural issues, such as non bis in idem. As can be inferred from 
this, general principles of law become most relevant in relation to Intemational 
Tribunals. As discussed previously. International Tribunals do not belong in 
complete systems of law, like national courts do, therefore they need 
complementing in some matters, and general principles are ideal for this task. 
The pre-eminent general principle is the principle of legality, non bis in idem, 
which forbids the retroactive application of the law. Meron believes that 'the 
prohibition of retroactive penal measures is a fundamental principle of criminal 
justice and a customary, even peremptory, norm of international law that must 
be observed in all circumstances by national and international tribunals'.^^ This 
principle will be taken into consideration throughout this thesis. 
Multilateral treaties are the usual way by which states criminalise conduct. An 
example of this action is found in the Geneva Conventions. Criminalising 
conduct by way of treaty is relatively straightforward. A treaty will not only 
envisage a definition of the proscribed conduct, but will also spell out the 
obligations incumbent upon state parties as regards jurisdiction (like obligation 
to criminalise in domestic law or to prosecute or extradite). Yet the importance 
of multilateral treaties resides also in their relation to custom: whether the treaty 
reflects existing customary law or whether it constitutes progressive 
development of the law poses significant questions in relation to non-parties to 
the treaty. However there is a paradox, in that the larger the number of parties 
to a treaty, custom tends to become irrelevant, as it tends to fall in line with the 
treaty.^^ This has been the case of the Geneva Conventions, which are now 
generally recognised to constitute customary law. 
Some of the problems involved in criminalising conduct through customary law, 
such as lack of specificity, have already been anticipated, but there are 
additional aspects. These relate to the constitutive elements of customary law: 
T. Meron, 'International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities' (1995) 89 AJIL 554, 573. 
^^ibid 565. 
R. Baxter, 'Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law' (1965-
66) 41 BYIL 275. 
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widespread and uniform state practice and evidence of opinio juris. In relation to 
crimes under customary law, there is arguably a need to weigh the requisite of 
opinio juris against state practice. This has been the case for war crimes. 
Because of their connection to international humanitarian law, there are a 
number of considerations that apply to war crimes. International humanitarian 
law is mainly a preventive law, rather than a law for the prosecution of offenders. 
As a preventive law, international humanitarian law is a law of negative 
obligations. It is therefore necessary to give added weight to the element of 
opinio juris in the absence of a known uniform and widespread state practice. 
The Tadic Decision submitted the argument of the importance of opinio juris for 
violations of international humanitarian law. In the Decision, the reasons alleged 
for paying more attention to formal rules rather than to actual practice were 
described as the difficulty encountered in discerning state practice, a difficulty 
exacerbated by the impossibility of finding out precisely what went on in the field 
in the event of an armed c o n f l i c t E v e n t s in the field are difficult to discern not 
least because of propaganda and misinformation encouraged by participants. 
The argument that opinio juris must be taken into account more than actual 
practice has been supported by a few a u t h o r s , a n d is not unheard of in the 
field of human rights. The argument maintains that actual deviation from 
international human rights law cannot be characterised as practice evidencing 
law, but rather that it should be regarded as violations of the law; human rights 
law is also a law of negative obligations, were the obligation is posed on states 
not to violate human rights. For example, it is submitted by human rights 
lawyers that the widespread occurrence of torture (committed by state officials, 
as definition in the 1984 Torture Convention goes) is not an example of state 
practice. That states condemn in no unclear terms the occurrence of torture, is 
evidence of opinio juris, which in this case outweighs practice. 
Yet the differences between human rights law and international humanitarian 
law soon become apparent. In international humanitarian law, for the case of 
provisions that envisage individual criminal responsibility, an area of 
convergence with international criminal law, the negative obligation is posed on 
Tadic Decision par.99. 
T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: 
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individuals, not on states. For this reason, violations of international 
humanitarian law involve the international criminal responsibility of those 
responsible, whilst violations of human rights law do not (there are exceptions, 
such as the case of torture under the terms of the 1984 Torture Convention). 
Moreover in international humanitarian law, there are additional positive 
obligations posed on states, such as the obligation to search for, to prosecute 
and extradite and to train troops in the provisions of the law of armed conflict. 
To what extent can the same rule of giving pre-eminence to opinio juris be said 
to apply? Is the absence of national prosecutions evidence of state practice? 
Though this is possible, these positive obligations are for the most part spelt out 
in treaties, so that deviant practice will constitute examples of violation of the 
terms of the treaty. 
Reliance on opinio juris in determining customary law has ultimately to be 
weighed against a finding on individual criminal responsibility. One would think 
that the burden of proof in these cases would be higher than the evidence 
provided by statements by government officials and military manuals. 
Greenwood is of the opinion that when the German military manual establishes 
that grave breaches apply to internal armed conflicts it is an expression of 
German policy rather than anything else.^^ This highlights the difficulty in 
distinguishing between evidence of opinio juris and that which is not in the 
absence of clear state practice. Therefore we can again hint at the tension 
between the need to rely on opinio juris and the need not to violate the principle 
of legality. This tension will be further exacerbated in relation to the elements of 
the crimes, where customary law is not sufficiently specific due to lack of 
practice. This tension will be inherent throughout, in the problems found 
between doing things by international law (the whole process of making conduct 
criminal by international law, in particular customary law) and the need to 
respect the principle of legality. 
It seems relevant at this point to suggest that other sources can prove 
enlightening as evidence of opinio juris. These are Resolutions of the Security 
Council, including the annexed Statutes of International Tribunals. The Ad Hoc 
Tribunals have also made extensive use of the writings of authors. Also relevant 
Clarendon Press, 1989) 
n.42, 276. 
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are the decisions by these Tribunals, particularly as the decisions of the Appeals 
Chamber bind the Trial Chambers, and that the Appeals Chamber tends to 
follow its own decisions. In particular I will be looking at the Tadic Decision, 
which is significant for the purpose of this thesis because it confirms the 
development of the criminalisation of violations of international humanitarian law 
in internal armed conflict.®^ 
^°Note: throughout this work I speak about the 'criminalisation of violations of 
international humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts' and the 'criminalisation of 
violations of international humanitarian law (committed) in internal conflicts'. Though 
aware that they mean different things, I will use them interchangeably because the 
customary development has affected both the standards applicable to internal conflict 
and the criminality of those standards. Section 2.2. 
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P A R T O N E : T H E P R O C E S S O F CRIMINALISING O F F E N C E S IN 
I N T E R N A L C O N F L I C T S 
Chapter 2: The Tadic Decision 
2.1 Introduction to Part One 
Part One will describe the way in which states make conduct criminal in 
international law, by focusing on the process that criminalised violations of 
international humanitarian law in internal armed conflict. No conduct, whether 
an act or an omission, is inherently criminal. It is only the law that makes it 
criminal. For war crimes, it is international or domestic law. In some instances, 
it is both; this is the case of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 
Moreover, it has also been highlighted previously how states may decide to 
forbear criminalising conduct in international law and simply create an obligation 
on states to do so in national law. This manner of rendering conduct criminal 
does not occupy us at present: I will concentrate on war crimes as crimes 
against international law. As crimes against international law, the source of the 
criminal standard is found in international law. As will be discussed below, in the 
present case we will be dealing with customary law. 
Thus this Part will focus on the customary development of violations of 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. Describing this 
process encounters some difficulties because due to the absence of a central 
legislator the substantive definitions of the offences have not developed in a 
consistent manner. This Part will explain how the process unfolded. It will place 
particular emphasis on the Tadic Decision, which represented the first judicial 
determination that confirmed that this process had taken place. The Tadic 
Decision also ascertained the jurisdiction of the ICTY over offences committed in 
internal conflicts, and this in turn meant the crystallisation of the legal regime 
belonging to these offences in proceedings before the Tribunal and at a later 
date before the ICTR. I will look at the implications of the Tadic Decision in Part 
Two. 
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2.2 The 'two- box' approach to international humanitarian law and the 
customary development of the law applicable to internal armed conflicts 
It is maintained that there has been a customary law development of the 
international humanitarian law applicable to intemal armed conflict. Previously 
international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts had been 
neglected in comparison to the law that applied to international conflicts. It is 
worth noting that the authors speak in terms of a 'reform' or a 'development'.'' 
They do not talk about emergence of the law. The presumption behind this 
terminology is that the law was already there, whether in treaty or in customary 
form, and it has been transformed in relation to internal armed conflicts. 
It is useful at this stage to draw a distinction between the development of 
appropriate standards to apply to internal armed conflicts -such as common 
Article 3^ and Additional Protocol II, and as will be noted some Hague law rules-
and the development of criminality for breaches of these standards. Following 
this distinction, it is possible to conclude that the development of the 
international humanitarian law for internal armed conflicts has responded to a 
two-tier transformation. In the first place, standards that used only to apply to 
international conflicts have been extended to cover internal conflicts (Hague law 
rules). In the second place individual criminal responsibility for breaches of 
these and other standards (such as those that already made reference to 
internal conflicts, but which did not envisage criminal responsibility for violations, 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II) has been developed. Thus the 
development with respect to internal conflicts has occurred in both standards 
and criminality. 
Before this development in the law, the regulation of conduct in internal conflicts 
had been sparser in comparison to the regulation of international conflicts. This 
held true for both standards applicable to internal conflicts and for criminality of 
breaches of these standards. 'Indeed, only since the mid- 1990s has there been 
a clear tendency and a direct movement to reduce the distinctions between civil 
^ 'Reform' suggests a considered and careful project, and this has not been the case. 
^ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, n.35 in Ch.1. In footnotes it will appear 
as CA3. 
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wars and international wars'.^ The difference in regulation between the two 
types of conflicts had become known as the 'two- box' approach to international 
humanitarian law. One big box for international conflicts and a smaller box for 
internal conflicts. As will be demonstrated below, with the development of 
customary law, the differences between the two have been bridged; though this 
approach has not been superseded. What interests at present is finding the 
reasoning behind the previous regime, whereupon internal conflicts were largely 
overlooked. Fewer standards were applicable to internal conflicts, why? In 
particular as regards the main focus of this thesis, why were violations of the 
standards applicable to internal armed conflicts not deemed crimes? An 
historical overview is necessary to understand the previous regime and the 
actual development. 
Since the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War there has been a trend 
away from the need for formal declarations in armed conflicts. Thus, there was 
a movement away from declarations of 'war' and 'belligerency' as the 
appropriate legal categories, dependent in large measure on the declarations of 
states, to the objective facts of 'international' or 'internal' 'armed conflict'. The 
development consisted of the following: whereas before the question 'is there an 
armed conflict?' depended largely on the declarations by states, now-a-days this 
question is answerable by reference to objective criteria, in particular as 
concerns the application of international humanitarian law. There are caveats to 
this assertion that will be considered below. 
Yet the movement away from formal declarations also meant that in case of an 
internal armed conflict, the state lost the monopoly of deciding when violence in 
its territory amounted to a conflict regulated by rules of international law. The 
1974- 1977 Diplomatic Conference, which adopted the Additional Protocols,'' did 
so with a view to reaffirming the regime of objective determination of the 
existence of an 'armed conflict'. 'Thus the impetus behind (...) the Diplomatic 
Conference in this regard was to (...) to develop objective criteria which would 
not be dependent on the subjective judgements of the parties'.^ 
^ K. D. Askin, 'Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court' (1999) 
lOCrim. LF 33, 57. 
^ Additional Protocol I and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Anned Conflicts of 
1977 (Additional Protocol II). In footnotes they will appear as API and APIl respectively. 
^ Rutaganda Judgement par.92. 
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As evidenced in the debates of the 1974- 1977 Diplomatic Conference, some 
states felt uneasy about applying internationally recognised rules to intemal 
armed conflict.^ There are three motives for this, and these motives in turn 
explain the marginal development of the law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts in comparison to that applied to international conflicts. 
In the first place states feared that by having objective criteria which determine 
the moment when international humanitarian law applies, the application of such 
law would grant the rebels legal status under international law. This fear stems 
from the basic inequality between warring parties in internal conflicts. One of 
the parties will be the government of the state; as the state it will enjoy legal 
personality in international law. This will not be the case for the rebel group, 
which will have no international legal status, and states want to keep it that 
way.^ The inequality between warring parties results in that 'states are willing to 
accept more detailed restrictions in the conduct of international armed conflict, 
between, legally speaking, sovereign equals than in the conduct of internal 
armed conflict where the warring factions are the established government and 
rebel groups which challenge the right of the government to exercise control 
over some or all of the state's territory'.^ In this sense states were not reassured 
by the wording in common Article 3, whereupon its application 'shall not affect 
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict'. 
As a direct consequence of the inequality between warring parties, states have 
been reluctant to criminalise violations of the law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts because they have preferred to deal with rebels through national 
criminal law rather than apply international standards. Chances are that if a 
state does not wish to grant the rebels any level of recognition it is because it 
regards the fighting as terrorism, and will therefore apply provisions of its own 
^ F. Kalshoven, "Protocol II, the CDDH and Colombia" in K. Wellens (ed). International 
Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998). 
^ National liberation movements, on the other hand, can make a unilateral declaration 
under Article 96 of API to bring into force the Geneva Conventions and API to national 
liberation wars. Yet no liberation movement has seriously attempted the required 
declaration, 'perhaps because it would have had difficulty accepting and carrying out all 
the obligations stated in the Protocol'. T. Meron, 'The Time Has Come for the United 
States to ratify Geneva Protocol I' (1994) 88 AJIL 678, 683. 
® W. J. Fenrick, 'Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes' (1999) 37 
Columbia JTL 767. 770. 
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criminal law involving charges on treason, terrorism or organised crime.^ Thus 
there is a clear disadvantage for the state in accepting international regulation. 
Because, whilst only some of the government forces' conduct will violate 
domestic law, all the rebel's conduct violates national law. International 
regulation of the conflict will mean that there are things that rebels can 
legitimately do to the government. This in turn will result in that the application 
of international standards to the internal conflict implies some degree of equality 
between government force and rebel force. For third states it is a different 
matter altogether; 'in the event of a non- international armed conflict, states not 
party to it [the internal conflict] would most probably be little inclined to exercise 
this competence [penal repression of war crimes] for fear of being accused of 
interfering in the internal affairs of the State in which the conflict has broken 
out'.^° Finally, the idea of having internationally recognised standards to deal 
with rebel contenders was viewed by some states as interference in the internal 
affairs of the state (and hence violating national sovereignty). In addition, 
international regulation of internal conflicts could also provide an excuse for bad 
faith intervention from third parties. Yet the language of Additional Protocol II 
does not leave much scope for abuse. 
In practice, however, and regardless of the preceding considerations, if a state 
wished to deny that the violence occurring within its territory amounted to an 
internal armed conflict, there was little opportunity to contest its judgement, still 
less to obtain an authoritative decision as to whether or not it were correct. 
Furthermore, in the matter of internal conflicts, third states tend to keep their 
own counsel. The threshold of applicability of Protocol II is in practice very high. 
Moreover, Additional Protocol II applies to rebels if they can comply with these 
conditions. Yet, from a different perspective, international regulation imposes 
conditions upon the rebels that they might find difficult to accept in practice. Do 
rebels really want to fight fairly? Not fighting fairly constitutes in some cases 
what advantage they might have. In any case if they refused to take advantage 
of the protection provided by Additional Protocol II, they could be breaching 
^ The Prosecutor of the ICTY had been seeking 'to examine whether there was "an 
armed conflict" underway in Kosovo. If so, alleged crimes would then fall under the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Belgrade in turn disputes this and argues "a legitimate fight 
against terrorism". Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Tribunal Update: Last 
Week in The Hague no.117 (15- 20 March 1999). 
^°n.13in Ch.1,417. 
Article 3(2) of APII. 
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international humanitarian law, but they might still be punished less harshly than 
if these standards did not apply (for they would be punished for fighting, under 
national criminal law). 
If all these obstacles stood in the way of the codification of law applicable to 
internal armed conflicts, what has changed that has allowed for the development 
of standards and for the criminalisation of violations? There are two reasons. In 
the first place, international humanitarian law was designed to deal with inter-
state conflict, that is, with conflict between two legal equals. Yet at present the 
majority of conflicts is internal and takes place within the territory of a single 
state between government forces and rebel-contenders, or even between 
different rebel factions. In view of this reality in the field, law has adapted, 
mostly through custom. In connection with this new reality, the sheer 
concentration of diplomatic effort has facilitated the criminalisation of internal 
atrocities. In this way Wedgwood is of the opinion that internal armed conflicts 
provided 'the moral impetus for the negotiation of a Rome treaty'.""^ 
The second reason is the development of human rights law. Human rights apply 
irrespective of nationality, and this has had an impact on those provisions in 
international conflict that envisage the protection of some persons, but not of 
other, depending on their nationality (eg grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions). The development of human rights law has been taking place 
since the first efforts at standard setting within the UN. But having finalised the 
standard setting process, the focus is now on the enforcement of these 
standards. Cnminal law constitutes a means of enforcement, hence the newly 
found drive for the criminalisation of internal atrocities. 
If the new reality is one where internal conflicts predominate, and if human rights 
law has had regard for the application of standards regardless of nationality 
requisites, how has international humanitarian law adapted to this new set of 
circumstances? The Appeals Chamber for the ICTY confirmed the development 
of applicable standards for internal armed conflicts in the Tadic Decision. Yet 
the Tadic Decision also illustrated that there has not been an unequivocal, single 
way by which international law has developed these standards for internal 
12 R. Wedgwood, 'The International Criminal Court: An American View' (1999) 10 EJIL 
93, 101. 
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conflicts. 'The emergence of international rules governing internal strife has 
occurred at two different levels: at the level of customary law and at that of treaty 
law (...) the interplay between these two sets of rules is such that some treaty 
rules have gradually become part of customary law'.^^ The development of 
norms to apply to internal conflicts has taken many guises; with particular 
reference to customary law, Meron explains that 'there are several ways that 
customary law strategies can figure... in the evolution of this law'. 
First, rules initially stated in treaty provisions governing nonintemational 
armed conflicts, such as common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 11, 
can be transformed into customary law. Second, through customary 
law, some rules have also been recognised as norms whose violation 
gives rise to individual criminal responsibility (...) Third, general 
principles first developed for international wars, such as proportionality 
and necessity, may be extended through customary law to civil wars. 
Fourth, prohibitions on certain weapons and means of warfare (...) are 
gradually being applied to internal armed conflicts through customary 
law, as well as through the more visible process of treaty making.""^ 
Thus it has been noted how in the development of standards to apply to internal 
conflicts there has been interplay between treaty and customary law. On the 
other hand, the development of criminality for breaches of these standards (i.e. 
the question as to whether the standards are criminal in international law), has 
come about entirely by customary law 'because none of the treaties governing 
internal conflicts set up rules of international criminal law'."*^ Moreover, there is 
no evidence of amendments to these treaties. 
International humanitarian law has developed to apply to internal conflicts. Yet 
this development has been limited. There is no suggestion that the 'two-box' 
approach to international humanitarian law standards and to criminality of these 
standards has been abandoned. If only, the 'traditional dichotomy between 
'This holds true for CA3 (...), but also applies to Article 19 of the Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, 
and, (...), to the core of APII.' Tacf/'c Decision par.98. 
T. Meron, 'The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formulation of International 
Humanitarian Law' (1996) 90 AJIL 238, 244 
C. Warbrick, 'International Criminal Law' (1995) 4 ICLQ 466, 469. 
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international wars and civil strife' has been blurred.""^ There has been no 
immediate adaptation to internal armed conflict of the standards applicable to 
international armed conflict. They are adapted to internal armed conflict in a 
two-tier manner as reflected by the Tadic case: 
Two particular limitations may be noted: (i) only a number of rules and 
principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually been 
extended to apply to internal conflicts; and (ii) this extension has not 
taken place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules 
to internal conflicts; rather, the general essence of those rules, and not 
the detailed regulation they may contain, has become applicable to 
internal conflicts.'''' 
The development of criminality for these standards is less easily catalogued; it is 
rather a matter of taking into consideration whether the standards presently 
applicable to internal conflicts customarily entail individual criminal responsibility 
for the perpetrator of the violation. As I will note below, the 'two- box' approach 
to the international humanitarian law standards applicable to internal and to 
international conflicts, and the finding as to whether the standards are criminal, 
has derived in a 'two- box' approach to individual culpability. For the moment, 
there remains the question about the relationship between these vague 
principles of application of the law (i and ii) and the principle of legality in 
criminal law. The difficulty in reconciling these is compounded by the need 
expressed by the Appeals Chamber to rely on the opinio juris in an attempt to 
discover the present state of customary law applicable to internal conflicts. 
The difficulty in discovering the present state of customary law pertains, in the 
first place, to absence of clear state practice. The Tadic Decision circumvented 
the paucity of state practice by instead heavily relying on the requirement of 
opinio juris. In the second place, to proving the existence of practice in the 
instances where there is interplay between treaty and custom, 'where there 
exists a prior multilateral treaty which has been adopted by the vast majority of 
States. The evidence of State practice outside of the treaty, providing evidence 
of separate customary norms or the passage of the conventional norms into the 
Tadic Decision par.83. 
ibid par.126. 
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realms of custom, is rendered increasingly elusive, for it would appear that only 
the practice of non-parties to the treaty can be considered as relevant'.""^ 
The initial distinction between the development of standards applicable to 
internal armed conflict, and the development of criminality for breaches of these 
standards is useful to discriminate what constitutes the main focus of this 
chapter. While there have been developments in the standards applicable to 
internal armed conflicts and in the criminalisation of the violation of some of 
these standards, it is only the latter which is of direct concern to this thesis. The 
development of criminality for breaches of these standards illustrates that 
previously these prohibitions at most entailed state responsibility. There is thus 
a difference between mere prohibitions and crimes. 
The conceptual difference between mere prohibitions and crimes is that the 
latter entail the criminal responsibility of individuals responsible for their 
violation. For instance, grave breaches are specifically made criminal in the 
Geneva Conventions regime. Initially, violations of the law applicable to internal 
armed conflict, essentially common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, did not 
entail individual criminal responsibility. Evidence for this fact is provided in 
statements made by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
Plattner, a member of the Legal Division of the ICRC wrote in 1990 that 
international humanitarian law 'applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
does not provide for international penal responsibility of persons guilty of 
violations'.^^ As early as 1993, the ICRC in its Preliminary Remarks on Setting 
up an International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia underlined 'the fact that, 
according to humanitarian law as it stands today, the notion of war crimes is 
limited to situations of international armed conflicts'.^° As noted by the Tadic 
Decision, law today stands differently. 
As to the actual significance of the criminalisation of violations of the law 
applicable to internal armed conflicts, perhaps one had better wait and see. 
They have been included as war crimes within the ICC Statute. Yet it will be 
indicative to look at actual prosecutions on these crimes, rather than just 
charges, in particular with respect to the ICTR. At present it is necessary to look 
®^ Ce/e£)/c/Judgement paras.302-303. 
n.13 in Ch.1, 414. 
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at the decision by the ICTY that confirms the development of criminalisation of 
offences in internal conflicts. 
2.3 The Tadic Decision 
The Tadic Decision was the first decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY. Of the three grounds of appeal, I am only interested in the ground 
concerning the Defence's contention that the Tribunal lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to hear the charges. I will be looking at this argument in particular 
with respect to violations of international humanitarian law committed in internal 
armed conflicts. 
The first finding by the Appeals Chamber concerned the existence of an armed 
conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time the alleged conduct 
took place.^^ The Appeals Chamber needed to ascertain the existence of an 
armed conflict as a requisite to apply the relevant A r t i c l e . U n d e r the Statute of 
the ICTY, the existence of an armed conflict is a requisite for Article 2 (grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions), Article 3 (serious violations of the laws 
and customs of war) and Article 5 (crimes against h u m a n i t y ) . I t is not a 
requisite for a finding under Article 4 (genocide), but at the moment of writing, 
the ICTY has not convicted any accused of this crime. 
Cited in the Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Tadic Decision par.9 
The ICTY has coined a definition of armed conflict. 'An armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups 
within a State'. Tadic Decision par.70. This definition has played a significant role; it 
encompasses both internal and international conflicts in one definition, so that the 
character of the conflict need not be determined to satisfy the preliminary condition of 
the existence of an armed conflict. This is important for Articles 3 and 5, which apply 
irrespective of the internal or international character of the conflict. To date the Tribunal 
has always found the existence of an anned conflict; it has not faced the issue of a 
minimum threshold. In relation to the situation in Kosovo before NATO intervened; the 
Prosecutor seems confident that she will be able to demonstrate at least an internal 
armed conflict, for she has charged Milosevic and associates with crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. The Prosecutor v Slodoban 
Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Nikola Sainovic, Dagoljub Ojdanic, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, 
Indictment, Case No IT-99-37 (22 May 1999). 
Articles of the ICTY and the ICTR Statute will appear in bold, but not Articles of the 
ICC Statute. 
This poses a limitation in relation to the definition of crimes against humanity in 
customary law. Tadic Decision par. 141. 
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In finding that there was an armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber in Tadic did 
not decide on whether it was international or internal. However, it must at this 
point be understood that the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber was not 
inevitable, as it could from the start have treated the conflict as international. 
Many commentators believed from the outset that the conflict was international: 
'the offences listed in Articles 2 and 3 of the Yugoslavia Statute (...) indicate 
that the Security Council considered the armed conflict in Yugoslavia as 
international. The facts on the ground and the applicable rules of international 
law strongly support this conclusion.'^^ Yet the Appeals Chamber was reluctant 
to characterise the conflict as either internal or international, for the character of 
the hostilities was far from clear. 'One is tempted to cut the Gordian knot and 
simply argue that all the fighting that occurred in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 was part of one large international armed 
conflict. It is difficult, however, to fit all the fighting into such a framework.'^^ 
Judge Sidwha rightly considered that the character of the conflict 'was a mixed 
question of law and fact' to be determined in the conduct of proceedings." 
Hence the Appeals Chamber left the character of the conflict to be decided at 
the trial stage on the basis of factual evidence. Of greater importance at present 
is the finding by the Appeals Chamber that for international humanitarian law to 
apply, 'it is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities 
occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the 
c o n f l i c t ' . T h e conduct under consideration satisfied this requirement.^^ 
See Jelisic Judgement. 
n.54 in Ch.1, 556. A similar view in G. H. Aidrich, 'Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' (1996) 90 AJIL 64. 
W. J. Fenrick, 'The Application of the Geneva Conventions by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia' (1999) no.834 IRRC (web version) 317. 
Separate Opinion of Judge Sidwha on the Tadic Decsion par. 121. 
^® Tadic Decision par.70. 
Unlike the ICTR, the ICTY has always found that the conduct satisfies the nexus to 
the armed conflict. The exception might be found in conduct that constitutes an ordinary 
crime. Prosecutor Caria del Ponte, when asked after the crimes committed against 
Serbs in Kosovo: 'we don't have jurisdiction, these are ordinary crimes. The limits of 
jurisdiction cannot be ignored'. El Pais (7 February 2000). 
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What did the Tadic Decision resolve exactly as to the object of this inquiry? The 
Appeals Chamber decided the following: 
1. Serious violations of common Article 3 entail the individual criminal 
responsibility of the perpetrator in customary law. The same goes for other 
customary rules and principles on the protection of victims of internal armed 
conflict (par. 134). The ICTY has jurisdiction over these offences under 
Article 3 (violations of the laws and customs of war) of the Statute (par. 89). 
2. Breaches in internal conflict of some customary law principles and rules 
concerning the means and methods of combat entail individual criminal 
responsibility (par. 134) and come within the jurisdiction of the ICTY by virtue 
of Article 3 of the Statute (par. 89). 
How did the Appeals Chamber arrive at this conclusion? The answer lies in the 
finding by the Appeals Chamber concerning its jurisdiction under Article 3. 
Much turned on its reasoning to this effect and thus I will make a detailed 
analysis. The Chamber made two observations with respect to Article 3. 'A 
literal interpretation of Article 3 shows that: (i) it refers to a broad category of 
offences, namely all "violations of the laws or customs of war"; and (ii) the 
enumeration of some of these violations provided in Article 3 is merely 
illustrative, not exhaustive.'^° 
The first observation conveyed that Article 3 is not merely an incorporation of 
the 1907 Regulations annexed to the IV Hague Convention on Land Warfare, 
and which apply to international conflicts.^'' It is broader in content. Article 3 
employs the expression 'laws and customs of war': 
The expression "violations of the laws or customs of war" is a traditional 
term of art used in the past, when the concepts of "war" and "laws of 
warfare" still prevailed, before they were largely replaced by two broader 
notions: (i) that of "armed conflict", essentially introduced by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions; and (ii) the correlative notion of "international law 
30 Tadic Decision par.87. 
Hague Convention Re 
Hague Convention) and Annexed Regulations. 
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (IV 
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of armed conflict", or the more recent and comprehensive notion of 
"international humanitarian law".^^ 
The Appeals Chamber found that the Secretary-General's Report warranted this 
conclusion.^^ In addition, the Chamber went on to clarify that 'the more recent 
and comprehensive' notion of international humanitarian law 'govems the 
conduct of both internal and international armed conflicts'.^'' Moreover, it argued 
that international humanitarian law covers both Hague and Geneva law. 
The latter conclusion is confirmed by the second observation made by the 
Appeals Chamber in respect to the scope of Article 3. Article 3 is not an 
exhaustive enumeration of crimes, but is merely illustrative; it 'shall include, but 
shall not be limited to' the enumerated offences. Thus though Article 3 only 
expressly includes Hague law, because it is not exhaustive, the Chamber 
suggested 'that Article 3 is intended to cover both Geneva and Hague rules.'^^ 
The final reasoning on the scope of Article 3 results from the previous 
observations. Bearing in mind that the term 'violations of the laws and customs 
of war' refers to the broader notion of international humanitarian law, and taking 
into consideration that Article 3 is not exhaustive, the Chamber concluded that 
the list in Article 3 'may be construed to include other infringements of 
international humanitarian law'.^^ We shall see below what these infringements 
are, but given the all-embracing notion of international humanitarian law, they 
will include violations of the law applicable to internal and to international 
conflicts, and breaches of both Geneva and Hague law. 
Yet the two observations on Article 3 were not of themselves sufficient to arrive 
at the ratio decidendi described earlier. In order to reach this conclusion, the 
Appeals Chamber first employed a systematic interpretation of the Statute. 
Such interpretation emphasised 'the fact that various provisions, in spelling out 
the purpose and tasks of the International Tribunal or in defining its functions, 
refer to "serious violations" of "international humanitarian law". It is therefore 
appropriate to take the expression "violations of the laws or customs of war" to 
Tadic Decision par. 87. 
Report of the Secretary-General n.38 in Ch.1 par.41. 
Tadic Decision par.67. 
ibid par.87. 
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cover serious violations of international humanitarian law'.^'' Secondly, it 
adopted a teleological approach to the Statute; it found that 'the Security Council 
established the International Tribunal with the stated purpose of bringing to 
justice persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law in the former Yugoslavia'.^^ Taking this to be the Security Council's aim, 'if 
correctly interpreted. Article 3 fully realises the primary purpose of the 
establishment of the International Tribunal, that is, not to leave unpunished any 
person guilty of any such serious violation, whatever the context within which it 
may have been committed'. The systematic and the teleological interpretation of 
the Statute further sustained the Chamber's view of Article 3 'as a residual 
clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of international humanitarian 
law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal'. 
The sole limitation as to the otherwise very broad scope of Article 3 is that 
violations contained therein must not already be covered by other Articles of the 
Statue. Hence violations of Article 3 must not already be covered by the 
provisions on grave breaches, crimes against humanity and g e n o c i d e . T h u s 
the Chamber reasoned that Article 3 included: i) violations to the Hague 
Conventions in international conflicts, ii) infringements of non- grave breaches 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, iii) violations of common Article 3 and 
other customary rules on internal conflicts and iv) violations of agreements 
between parties to the conflict considered qua treaty law."^ 
The residual character of Article 3, and the ability of the Tribunal to exercise 
jurisdiction over a broad range of offences by virtue of it, has since been 
confirmed by decisions of the Trial Chambers. This is not surprising inasmuch 
as the Trial Chambers are bound by decisions from the Appeals Chamber. Of 
particular interest on the other hand is the Decision on the Joint Defence Motion 
to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction in the Kordic and 
Cercez case, for even though it confirms the nature of Article 3 as a residual 





^° ibid par.89. 
ibid par.89. 
Kordic and Cercez Decision par.22. 
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was of the opinion that violations of the laws and customs of war constitute war 
crimes. 'Violations of the laws or customs of war encompass what is called "war 
crimes" in contemporary customary law. It follows that the term "Violations of the 
laws or customs of war" cannot be limited to "Hague Law". It is encompassed in 
the larger "generic" term of "war crimes".''^ 
In determining that violations of the laws and customs of war are war crimes, the 
Kordic and Cercez Decision took the further step that the Tadic Decision did not, 
though it was the logical conclusion to be inferred from the reasoning in the 
Tadic Decision. If 'laws and customs of war' is the traditional term for 
international humanitarian law, then violations of laws and customs of war are 
violations of international humanitarian law; the latter are known as 'war 
crimes'.'*'' The reason the Tadic Decision did not take this step is that the 
Statute of the Tribunal does not at any point mention war crimes. Yet Article 85 
of Additional Protocol I explicitly makes the connection between grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes. However, the Tadic Decision does 
not mention Additional Protocol I. On the other hand, it is not until Article 8 of 
the Statute of the ICC that the term 'war crimes' is used with reference to 
violations of international humanitarian law. 
Notwithstanding its character as a residual clause, the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Decision posed the conditions that must be met for a violation to be 
subject to Article 3."^ They are the following four conditions: 
1. the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law 
2. the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the 
required conditions must be met 
3. the violation must be serious, that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a 
rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave 
consequences for the victim 
4. The violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, 




The Tribunal further decided that 'it follows that it does not matter whether the 
'serious violation' has occurred within the context of an international or an 
internal armed conflict as long as these requirements are met'. 
However this reasoning is not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, there 
is a strong suspicion of circular reasoning. Secondly, it seems to take away the 
requisite for Article 3 of determining whether the conflict in question is an 
internal or an international conflict. This will not be the case if the required 
conditions mentioned in (ii) are the existence of an international conflict, or the 
existence of an internal conflict. I will indicate in the following chapters how 
common Article 3 has been interpreted by the Tribunal to apply irrespective of 
the character of the conflict. I will also mention that, when rooting charges in 
mirror provisions of the Additional Protocols (as subsequently understood to 
come under Article 3) determining the character of the conflict will mean that 
one applies, but not the other. So whilst on the face of it the Chamber is 
suggesting that, in respect to Article 3, the substantive laws that apply to both 
internal and to international conflict are the same, this has to be understood in 
the context of the Statute as a whole; international conflicts will be dealt with 
under Article 2, the grave breaches provision. There is also a need to bear in 
mind the two limitations mentioned earlier in relation to the application to internal 
conflicts of standards applicable to international conflicts. 
Of the four conditions to be met, two involve questions of fact and must be 
resolved at the trial stage. These are the requisites that the violation must be of 
a rule of international humanitarian law rule and that the violation has to be 
serious. The former requisite derives from Article 1 of the Statute, which sets 
out the jurisdiction (temporal, geographical and material) of the ICTY. The latter 
is a problematic requisite, for determining what constitutes a 'serious' violation is 
bound to face questions of legal certainty. 
An example will illustrate how the requisite of a 'serious violation' works in 
practice. In the Celebici case, the accused were charged with plunder, a 
violation of the laws and customs of war under Article 3(e) of the Statute, for the 
appropriation of money and other valuables belonging to detainees. The Trial 
Chamber decided that the conduct in question constituted plunder, which was 
''^ Tadic Decision par.94. 
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an offence under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by virtue of Article 3. Yet the 
alleged conduct did not satisfy the 'serious violation' requisite of Article 1. The 
Tadic Decision sets out the test that needs to be satisfied for a violation to be 
serious.'*^ The Celebici Judgement followed this test: for a violation to be 
serious it has to 1. breach a rule that protects important values and 2. have 
grave consequences for the victims. The Chamber decided that the conduct in 
question satisfied the first condition but not the second one.''^ It is interesting to 
compare this to the Kunarac Decision where the conduct was also charged as 
plunder by the Prosecutor, but was considered an ordinary crime by the 
Chamber.'*^ The importance (and the difficulty) of distinguishing war crimes from 
ordinary crimes has already been mentioned. Yet both the Celebici Judgement 
and the Kunarac Decision arrived at the same conclusion: that the conduct in 
question did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (in the first case 
because it was not a serious violation, although it constituted the war crime of 
plunder, in the second case because it was an ordinary crime, not a war crime). 
The different outcome can be justified in that the charge of plunder in the 
Kunarac Decision concerned a single instance, whilst the conduct in the Celebici 
case was a recurrent practice. 
The other two requirements for a violation to be subject to Article 3, however, 
can be used in general to find out which violations of international humanitarian 
law applicable to internal armed conflict have been criminalised in customary 
law. Carrying out a test on the basis of these two requirements has become 
subsequently known as the Tadic test. It is significant that the ICTR used this 
test in its first contentious case to find out whether the offences contained in 
Article 4 of its Statute satisfied the principle of legality or whether they actually 
constituted retrospective application of criminal law.''^ This test was also applied 
by the Chamber in the Kordic and Cercez Decision, when the Chamber found 
'that the relevant main issue as to the scope of Article 3 of the Statute at this 
stage, is, as stated in the Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, whether 
the relevant norms are customary in nature, and whether they entail individual 
criminal responsibility'.^° 
ibid par.94. 
'^ '^  Ce/e/)/c/Judgement par.1154. 
'It is inappropriate to include within that term (plunder) a theft from only one person or 
from only a few persons in the one building'. Kunarac Decision par. 16. 
The Akayeshu Judgement is discussed in section 3.3. 
^° Kordic and Cercez Decision par. 17. 
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In the Tadic Decision, the Appeals Chamber exposed common Article 3 to this 
test. It also looked at whether principles on the limitation of means and method 
of warfare applicable to internal conflicts satisfied this test too. The obstacles for 
these were different than those for common Article 3. The main difficulty 
concerning common Article 3 was whether it entailed individual criminal 
responsibility for breaches of its provisions, whilst the hurdle on rules of means 
and methods of warfare was proving that these (which apply by treaty and by 
custom to international conflicts) had been extended through customary law to 
cover internal conflicts. Yet the Chamber found that both categories of offences 
satisfied the successive tests and were thus subject to Article 3. 
The difficulty with the Tadic test resides in the relationship between customary 
law and the principle of legality, which encompasses a possible defence of 
mistake of law. Though in this connection there is a need to take into account 
that the Tadic Decision did not explore the full range of Article 3 of the Statute, 
but rather the Appeals Chamber confined itself to findings on the Article 3 
charges against Tadic. Even so, the first objection to be poised to the reasoning 
in the 7acf/c Decision is its consequences for the principle of legality. Though it 
is an impeccable exercise in legal reasoning, the Tadic test may not have much 
to commend it for legal certainty. 
The tension between the principle of legality and customary law is further 
exacerbated in the Judgement by the 'factors relevant to deciding that authors of 
particular prohibitions incur individual responsibility'.^^ These are 1) the clear 
and unequivocal recognition of the rule of warfare in international law and 2) 
state practice indicating an intention to criminalise the prohibition.^^ It then 
goes on to find evidence for this intention in statements of government officials 
and punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals. Thus, in 
striving to discover the present state of customary law, the Appeals Chamber 
emphasised the opinio juris rather than relying on state practice. The argument 
that the Appeals Chamber violated the principle of legality by relying overtly on 
opinio juris has already been raised by the Defence in another case.^^ 
Tad/c Decision par. 128. 
My emphasis. 
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Though the Statute was drafted by the Secretary-General, it was adopted by the 
Security Council. Statements were made in the Security Council as to its 
precise interpretation. Much turned on the statement interpreting Article 3 
made by Madeleine Albright in the Security Council and the fact that other states 
did not oppose it. They did not affirm it either; another objection to the 
reasoning in the Tadic Decision is that if in effect the Appeals Chamber 
interpretation of Article 3 is what states meant, then why did they not make this 
meaning appear explicitly in the Statute. 'By nominating the offences which do 
fall within the authority of the tribunals, the members of the Security Council 
provide evidence of what they conceive to be the present state of international 
criminal law'.^"* In addition relying too much on statements, even if they are 
statements in the Security Council, highlights again the objection to over 
reliance on opinio juris to the detriment of actual state practice. 
The tension between customary law and the principle of legality, and the 
uncertainty derived from relying too on opinio juris for evidence of the state of 
the law must not take our eyes off the ball, though. The main issue is whether 
the Appeals Chamber in this judgement decided 'to the extent possible under 
existing international law'.^^ It is difficult to say.^^ To reinforce its case against 
any possible claim of retrospective application of the law, the Chamber decided 
that requirements of 'substantive justice and equity' were satisfied because the 
crimes contained in the Statute also appeared in the Criminal Code of the SFRY 
and of Bosnia- Herzegovina.^'' Justice was thus being rendered to the individual 
defendant, who as a national was aware, or should have been aware, that he 
was amenable to the jurisdiction of the national criminal courts for these 
v i o l a t i o n s . A n o t h e r device to reinforce the case against retrospectivity was 
offered by the Chamber under the guise of the agreements between the parties 
to apply international humanitarian law to the conflict. This might have been 
enough to answer an argument on retrospective application of the law, yet both 
the Tadic Decision and the Akayeshu Judgement felt compelled to look at the 
Kordic and Cercez Decision, par.7. 
15, 468. 
Tadic Decision par.77. 
The Defence in the Kordic and Cercez case maintained that 'the conclusion of the 
Appeals Chamber as to the residual character of Article 3, and its broad interpretation 
of the scope of Article 3, based on its interpretation of the term "international 
humanitarian law", is in violation of the principle of legality'. Kordic and Cercez Decision 
par.7. 
Tadic Decision par. 135. 
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customary nature of these provisions of international humanitarian law, and at 
whether their breach entailed criminal responsibility. 
Hence, notwithstanding the existence of national criminal law and agreements 
between the warring parties, the Appeals Chamber was intent on clarifying the 
state of customary law, and applying it. Total reliance on customary law is a 
direct consequence of the Report of the Secretary-General and the decisions by 
the Security Council. The Secretary-General justified reliance on customary law 
in the need to bind all parties, some of whom might not be parties to the relevant 
a g r e e m e n t s . Y e t why did the Security Council choose to rely on law that was 
beyond any doubt customary at the time? This is an important question. 
Because the Security Council made it clear that it wanted to set up a Court. 
This decision was no more or less political than any other decision taken by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII. But once it took the decision, if it wanted to 
establish a court to try criminal charges, there were some criteria that had to be 
met. The requirements make up the core of what it constitutes an independent 
court. Some of these requirements are objective, such as the need for 
independent judges. Other requirements concern the substantive law to be 
applied; the Court may try only offences that were established in law at the time 
they were committed. For the requirement of defined crimes it decided to 
employ existing ones in customary law. The Security Council was prompted by 
the wish to avoid been seen as legislating. If it hadn't complied with 
requirements such as pre-existing law or independent judges, it would not have 
been creating a court. Though as will be noted in the next chapter, the Statutes 
are not conclusive, for the Tribunals still have to determine that the provisions 
contained therein satisfy the principle of legality. 
If the Appeals Chamber was bound to apply existing law that was undoubtedly 
part of customary law, then a more rationalised interpretation of the Statute 
could have prevailed. After all, most of the legal consequences in 7ad/c stem 
from a premise that is open to question: that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
covers all serious violations of international humanitarian law not already 
covered by the other articles. 'Article 3 may be taken to cover all violations of 
ibid par. 135. 
Report of the Secretary-General n.38 in Ch.1 par.34. 
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international humanitarian law other than the "grave breaches" of the four 
Geneva Conventions falling under Article 2 (or, for that matter, the violations 
covered by Articles 4 and 5, to the extent that Articles 3, 4 and 5 overlap).^° 
The Chamber itself admitted that stemming from this interpretation Article 3 of 
the Statute would cover most of the conduct that the Tribunal would have to 
adjudicate on.^ "" 
The alternative interpretation would have kept Articles 2 and 3 applicable only 
to international conflicts, whilst Article 5 on crimes against humanity would deal 
also with internal armed conflicts, and Article 4 with situations in international 
armed conflict, internal armed conflict and peacetime. This interpretation was 
put forward by the Defence in the Kordic and Cercez D e c i s i o n . T h e Defence 
attacked the residual clause character of Article 3. 'The Security Council did 
not intend to criminalise through Article 3 of the statute all violations of 
international humanitarian law not covered by other subject-matter Articles of the 
s t a t u t e ' . I f it had, it would have said so. 'Article 3 is based on "Hague law" 
and does not mention the type of conflict it is applicable to: if the intention of the 
drafters of the Statute was to render it applicable also to internal armed conflicts, 
it would have been specifically mentioned, since "Hague law" is traditionally only 
applicable to international conflicts'.®'^ The Defence was challenging the 
application of Article 3 to internal conflicts.®^ The Defence arguments were 
dismissed by the Chamber. 
The main consequence of the 7acf/c Decision is the confirmation that offences 
committed in internal conflicts are criminal in international law. Though the 
previous alternative interpretation of the Statute has a number of advantages, it 
is also 'reasonable to presume that these courts will endeavour to find legally 
acceptable means to apply similar rules to similar conduct'.®® Tribunals will want 
to apply similar law to similar offence regardless of the context in which they 
were committed. The underlying logic, is the following: 'there is no moral 
justification, and no truly persuasive legal reason, for treating perpetrators of 
^° Tadic Decision par.87. 
n.10inCh.1,259. 






atrocities in internal conflicts more leniently than those engaged in international 
wa rs ' .No tw i t hs tand ing this, as will be noted below, far from annulling the 
distinction between internal and intemational conflicts, the Tadic Decision 
confirmed the character of the conflict as an element of the crimes. 
Though similar rules should apply to similar conduct, it will still be necessary to 
go through conflict classification, at least when charges on grave breaches are 
put forward. There seem to be few ways of avoiding characterising the conflict 
as internal or international in every individual case unless the Chamber had 
decided from the start that it was an intemational conflict.^^ The issue of the 
character of the conflict was not as crucial to the case in Tadic because the 
Prosecutor had placed the charges in the alternative. In the present state of 
affairs, it remains a mixed question of law and fact that will have to be evaluated 
at every instance it comes up. Thus, the practice of putting charges in the 
alternative will all but cease. 
A further consequence of the Tadic Decision has been a measure of legal 
uncertainty: there have been a considerable number of Defence Motions as 
regards subject-matter jurisdiction under Article 3. The full scope of Article 3 
has not been decided authoritatively. In addition, the only limitation that 
violations have to be 'serious' seems unsatisfactory. 
Finally, a possible conclusion based on the preceding analysis is that the 
decision in Tadic can be regarded as an instance of 'progressive development of 
the law rather than of crystallisation of the law'.^ ® Rather the case seems to 
have been one of extracting the maximum reach from the Statute in order to 
ascertain jurisdiction. For, if one were to accept that violations of international 
humanitarian law in internal conflicts have been criminalised, and bearing in 
mind the alternative interpretation suggested above, the question remains 
whether these offences come under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal at all. In 
addition, the Appeals Chamber was deciding more than the case at hand. The 
Appeals Chamber's interpretation of Article 3 bound the Tribunal.^° This 
n.54 in Ch.1, 561 
Unless it had decided that grave breaches apply to internal conflicts. Section 3.2. 
n.10 in Ch.1, 260. 
^° Kordic and Cercez Decision, par.12. 
45 
application of judicial method to claim jurisdiction over offences remains a 
possibility when you create an independent body. 
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P A R T TWO: T H E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F T H E P R O C E S S 
Chapter 3: C o n s e q u e n c e s for the Substantive Law Applicable by 
the International Tr ibunals (I) 
3.1 introduction to Part Two 
It has been illustrated in the previous chapter how the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Decision dispelled some of the doubt surrounding the criminalisation in 
customary law of violations of international humanitarian law in internal conflicts. 
Yet the pervasive influence of the Decision did not stop at this; the Appeals 
Chamber might not have anticipated some of the consequences of the Tadic 
Decision. This Part will illustrate the implications of the Tadic Decision for the 
law of war crimes. It will do so by looking at the consequences for the 
substantive law of war crimes, and at the consequences for determining the 
culpability of an accused of war crimes. In this manner it will attempt to 
elucidate at least part of the legal regime of war crimes. Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this Part intend to demonstrate the consequences of the Tadic Decision for the 
application by the ICTY and ICTR of the substantive law contained in their 
Statutes, as well as the consequences for the substantive law within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Statute of the ICC. 
The Tadic Decision established how the ICTY was to understand the offences 
within its subject-matter jurisdiction (except for Article 4). I will be looking in 
particular at how, by rejecting the notion that grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions were applicable to internal conflicts, and by the Appeals Chamber's 
refusal to characterise the conflict as either internal or international, the Tribunal 
found itself in the need to engage in conflict classification at every instance that 
grave breaches were charged. In addition, the consequences for the 
substantive law within the jurisdiction of the ICTY of the Tadic Decision 
encompassed the notion of violations of the laws and customs of war. The 
result of the Tadic Decision's interpretation of Article 3 as a residual clause 
applicable to internal and international conflicts was that the Office of the 
Prosecutor sought to utilise this Article as a means to avoid engaging in conflict 
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classification. The strategies it adopted towards this end will be illustrated in the 
next Chapter. 
Moreover, the consequences of the 7acf/c Decision did not exhaust themselves 
in the practice of the ICTY, but affected the way the ICTR understood its own 
jurisdiction. To illustrate this premise, the treatment by the ICTR of violations of 
common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II will be analysed below. In most of 
the cases the ICTR felt compelled to apply the Tadic test to these offences, in 
particular to Protocol II. 
Finally, the influence of the Tadic Decision regarding the criminality of violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in internal conflicts was felt when 
devising up the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 8 on "War Crimes" 
could represent the final confirmation of the process that crystallised in the Tadic 
Decision, as explained in the next chapter. Thus, not only the concentration of 
diplomatic effort, but also the existence of international jurisprudence confirming 
their criminality under international law, encouraged the inclusion of violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in internal conflicts within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. 
3.2 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
The ambit of application of grave breaches is confined to international armed 
conflicts whilst the major emphasis of this thesis is on offences committed in 
internal conflicts. However it is important to analyse the treatment of grave 
breaches in the Tadic Decision. First, it is important to understand why the 
Appeals Chamber rejected the suggestion that grave breaches ought to be 
applied to internal conflicts. The notion of protected persons played a significant 
part in this decision. The direct consequence of this decision was that, in 
determining that grave breaches were the stuff of international conflicts, the 
Appeals Chamber instituted the trend whereupon every time that grave 
breaches were charged, the character of the conflict in the particular case had to 
be determined. Hence the character (internal or international) of the conflict 
remained an element of the crime. 
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Second, it is necessary to analyse how the Tadic Decision treated non- grave 
breaches, so as to determine whether they constitute a basis for trying offences 
in internal conflicts, and if they are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. No less 
important is to have regard for what the Tadic Decision did not take into 
consideration as a basis for the prosecution of offenders; I am referring to 
Additional Protocol I. 
A) Grave breaches 
The Appeals Chamber departed from the decision under appeal on the issue of 
the ambit of application of grave breaches.'' The Appeals Chamber decided that 
grave breaches were only applicable to offences committed during international 
conflicts despite admitting being faced with substantial indications to the 
contrary. Also despite acknowledging that its decision might constitute an 
anachronism for it perpetuated the 'two- box' approach to international 
humanitarian law.^ 
Amongst these indications was Judge Abi Saab's Separate Opinion, which 
supported the applicability of grave breaches to offences committed in internal 
conflicts and is analysed below. In addition and at a later date, the Trial 
Chamber in the Celebici Judgement expressed its support for the opinion that 
grave breaches are applicable in internal conflicts.^ However, once it reached 
the conclusion as to the existence of an international conflict, the Chamber in 
Celebici made 'no finding on the question of whether Article 2 of the Statute can 
only be applied in a situation of international armed conflict, or whether this 
provision is also applicable in internal armed conflicts'.'* Yet it is interesting to 
note that Judge Abi Saab and Celebici agreed on the applicability of grave 
breaches to internal conflicts, and coincided in the manner that this ought to be 
done: under Article 2. Abi Saab considered the "division of labour" between the 
two Articles of the Statute in the Decision rather artificial. 'Instead of reaching, 
as the Decision does, for the acts expressly mentioned in Article 2 via Article 3 
when they are committed in the course of an internal armed conflict (...) a strong 
^ The decision under appeal was the Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber). 
^ Tadic Decision par.83. 
^ Celebici Judgement par.202. 
^ ibid par.235. 
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case can be made for the application of Article 2, even when the incriminated 
act takes place in an internal conflict.'^ 
The most compelling arguments supporting the extension of grave breaches to 
violations in internal conflict were found in the Decision under Appeal. In order 
to understand the Trial Chamber's conclusion it is essential to have regard for 
the distinction between grave breaches as the description of the conduct that is 
criminal, and grave breaches as the regime that states assume to prevent and 
punish the aforesaid criminal conduct. It is necessary to keep these two 
meanings of grave breaches separate and to appreciate that the Tribunal is only 
interested in the description of criminal conduct. 
The Trial Chamber decided that grave breaches were applicable to international 
and to internal conflicts. In addressing Article 2 of the Statute the Trial 
Chamber arrived at the conclusion that, notwithstanding the term 'grave 
breaches oftfie Geneva Conventions', the Article was self-contained rather than 
referential, with the exception of reference to protected persons; the latter had to 
be sought in the Geneva Conventions. It argued that 'the requirement of 
international conflict does not appear on the face of Article 2. Certainly, nothing 
in the words of the Article expressly require its existence; once one of the 
specified acts is allegedly committed upon a protected person the power of the 
International Tribunal to prosecute arises if the spatial and temporal 
requirements of Article 1 are met'.^ Yet the Trial Chamber's conclusion on the 
self- contained nature of Article 2 stemmed from its understanding of the law 
that the Tribunal was entitled to apply; it rightly believed it was empowered to 
apply customary law.^ Like Judge Abi Saab, it understood that the core of grave 
breaches, the description of the criminal conduct, was under customary law also 
applicable to internal conflicts. 
^ Separate Opinion of Judge Abi Saab on the 7acf/c Decision. Yet Celebici went a step 
further and also suggested that violations of CAS ought to be included under Article 2. 
Celebici Judgement par.317. This constituted a different assertion altogether, for it 
meant applying a non-grave breach -CAS- under Article 2. Though this conclusion may 
seem perplexing, the correct interpretation is that the Chamber in Celebici was prepared 
to apply grave breaches to internal conflicts and to include CAS under Article 2. It is a 
significant assertion in that it points at a degree of arbitrariness when ascribing offences 
to particular Articles in the Statute. 
^ Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber) par.50. 
^ ibid par.52. 
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At present it is necessary to determine to what extent the Appeals Chamber 
corrected the Trial Chamber's approach to Article 2. There is a good case for 
maintaining that the Appeals Chamber too admitted the customary character of 
grave breaches.^ It explained that grave breaches constitute a specific regime 
of the Geneva Conventions, applicable expressly only to international conflicts 
and carrying a detailed enforcement regime. Unlike the Trial Chamber, the 
Appeals Chamber considered that Article 2 imported from the definition of grave 
breaches in the Geneva Conventions the requisite of the existence of an 
international armed conflict. In turn, reference in the Geneva Conventions to 
international conflicts imported the concept of 'protected persons' with the 
offences. It is possible to talk in terms of a 'general renvoi' to the Geneva 
Conventions. That the Statute imported these two elements together is 
coherent because the category of protected persons makes little sense for 
internal conflicts. I will explain below the full reasoning behind the Appeals 
Chamber's contention that grave breaches were only applicable to international 
conflicts. The Chamber also decided that grave breaches could only be found in 
Article 2. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the application of Article 2 
comprised two conditions: the existence of an international conflict and the 
character of the victims as protected persons within the terms of the 
Conventions.^ It is significant that the Appeals Chamber dismissed the notion 
that grave breaches could be applied to internal conflicts before going on to 
decide what was the content of the subject- matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
under Article 3 of the Statute.''^ 
B) Protected persons 
Though the Trial Chamber's approach was subsequently corrected by the 
Appeals Chamber, it remains somewhat perplexing that the former supported 
the application of grave breaches to internal conflicts, notwithstanding admitting 
that victims of grave breaches had to posses the character of protected persons 
under the terms of the Convention.'"'' Crucially, though, the Trial Chamber 
avoided elaborating further: 'in the present case it is not contended that the 
alleged victims in the several charges were not protected persons; in any event 
Implicit in the Tadic Decision paras.77- 85. 
^ The status of the victims as protected persons is therefore also an element of the 
offence for grave breaches, n.1 in Oh.5. 
^° Tadic Decision par.81. 
It was all the 'more surprising, since the Prosecutor had not advanced such an 
argument', n.42 in Oh.1, 268. 
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that will be a matter for evidence in due course'.""^ It remains to be seen how it 
would in practice have reconciled the two propositions: that grave breaches can 
be applied to internal conflicts, yet face the requirement that they must be 
committed against protected persons. For 'the Conventions link the concept of 
grave breaches to that of protected persons, a concept which they define in 
such a way that it can exist only in an international armed conflict'.''^ 
The given wisdom is that grave breaches represent an instrument of little use for 
internal conflicts precisely because of the requirement that they have to be 
committed against protected persons. The conditions that protected persons 
have to satisfy under the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions make 
grave breaches of these Conventions inapplicable to internal conflicts. For 
example, as regards the Third Geneva Convention, 'for internal conflicts, as the 
concept of prisoner of war has no legal significance, the victim groups are 
"persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including member of the armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat" and "all 
persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities".'''* The requirements in the First, Second and Third Geneva 
Conventions assume the existence of regular armed forces, with open arm-
bearing, and a discernible chain of command; thus practically ruling out the 
possibility that grave breaches could be applied to internal conflicts.''^ In 
practice rebels fighting governmental forces (or each other) cannot comply with 
these requirements and to an extent, might not want to. However, it is 
necessary to point out that the cases so far before the ICTY have dealt with 
violence against civilians, in one form or another (some under Hague law 
provisions -means and methods of warfare).""^ That terrorising civilians has 
become a novel method of warfare underscores the overlap between war crimes 
and crimes against humanity found in armed conflicts such as the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia. The Fourth Geneva Convention has been the most invoked 
Tadic Decision on Jurisdiction (Trial Chamber) par.49. 
C. Greenwood, The Development of International Humanitarian Law by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' (1998) 2 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 97, 11S. 
Text of CAS and Article 4 of APII respectively, n.8 in Ch. 2, 772. 
Eg Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention. 
In the Blaskic case the Prosecution contended that it had brought some charges of 
using POWs as human shields. The Chamber rejected this because the Indictment only 
contained charges against civilians. B/as/(/c Judgement par.147. 
52 
so far in proceedings before the ICTY; for this reason, particular attention will be 
paid to the notion of protected persons found in the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian 
persons in time of war, protected persons are those civilians who find 
themselves in the hands of a Party to the conflict of which they are not nationals 
(Article 4). The nationality requirement in practice annuls any possibility of 
applying grave breaches to internal conflicts; internal conflicts take place within 
the boundaries of a single state, hence civilians share the same nationality as 
those in whose hands they find themselves. An example will illustrate the 
difficulties encountered in the application of grave breaches of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. 
The Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement (Trial on Merits) held that Bosnian 
Muslims were not protected persons within the terms of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention because they shared the nationality of the Bosnian Serbs, in whose 
hands they found themselves. Thus, of the two conditions for the application of 
grave breaches mentioned earlier, (that there was an international conflict, and 
that the breaches were committed against persons protected by the 
Conventions), the Chamber decided that the case in point failed to satisfy the 
s e c o n d . G r a v e breaches were considered inapplicable. The conclusion was 
the target of much criticism and of a particularly strong dissent from the 
Presiding Judge, Judge McDonald. It has subsequently been corrected by the 
7"acf/c Judgement (Appeal on Merits). 
To an extent the Appeals Chamber itself had prompted this unsatisfactory result 
in the Tadic Decision, where it made some unwarranted assertions as to the 
character of protected persons of Bosnian Serbs.""^ It commented that Bosnian 
Serbs who found themselves in the hands of the Bosnian Government forces 
would not be protected persons because the two shared the same nationality. 
Yet the case in Celebici dealt precisely with this scenario. The accused were 
members of the Bosnian Government's armed forces who mistreated Bosnian 
Serbs in a detention camp. 
And did not go on to rule whether it satisfied the requirement of an international 
conflict. Tadic Judgement (Trial on Merits) par.569, 605-607. 
®^ Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald on the Tadic Judgement (Trial 
on Merits) paras.5-34. 
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The Chamber in the Ce/e/3/c/Judgement affirmed from the start the international 
character of the conflict, hence satisfying one of the requisites for the application 
of grave breaches. Faced with the question as to whether the victims were 
protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Chamber adopted 
a more progressive view than the Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement (Trial 
Chamber) had done. The Celebici Judgement estimated that the strict 
determination of nationality was misleading in certain types of modern conflicts; 
there was need for a more flexible approach to the nationality of the victims. To 
support this view in law, the Chamber cited the developing opinio juris in favour 
of the right of individuals to have the nationality of their choosing in the case of 
'State succession'. In particular it looked at the Badinter Commission that had 
been dealing with the question of nationality to the successor states of the 
SFRY.^° It arrived at the conclusion that this option was not yet established in 
international law. The Chamber chose to maintain the customary character of 
the effective link doctrine as found in the Nottebohn case.^^ Celebici thus 
established that in complex conflicts determining nationality was not 
straightforward. It concluded that the victims 'must be considered to have been 
'protected persons' within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as 
they were clearly regarded by the Bosnian authorities as belonging to the 
opposing party in an armed conflict'.^^ 
In the Celebici Judgement, therefore, the two requirements for the application of 
grave breaches were met.^^ Celebici might not have been the most indicative 
case since it was controversial and is currently under appeal.^'* Still it adopted a 
progressive approach to the nationality requirement under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and was in this connection followed by the 7acf/c Judgement 
(Appeal on Merits) and Blaskic Judgement.^^ These Judgements adopted the 
suggestion that in complex conflicts determining nationality was not 
straightforward, and both sought to find better indicators than nationality; they 
See Tadic Decision par.76 
^° Ce/e/3/c/Judgement par.256. 
ibid par.257. 
ibid par.265. 
The question remains as to the relationship between the two requirements, ie whether 
the finding that there was an international armed conflict prompts the conclusion that the 
civilian victims are protected persons or vice versa -or even whether they are two 
different findings. The question was identified in Ce/eJb/c/Judgement paras.210, 245. 
^^IWPR, Tribunal Update: Last Week in The Hague no.179 (5-10 June 2000). 
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opted for ethnicity. Adopt ing ethnicity to determine the protected status of the 
vict ims may have proved useful for the case at hand, in the particular context of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. However the Tribunal could be deciding 
more than the case in point, and ethnicity might not be relevant in other conflicts. 
Nevertheless, the quest ion is: what conclusions can be drawn from the more 
lenient approach to determining whether the victims were protected civilians? 
If the appl icat ion of grave breaches to internal conflict faced the obstacle of 
protected persons for civilian victims, this has been the case too for some 
international confl icts {Celebici Judgement) . The first conclusion to be drawn is 
that an instrument such as the Fourth Geneva Convent ion, devised to cope with 
strictly international conflicts (except for common Article 3), might not prove 
useful when deal ing with complex conflicts unless there is a receptive judiciary 
ready to interpret it in a way that will fit modern conflicts. In the language 
employed by the Tribunal it is possible to identify a trend whereupon the worst 
consequences of a literal reading of the instruments are avoided by an approach 
based on a teleological interpretation. 
Secondly, the Fourth Geneva Convent ion can be interpreted alternatively in 
order not to render absurd results in modern conflicts. In light of this 
development , the content ion that grave breaches can only be applied to 
international confl icts because of the nationality requirement for the 
determinat ion of protected civil ians needs to be evaluated afresh. There is no 
apparent reason why the same accommodat ion could not be effected so that 
grave breaches would apply to civil ians sharing the same nationality in an 
internal, rather than an international, conflict. T h e Tribunal's enlightened vision 
of such customary law as is pertinent to both international and noninternational 
a rmed conflicts certainly could have encompassed grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions'.^^ 
Judge Abi Saab's Separate Opinion becomes relevant at this point. Judge Abi 
Saab introduced addit ional arguments for the application of grave breaches to 
of fences in internal confl icts. He agreed with the Chamber that Hague Law had 
exper ienced a customary development in order to encompass violations 
Tacf/c Judgement (Appeal on Merits) par.166 and 6/as/(/c Judgement par.124. 
T. Meron, 'Classification of Armed Conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's 
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commit ted in internal conflicts but argued that Geneva Law had not been 
indifferent to a similar customary development. He thus argued that grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convent ions were to be applied also to internal conflicts 
and indicated two ways in which customary law could have effected this change 
to grave breaches. 'As a result of the "subsequent practice" and opinio juris of 
the States parties: a teleological interpretation of the Convent ions in the light of 
their object and purpose to the effect of including internal conflicts within the 
regime of "grave breaches". The other possibility consisted of 'a new customary 
rule ancil lary to the Convent ions, whereby the regime of "grave breaches" is 
ex tended to internal conflicts'.^'' 
In my view, the importance of Abi Saab's opinion resides in that it placed the 
right emphasis ; if the definition of grave breaches has been transformed to 
include violat ions occurr ing in internal conflicts, then this had come about, 
necessari ly, by means of customary law. His argument is not only logically 
feasible, but it is also in accordance with the reasoning in the Tadic Decision 
with respect to Article 3. The Tadic Decision asserted amongst other things the 
extension to internal conflicts of Hague law rules and the criminality for their 
infr ingement. It did so by relying on a teleological interpretation of the Statute, 
and by determining that the words of the Statute were neither conclusive nor 
determinat ive. It is not farfetched to maintain that the Appeals Chamber could 
have concurred with the Trial Chamber and with Judge Abi Saab concerning 
grave breaches. In light of the reasoning in the Tadic Decision, it could have 
conc luded that the core of the grave breaches (the descript ion of the criminal 
conduct) had been extended to cover internal conflicts, whilst at the same time 
adopt ing a more lenient determination of the character of the victims as 
protected p e r s o n s . T h e question remains as to how close this would come to 
resembl ing common law crimes, ie Judges legislating. 
The most compel l ing reason why grave breaches do not apply to internal armed 
confl icts was il lustrated by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Decision; there is 
not sufficient state practice to sustain the notion that they are applicable to 
Fallout' (1998) 92 AJIL 236, 239. 
Separate Opinion of Judge Abi Saab on the Tadic Decision. 
®^ In addition, if we take the need to alter the basis on which civilians are characterised 
as protected persons one step further, the argument for abandoning the distinction 
between internal and international conflict seems to carry substantial strength. 
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internal conflicts.^^ There is no sufficient practice because states don't want 
to.^° They wish to be less constrained in their conduct during internal armed 
confl icts. Thus, it comes back to the 'two-box' approach: 'as long as 
humani tar ian law remains in two boxes, courts which address criminal 
responsibi l i ty in complex modern conflicts will be compel led to undergo similar 
analyt ical contortions'.^^ 
Yet the content ion by the Appeals Chamber that states are not prepared to 
subject violations commit ted in internal conflict to the obligations found in the 
grave breaches regime fails to maintain the distinction ment ioned above 
between the descript ion of the criminal conduct and the enforcement regime. 
In this sense it fails to take into consideration that what is argued is that the core 
of grave breaches has become customary law and applicable to internal 
confl icts; not the enforcement regime. In a way the Appeals Chamber accepts 
this reasoning obl iquely when admitt ing that the Statute in itself constitutes an 
instrument for the enforcement of international humanitarian law.^^ The grave 
breaches ' enforcement regime is analysed below. 
The argument that it constitutes the will states to keep grave breaches confined 
to international confl icts was strongly opposed by Judge Rodrigues in his 
Dissent ing Opin ion on the Aleksovski Judgement (Trial Chamber) . Essentially, 
Judge Rodrigues supported the application of grave breaches to internal armed 
confl icts. Al luding to the lack of jurisdiction of the International Thbunal over 
jur idical persons, he argued that 'if the principle is to prosecute natural persons 
individually responsible for serious violations of international humanitar ian law 
irrespective of their membership in groups, how can one accept the notion that 
the interests of a State's sovereignty limit the individual responsibil ity of any 
citizen?'^'* However, if with Judge Rodrigues we admit that the change effected 
to the Geneva Convent ions to allow the application of grave breaches to internal 
confl icts has come about by customary law then one of the precondit ions is state 
Tadic Decision par.84. 
^° ibid par.80. 
n.26 in Ch.2. 
Tadic Decision par.80. 
^^ibid par.81. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues on the /\/e/csovs/(/Judgment (Trial Chamber), 
par.31. That the power defined in the Statute 'might be applied as such, irrespective of 
issues of State sovereignty, protected under the Geneva Conventions by the 
international character condition', ibid par.32 (emphasis in the original). 
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practice. State practice is lacking. And though this obstacle could be 
c i rcumvented by relying on opinio juris (as the Appeals Chamber did for Article 
3), the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Decision was of the view that opinio juris 
did not support the extension of grave breaches to intemal conflicts. 
The next objection to Judge Rodrigues' views is the question as to where the 
l ine can be drawn; in particular wi th respect to protected persons. Judge 
Shahabundeen il lustrated the difficulty in drawing the line in the Declaration he 
appended to the 8/as/c/c Judgement. Judge Shahabundeen addressed the 
confusion ment ioned above; in the Tadic Decision the Appeals Chamber 
asser ted that in an international conflicts the Bosnian Serbs would not be 
regarded as protected persons for they shared the nationality of their captors, 
the Bosnian government, whilst on the other hand the victims of Bosnian Serbs' 
atrocit ies wou ld be regarded as protected persons. The same Appeals 
Chamber branded this result absurd. Judge Shahabundeen, on the contrary, 
found nothing formal ly absurd about it: if a party wishes to expose itself to such 
dangers (that his troops not considered protected persons) then it is up to it. 
T h e lack of symmetry is superficial and does not attract an absurdity argument. 
In one case, the captors would have been acting as agents of a foreign state; 
not so in the other. The law itself is symmetr ical. If a party puts itself within the 
reach of its sanct ions for a reason which does not apply to another, there can be 
no complaint on the ground of inequality in the operation of the law'.^^ 
I agree that a line might be drawn and it is possible that the law, as it exists now, 
cannot be stretched further. If a commander, during an international armed 
conflict, faced with mutiny by a group of soldiers from his own troop, tortures and 
kills the soldiers: wou ld this conduct constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tr ibunal under Article 2? It seems unlikely, for, notwithstanding the 
existence of an international armed conflict, the victims would not be protected 
persons under any of the Geneva Conventions. The conduct is generally 
regarded as worthy of punishment, and the Tribunal might attempt to assert 
^^The full reasoning is that the difficulty spotted by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic 
Decision can be overcome in the way done by the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits) 
and the Blaskic (Judgement), 'recourse being had to the broad objects of the relevant 
provisions. But it is right to recognise that those possibilities have a limit beyond which 
the victims indisputably have the same nationality as that of the state in whose hands 
they find themselves. What then, when that limit is reached?' Declaration of Judge 
Shahabundeen on the Blaskic Judgement. 
58 
jur isdict ion over it. In doing so, there is the danger of employing a 'bad man 
defini t ion' rather than fol lowing establ ished criminal categories for trying the 
accused. In relation to the previous example, the question that needs to be 
answered, and it is not straightforward, is whether states want to use grave 
breaches to punish the torturing and attack on dignity, or only the torturing and 
at tack on dignity of protected persons. The difference between international 
humani tar ian law and human rights law is thus highlighted. 
C) Non-grave breaches 
The Geneva Convent ions, notwithstanding their customary character, are treaty-
law wi th a self-enforcing regime. There is a need to determine in more detail 
wha t the grave breaches' enforcement regime actually consists of. The regime 
that grave breaches attach will become clear when compared to the regime of 
non-grave breaches. The Appeals Chamber est imated that grave breaches 
came under the jurisdict ion of the ICTY under Article 3 of the Statute. Under 
Article 3, one of the requisites that non-grave breaches have to satisfy (aside 
f rom being customary law) is that they must attach individual criminal 
responsibi l i ty. 
There are two compet ing views on the criminality of non-grave breaches. One 
v iew asserts that non-grave breaches are to be dist inguished from grave 
breaches, precisely on the basis that the non-grave breaches do not entail 
individual criminal responsibility.^^ A n elaboration on this view maintains that 
non-grave breaches entail the responsibil ity of the state, and not of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . Y e t the better v iew is that which ascribes individual criminal 
responsibi l i ty to violations of non- grave breaches, but distinguishes them from 
grave breaches on the basis of the jurisdiction and enforcement regime that they 
at tach. 
The Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Decision contrasts two legal regimes within 
the Geneva Convent ions: grave breaches and non-grave breaches.^® For grave 
breaches states are under an obligation to make these criminal in their national 
law. In addit ion, there is universal jurisdiction for these offences and, as 
n.13 in Ch.1, 410. 
E. Kussbach, 'The International Humanitarian Fact- Finding Commission' 43 (1994) 
ICLQ 174, 177. 
Tadic Decision par.80. 
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concerns the enforcement regime, an obligation to try or extradite. For non-
grave breaches the Geneva Convent ions create a different regime. States have 
a criminal power (not an obligation) to enact them in their national criminal law. 
They arguably also entail universal jurisdiction, though the enforcement 
obl igat ions are not compulsory. Meron argues as well that in respect to non-
grave breaches there is not merely a power on states to make them criminal in 
their national law, but ult imately these breaches are also criminal in international 
law.^^ This seems to be the approach envisaged by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Decision, where it conf irmed that non-grave breaches entail individual 
cr iminal responsibil i ty, and come within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
I suspect the suggest ion that non-grave breaches did come within the 
jur isdict ion of the ICTY was initially f loated with respect to common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Convent ions, the violations of which are not considered grave 
breaches of the Geneva Convent ions. Yet the Tadic Decision specifically 
env isaged the Tribunal 's jurisdict ion over violations of common Article 3. 
However, even after explicitly including common Article 3 within the Tribunal's 
jur isdict ion, the Appeals Chamber asserted the Tribunal's jurisdiction under 
Article 3 for other violations of the Geneva Conventions other than violations of 
common Article 3."*° So till we can determine what other violations the Appeals 
Chamber had in mind, the discussion remains largely theoretical. Whatever 
violat ions we are talking about, if they have to come under the Tribunal's 
jur isdict ion by virtue of Article 3, they will still have to satisfy the 4 condit ions 
establ ished by the Tadic Decision. 
D) Addi t ional Protocol I 
Cou ld it be that by non-grave breaches the Appeals Chamber was alluding to 
violat ions of Addit ional Protocol? This is dubious for violations of Addit ional 
Protocol I consti tute grave breaches, and attach the same enforcement regime. 
Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the grave breaches in Addit ional Protocol I 
were not included in Article 2 of the Statute. In addit ion, it is even more 
remarkable that the Appeals Chamber did not at any point allude to the 
jur isdict ion of the Tribunal for violations of Addit ional Protocol I. The reasoning 
behind this exclusion is that Addit ional Protocol I is not regarded as customary 
n.54 in Oh.1, 566. 
Tadic Decision par.89. 
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law in some quarters. In the next chapter, however, it will be demonstrated that 
the Tr ibunal has regarded some of the Protocol 's provisions as customary law. 
As grave breaches, violations of Addit ional Protocol I should be included within 
Article 2. However, Addit ional Protocol I charges have subsequently been 
brought under Article 3. Basically, there is an argument to say that there is no 
good reason to prosecute violations of grave breaches of Addit ional Protocol I 
under Article 3 instead of under Article 2. Either the ICTY has no jurisdiction 
over these of fences at all, or it has under Article 2 on grave breaches, 
notwithstanding the residual character of Article 3. 
Has the inclusion of violations of Addit ional Protocol I within Article 3 really 
been arbitrary? The inclusion makes sense if the reasoning in the Blaskic 
Judgement is fo l lowed. It starts from the premise that the Appeals Chamber in 
the 7"ad/c Decision decided that agreements between the parties came within 
the jur isdict ion of the ICTY under Article 3, qua treaty law.'*^ In Blaskic, the 
Prosecutor asserted that the governments of Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina 
had signed an agreement to apply provisions of the Addit ional Protocols 
between themselves. The Trial Chamber remarked that 'the two parties were 
bound by the provisions of the two Protocols, whatever their status within 
customary international law'."*^ It referred to the Secretary-General 's Report, 
that the law appl ied by the Tribunal must be customary international law so that 
' the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions 
does not arise.'' '^ 'In line with this reasoning, the Trial Chamber is also 
empowered to apply any agreement that incontestably bound the parties at the 
date the cr ime was perpetrated. Thus, the risk would not be run of infringing the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege where a bell igerent did not adhere to a 
part icular treaty'.'*'* In addit ion, in the Blaskic Judgement the Chamber decided 
that once it is establ ished that Addit ional Protocol I applies (ie that an 
international armed conflict exists) then Addit ional Protocol II does not apply.''^ 
Hence at first sight the Trial Chamber asserted the ICTY's jurisdiction over 
violat ions of Addit ional Protocol I, on the strength of the agreements between 
''^  B/as/</c Judgement par.172. Cites Tadic Decision par.144. 
'^ ^ B/as/c/c Judgement par.172. 
''^Report of the Secretary-General n.38 in Ch.1 par.34. 
Blaskic Judgement par. 169. 
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the part ies. However it fell short of doing so. It arrived at the conclusion that the 
conduct in quest ion was constitutive of an offence under Article 3 on its own 
terms. A possible reason why it did not apply agreements between the parties is 
because it would not have answered whether violations of these agreements 
incur individual criminal responsibil ity, for the binding character of the 
agreements is not determinat ive. Hence the Blaskic Judgement, like the Tadic 
Decision had done, left open the possibility of applying agreements between the 
part ies. To date, no accused has been convicted on the basis of these 
agreements . This reflects the Tribunal 's belief that it is entitled to apply 
customary law. The manner the charges had been brought in the Indictment 
reflects this belief, take Count 4: 'Violation of the laws and customs of war: 
unlawful attack on civilian objects. Article 3 and customary law and Article 
52(1) of Addit ional Protocol 1'.^^ 
Hence the object ion to violations of Addit ional Protocol I been included under 
Article 3 and not under Article 2 remains unanswered. It is this author's 
suggest ion that Article 3 is expressly non-exhaustive whilst there can be a 
strong argument that Article 2 is exhaustive. If violations of Addit ional Protocol I 
were al lowed into Article 2 with the argument that the Article was non-
exhaust ive, then the way for applying grave breaches to internal conflicts (in a 
similar reasoning to the Tadic Decision with respect to Article 3) would have 
been paved. In addit ion, the reason why violations of Addit ional Protocol I were 
not originally included in the Statute can be sought in the views of two 
Permanent Members of the Security Counci l ; US and France have yet to ratify it. 
Hence, for both grave breaches and violations of Addit ional Protocol I it has 
been il lustrated how the Tribunal is trying to get at the presented conduct 
wi thout being accused of retrospective application of the law. The grave 
breaches requirement of protected persons has posed particular problems in 
this respect. Article 2 also requires the existence of an international armed 
conflict. Grave breaches are applicable only to violations of international 
humani tar ian law commit ted in international conflicts; this means that every t ime 
they are charged, the character of the conflict must be determined. 
^^ibid par.173. 
The Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, Second Amended Indictment, Case No IT-95-14 
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3.3 S e r i o u s v io la t i ons of Ar t i c le 3 c o m m o n to the G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n s 
a n d of A d d i t i o n a l P ro toco l II 
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute contains a non- exhaustive list of violations of 
Addi t ional Protocol II and of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.'*'' 
This section will emphasise the consequences of the Tadic Decision for these 
of fences, in particular as regards proceedings before the ICTR. In addition it will 
focus on how the Rwanda Tribunal dealt with claims of retrospective application 
of the law as far as common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol II were concemed. 
The remarkable fact remains that the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Decision, in 
all its efforts to include within the jurisdiction of the ICTY offences committed in 
internal confl icts, did not once mention the ICTR Statute, even though the 
Tr ibunal for Rwanda was establ ished a year before the Decision was rendered. 
The ICTR Statute in turn confirms the criminality of these offences in 
international law. One wonders why it was not mentioned in the Tadic Decision. 
The reasons can be many. The Chamber in the 7acf/c Decision faced an appeal 
on grounds other than subject-matter jurisdiction. It also faced an appeal on the 
legality of the establ ishment of the International Tribunal and its primacy over 
nat ional courts. In this manner, to cite the ICTR Statute as evidence would only 
have referred back to the objection on the legality of Ad Hoc International 
Tr ibunals. In addit ion, the Appeals Chamber foresaw that claims of 
retrospect ive application of the law could also come up in the context of the 
ICTR and therefore did not wish to anticipate any arguments. 
Finally, the last possible reason is sceptical; the ICTR Statute contains no 
provision deal ing with the laws and customs of war, and instead of using the 
term 'war cr imes' it speaks in terms of 'violations of common Article 3 and 
Addit ional Protocol 11'. So it could in fact have been proving quite the contrary: 
yes, of fences commit ted in internal conflicts have been criminalised in 
international law, but they do not appear to come within the jurisdiction of the 
(25 April 1997). Cited as Blaskic Indictment. 
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute is a transcript of Article 4(2) of APII, with the exception of 
slavery and slave trade, and on the other hand includes the passing of sentences and 
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ICTY under any of its guises. The Defence before the Trial Chamber in the 
Celebici Judgement argued this; had the Security Counci l wanted to include 
common Art icle 3 within the jurisdiction of the ICTY, it would have done so 
explicit ly, like in the Statute of the ICTR."*^ The Trial Chamber in Celebici 
rejected this reasoning. The fact remains that the Tadic Decision still had to 
evaluate and defend the customary law and criminality of violations of common 
Art icle 3 and Addit ional Protocol II. At least with regards to Addit ional Protocol 
II, it gave an ambiguous answer. I will look at common Article 3 and Addit ional 
Protocol II in turn. 
C o m m o n Article 3 is a non-grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Yet as 
d iscussed earlier, it was taken into consideration in the Tadic Decision in its own 
right. The Tadic Decision conf i rmed its customary law character by reference to 
the ICJ's Decis ion in Nicaragua, which in turn est imated that common Article 3 
was a mini-convent ion, a list of basic considerations of humanity. The difficulty 
as regards common Article 3 did not concern its character as customary law, but 
whether the violation of its provisions entailed individual criminal responsibility in 
international law. It has been noted previously how the Appeals Chamber 
suggested that this was the case for non-grave breaches of the Geneva 
Convent ions. But the Tadic Decision also dealt with the question of the 
criminality of common Article 3 separately. 
The Tadic Decision dismissed straightaway that the development of criminality 
for breaches of common Article 3 had come about by treaty.''^ This is the 
correct approach since none of the conventional instruments applicable to 
international humanitar ian law in internal armed conflicts include criminal 
provisions, or have been amended to that effect. It is rather the case that 
customary law has developed to make criminal the violation of provisions of 
common Art icle 3. The precedent is found in the International Military Tribunal 
Charter and its t reatment of the 1907 Hague Regulations. The Judgement at 
Nuremberg determined that the Hague Regulations are a) customary law ^° and 
b) entai l individual cr iminal responsibil ity for their violation. The reasoning in 
Nuremberg, as cited by the Appeals Chamber in 7acf/c, is thus appropriate: 'a 
carrying out of executions, a provision from CAS. 
Ce/eJb/c/Judgement par.290. 
''^ Tadic Decision par. 102. 
^° The IV Hague Convention had a si omnes clause, which meant that it could only bind 
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f inding of individual criminal responsibil ity is not barred by the absence of treaty 
provis ions on punishment of breaches',^'' because there might always be a 
customary rule envisaging criminal responsibility. 
To an extent there also remains question as to the ambit of application of 
c o m m o n Article 3. The Tadic Decision, by placing it within the jurisdiction of the 
Yugos lav Tribunal under Article 3 implied that it appl ied irrespective of the 
internal or international character of the conflict.^^ It will be submitted in the next 
chapter that bringing charges based on common Article 3 has been one of the 
strategies employed by the Prosecutor to avoid engaging in conflict 
classif icat ion. Hence at least with respect to the ICTY, common Article 3 applies 
irrespective of the classif ication of the conflict as internal or international. 
This approach to the ambit of application of common Article 3 differed f rom the 
v iew adopted by the ICTR in the Kayishema case, where it implied that common 
Art icle 3 was restricted to internal conflicts.^^ I believe the Chamber was in this 
case confusing the ambit of application of common Article 3 with the threshold of 
applicabil i ty of Article 4 of the ICTR Statute. Whilst in the Akayeshu Judgement 
the ICTR admit ted that the thresholds of common Article 3 and Addit ional 
Protocol II ought to be taken separately and analysed individually, the 
Kayishema Judgement began a trend, fol lowed by Rutaganda, whereupon both 
thresholds need to be applied concurrently. The burden to prove that the 
confl ict in quest ion satisfied both thresholds s imultaneously rested with the 
Prosecutor. Fol lowing this reasoning, because the threshold in Addit ional 
Protocol II is very high, it is true that in this sense Article 4 of the ICTR Statute 
could only make reference to internal conflicts. But this does not limit the ambit 
of appl icat ion of common Article 3. On the other hand, the concem as to the 
ambi t of appl icat ion of common Article 3 is legitimate because Article 8(2)(c) of 
the ICC Statute effectively confines violations of common Article 3 to 
noninternat ional conflicts. I believe the correct approach as to the scope of 
c o m m o n Article 3 was expressed by the ICRC and submitted by Trial Chamber 
in the Blaskic Judgement : 'with common Article 3 representing, as it does, the 
min imum which must be applied in the least determinate of conflicts, its terms 
all contenders per customary law, as the Soviet Union was not a party to it. 
Tad/c Decision par. 128. 
ibid par.94. 
Kayishema Judgement par. 165. 
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must a fortiori be respected in the case of international conflicts proper, when all 
the provisions of the Convent ion are applicable'. 
The posit ion concerning Addit ional Protocol II is more complex, because the 
Tadic Decision w a s ambiguous in this respect. It had to decide on its customary 
character and on the criminality attached to violations of its provisions (the Tadic 
test). Customary character first: the 7acf/c Decision resolved that the core of 
Addi t ional Protocol II was part of customary international law, yet it did not 
specify what it meant by the core. As will be noted below, the Secretary 
General 's Report on the ICTR held a similar view, and submitted that the ICTR 
Statute was innovative concerning its approach to internal armed conflict. The 
Thai Chamber in Akayeshu had to deal with this obstacle: 'Additional protocol II 
as a whole was not deemed by the Secretary- General to have been universally 
recognised as part of customary international law. The Appeals Chamber 
concurred with this view inasmuch as "many provisions of this Protocol (II) can 
now be regarded as declaratory of existing rules or as having crystallised in 
emerg ing rules of customary law", but not all.'^^ 
It is necessary to anticipate one of the arguments employed by the ICTR to 
est imate the customary character of Addit ional Protocol II. In Akayeshu the 
Chamber sought to argue that some of the provisions contained in Addit ional 
Protocol II are customary, and that these coincide with the provisions in Article 
4 of the Statute (for it is a transcript of Article 4(2) of the Protocol, 'Fundamental 
Guarantees ' ) , inasmuch as Protocol II develops and supplements the basic 
provisions of common Article 3.^^ As the customary character of common Article 
3 was recognised, so was the customary nature of the fundamental guarantees 
in Addit ional Protocol II. It consti tuted customary law at the t ime of the 
commiss ion of the offence.^'' 
In addit ion it is necessary to note that the Tadic Decision did not only leave 
ambiguous the scope of Addit ional Protocol II that formed part of customary law. 
As to its criminality, the Tadic Decision did not specifically include the Protocol 
under the reach of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. It just mentioned 'other 
Blaskic Judgement footnote 322. 
Akayeshu Judgement par.609, my emphasis. 
Article 1 of ARM. 
Akayeshu Judgement par.610. 
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general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed 
c o n f l i c t ' . T h e ICTY did eventually recognise that some provisions of Addit ional 
Protocol II entai led individual criminal responsibility in international law, placing 
them under Article 3.^^ 
The ICTR thus was faced with the ambiguous legacy of the Tadic Decision with 
respect to Addit ional Protocol II. These difficulties were compounded by the 
more expansive approach taken by the Secretary-General and the Security 
Counci l as regards the choice of law applicable by the ICTR. The more 
expansive approach is reasonable in that the nature of the conflict was clearly 
internal, and no other provisions would do. The choice of law is not surprising; 
wi thin the limits of existing international law, the Security Council when 
establ ishing Ad Hoc International Tribunals has the discretion of determining 
wha t provisions will most closely fit the facts. If the Security Council does not 
empower the Tribunals in this way, the consequence is the 7"ad/c Decision -
styled contort ion to exercise jurisdict ion. What proved disturbing was the 
Secretary-General Report on the ICTR. In respect of violations of common 
Art icle 3 and Addit ional Protocol II: 
The Securi ty Counci l has elected to take a more expansive approach to 
the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the Statute of 
the Yugoslav Tribunal, and included within the subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether 
they were considered part of customary international law or whether 
they have customari ly entailed the individual criminal responsibil ity of 
the perpetrator of the crime. Article 4 of the Statute, accordingly, 
includes violations of Addit ional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not 
yet been universally recognised as part of customary international law, 
for the first t ime criminalises common Article 3 of the four Geneva 
Conventions.^° 
58 Tadic Decision par.134. 
Section 4 .1 . 
®° Secretary General's 'Report on Practical Arrangements for the Effective Functioning of 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Recommending Arusha as the Seat of the 
Tribunal', UN Doc. S/1995/134 (13 February 1995), paras.11-12. Cited in Akayeshu 
Judgement par. 604. 
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Though the passage acknowledged that it was as a whole that Addit ional 
Protocol II had not been recognised as customary law, and though it did not 
categorical ly deny the customary or criminal character of the provisions in 
quest ion, it did more harm that good. It could have prompted claims of 
retroactive appl icat ion of the law conceming common Article 3 and Addit ional 
Protocol II. The ICTR attempted to overcome these obstacles. However, why 
did the ICTR have to elicit that common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol II 
const i tuted of fences under customary law when it was empowered to apply 
them by the terms of the Statute? I have previously approached this question 
wi th respect to the ICTY. But, whilst the Secretary-General had made clear that 
the choice of law in the ICTY Statute was restrictive and only included provisions 
that were without doubt criminal in customary law, the case of the ICTR, as 
noted, was different. 
To pre-empt claims on retrospective application of the law, Intemational 
Tr ibunals can only apply 'existing customary international law and this is not 
dependent upon an express recognit ion in the Statute of the content of that 
custom'.^* Thus, though the choice of law favoured by the Secretary-General 
and the Security Counci l may have been expansive, it ultimately rests with the 
International Tribunal to apply only law that was customary law, and that 
entai led individual criminal responsibil ity in customary law, at the t ime of the 
of fence. To this end, at least concerning the ICTR, the Statute is not 
c o n c l u s i v e . T h e Chamber in the Rutaganda Judgement explained this in clear 
terms, and also il lustrated the difference between the two Tribunals. 'In 
establ ishing the ICTY, the Secretary-General dealt with this issue by asserting 
that in the appl icat ion of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege the Intemational 
Tr ibunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond 
any doubt part of customary law. However, in the case of this Tribunal, it was 
incumbent on the Chambers to decide whether or not the said principle had 
been adhered to, and whether individuals incurred individual criminal 
responsibi l i ty for violations of these international instruments'.^^ The ICTR 
sustained this v iew throughout.®'' The exception is found in the Kayishema 
Judgement , where the Chamber did not feel compel led to look into the 
Ce/e/?/c/Judgement par.310. 
As it was not conclusive for the ICTY either, as illustrated by the reasoning regarding 
Article 3 in the Tadic Decision. 
Rutaganda Judgement par.86. 
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customary nature of provisions in Article 4. It adopted an approach that has not 
been fol lowed so far: it deemed sufficient that Rwanda was a party to Addit ional 
Protocol II and that the offences had been incorporated into the Criminal Code 
of Rwanda law. 
Thus I will demonstrate how the ICTR has successfully managed to assert the 
customary and criminal character of the provisions in Article 4 of the Statute 
even in the face of these obstacles. In this sense Akayeshu remains the most 
convinc ing case with respect to Article 4. It was the first contentious case 
argued before the ICTR {Kambanda lodged a guilty plea). In Akayeshu the 
inf luence of the Tadic Decision became obvious: it had to dispel the doubts 
introduced by the Appeals Chamber with respect to Addit ional Protocol II, and in 
order to do so it appl ied the Tadic test. It also applied this test to common 
Art icle 3, but in this respect the ICTR relied heavily on what the Tadic Decision 
had d e c i d e d . A s for Addit ional Protocol II, we have seen already the answer to 
its customary character: Addit ional Protocol II essentially develops common 
Art icle 3, therefore Article 4 ( fundamental guarantees) is regarded as customary 
law. Similarly, because of their character as fundamental guarantees, they 
involved the criminal responsibil i ty of offenders. Finally, respect for the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege was further assured by the qualif ication found in 
Article 4 of the ICTR Statute: the Tribunals shall have jurisdiction over se r ious 
violations.^® Because Article 4 violations derive f rom common Article 3 and 
Addi t ional Protocol II they are indeed serious.®^ Hence Akayeshu, like the Tadic 
Decision, placed the right emphasis. 'It properly puts the emphasis on State 
practice: what the rebels do or do not do becomes less significant'.®^ State 
practice is the formal source of law; rebels might find themselves bound by 
customary law without realising it, as they don't participate in the process. 
To further support the criminality of Addit ional Protocol II Akayeshu argued that 
Rwanda was, at the t ime the conduct took place, a Party to the Geneva 
'^^  Eg Akayeshu Judgement par.605. 
®^  ibid par.608. 
®^ibid par.616. 
ibid par.616. The description of what constitutes a serious violation was identical to 
the Tadic Decision par.94. 
®^  n.10 in Ch.1, 258. The exception is to be found in the Kayishema Judgement, where 
the Chamber emphasised that the rebels, the RPF, had accepted to apply the provisions 
of API I. However the aim in this Judgement was to prove that the parties were bound by 
agreements. As noted above it was not the aim of this Judgement to prove the 
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Convent ions and to Addit ional Protocol 11.®^  'Moreover, all the offences 
enumera ted under Article 4 of the statute constituted crimes under Rwandan 
law in 1994', so nationals should have been aware.^° This last argument, 
however, may constitute an argument rooted on equity and fairness, as the 
Appea ls Chamber remarked in the 7acf/c Decision. For, though individuals are 
p resumed not to ignore their national law, it cannot be presumed to have 
knowledge of international criminal law. The typical example is that they may 
know they are commit t ing murder, but will be ignorant to the fact that they are 
commit t ing genocide. 
Despite the choice of law in the ICTR Statute, no accused has yet been 
convic ted before the ICTR of serious violations of common Article 3 and 
Addi t ional Protocol II. The main f inding of fact has not concerned the character 
of the conflict, but rather evidence of genocide. The fighting alongside the 
genoc ide clearly corresponded to an internal armed conflict. Hence the 
character of the conflict is clear, and in this manner it is easier to prove that 
violat ions of common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol II were committed. 
However it is necessary to have regard for the other face of the problem: in most 
cases charges on the basis of these violations will not apply. Even though the 
requisite of an internal armed conflict is satisfied, and even though the alleged 
conduct might fit the material e lement of the offence {actus reus), still the 
Tr ibunal has found the accused not guilty of violations of common Article 3 and 
Addi t ional Protocol II. The reason is the absence of nexus between the conflict 
and the imputed criminal conduct. 'Thus the term "nexus" should not be 
understood as something vague and indefinite. A direct connection between the 
al leged cr imes, referred to in the Indictment, and the armed conflict should be 
establ ished factually (...) It is incumbent upon the Prosecution to present those 
facts and to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such a nexus exists'.^* 
Thus the ICTR determined in the Akayeshu Judgement that 'genocide did 
indeed take place against the Tutsi group alongside the conflict. The execution 
of this genocide was probably facil itated by the c o n f l i c t ' . Y e t the ICTR was 
customary character of the provisions applicable. 
®^ Akayehsu Judgement par.617. Accordingly these are violations 'as a matter of 
custom and convention.' Rutaganda Judgement par.90. 
^° Akayeshu Judgement par.617. Applies to non-nationals too. Riggiu Judgement. 
Kayishema Judgement par. 188 
Akayeshu Judgement par. 127 
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categorical in maintaining that 'the fact that the genocide took place whi le the 
RAF was in conflict with the RPF, can in no way be considered as an 
extenuat ing c i rcumstance for it.'''^ To this end it kept them separate: 'although 
the genocide occurred concomitant ly (...) it was, fundamental ly different f rom 
the conflict (...) The genocide was organised and planned not only by the 
members of the RAF, but also by the political forces who were behind the 'Hutu-
power' , and it was executed essentially by civilians (...), and above all, that the 
majori ty of the Tutsi vict ims were non- combatants, including thousands of 
w o m e n and children.'^' ' The Chamber found that it had not been sufficiently 
proved that the acts perpetrated by Akayeshu 'were committed in conjunction 
wi th the armed conflict.'''^ He was instead found guilty of genocide and crimes 
against humanity. There is finally a f inding that demonstrates that genocide and 
cr imes against humanity can occur irrespective of the existence of an armed 
conflict, and further, that they can occur alongside an armed conflict yet 
independent ly f rom it. The ICTR's intent to dismiss any potential justif ication for 
the genocide also appears obvious in the Rutaganda case. 
In Rutaganda the defendant was a top official of the Interahamwe, the 
government 's militia. In addit ion, the defendant actually committed a crime 
himself: he murdered a man. This man was linked to the political arm of the 
contending party, the RPF. With respect to this murder, in the Rutaganda 
Judgement the defendant was found guilty of genocide and crimes against 
humani ty (murder and extermination) and not guilty of violations of common 
Art icle 3 and Addit ional Protocol 11.^ ^ It is submitted that the Tribunal was rightly 
trying to pre-empt this murder being justif ied as the killing a contender within the 
context of an internal armed conflict. To support its conclusions, the Chamber 
moreover determined that the Interahamwe served a double role: 'on the one 
hand, they supported the RAF war effort against the RPF, and on the other 
hand, they killed Tutsi and Hutu opponents.'^^ 'Nexus between the culpable acts 
commit ted by the accused and the armed conflict' was absent.''^ 
^^ibid par.128. 
^^b id par.128. 
ibid par.643. 
The murder was also included in the considerations that brought him a conviction for 
genocide. However he was found not guilty for violations of CAS (murder). He was 
acquitted on all other charges brought under Article 4 of the Statute, but for lack of 
evidence (he was not convicted either for the crimes against humanity equivalents). 
Rutaganda Judgement par.439. 
ibid par.442-444. 
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If the defendant was not convicted of violations of common Article 3 and 
Addi t ional Protocol II in Rutaganda, it is difficult to see any defendant being 
convicted. Yet if genocide and cr imes against humanity best described his 
conduct, however, it was because his conduct was not directed against a 
contending rebel party. Rather, it was directed towards an unarmed, civilian 
populat ion. It will therefore be interesting to see how many of the Indictments' 
charges under Article 4 of the ICTR Statute do give way to actual convictions 
on these charges. For the moment it does not look like many. Though there 
have been no convict ions so far, the condit ions for the applicability of Article 4 
of the ICTR Statute have been spelt out. As expressed by the Akayeshu and 
Rutaganda Judgements these are: 
a) the unlawful acts were commit ted in connection with an internal armed 
confl ict (nexus requirement and requirement of the existence of an intemal 
a rmed conflict) 
b) the perpetrator was connected to one side involved in the internal armed 
confl ict (class of perpetrator)^^ 
c) the vict ims were persons taking no active part in the hostilities (class of 
victims)^° 
d) an act listed in Article 4 of the ICTR Statute was commit ted {actus reus). 
The lack of nexus between the criminal conduct and the armed conflict was thus 
the main reason why there was no f inding on Article 4 of the ICTR Statute in 
Akayeshu and Rutaganda. Yet there might be connected questions, particularly 
as one requirement for its application is the existence of an internal armed 
confl ict satisfying the thresholds of common Article 3 and/or Addit ional Protocol 
II. It is possible to envisage circumstances when the violence of genocide might 
not make it to the internal conflict threshold (like Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge) . This was conf i rmed obliquely in Rutaganda: 'the Prosecutor cannot 
merely rely on a f inding of Genocide and consider that, as such, serious 
violat ions of common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol II are thereby 
automatical ly establ ished. Rather, the Prosecutor must discharge her burden by 
Includes paramilitary officials like Rutaganda and civilian government officials like 
Akayeshu. 
^° 'Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including member of the armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat' (CAS) and 'all persons 
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establ ishing that each material requirement of offences under Article 4 of the 
statute are met'.^^ Despite the choice of law by the Security Counci l in the 
Statute, where it appears to establish the existence of an internal armed conflict, 
it rests with the Prosecutor to prove the condit ions of application of Article 4. 
Amongs t these is the requisite of an internal conflict satisfying the minimum 
threshold.^^ 
Before the ICTR there have been charges but no convictions with respect to 
violat ions of common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol 11.^ ^ It is submitted that 
wha t the ICTR has so far been attempting to do is to prove that these offences 
come within the jurisdict ion of the Tribunal. Furthermore, it is expected that 
these of fences will be of little relevance in the Rwandan context. What was the 
rat ionale behind their inclusion in the first place? To condemn atrocities 
commit ted in the conduct of combat between the RAF and RPF, notwithstanding 
that the bulk of the of fences occurred with respect to the civilian population. In 
this connect ion, 'Article 4 of the Statute provides a safety net'.^'' An additional 
reason could be to deal with the death of peacekeepers of UNAMIR. It is 
chal lenging to look at how the deaths of the Belgian peacekeepers have been 
charged: there have been suggest ions on violations of the Geneva Conventions 
and on cr imes against h u m a n i t y . V i o l a t i o n s of common Article 3 and 
Addit ional Protocol II first: the Belgians had guns, though on the other hand they 
were taking no active part in the hostilities.^^ Finally it has to be remembered 
that cr imes against humanity in the ICTR Statute require discriminatory intent, 
on one of the discriminatory grounds envisaged by the Statute (Article 3). The 
ICC Statute, on the other hand, contains the offence of intentionally directing 
at tacks against personnel involved in a humanitar ian assistance or 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations for 
noninternat ional a rmed conflicts (Article 8(2)(e)(iii). 
who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities' (APII). 
Rutaganda Judgement par.462 
The material requirements for the existence of an internal conflict (the minimum 
threshold) can be found in Article 1 of APII. n.38 in Oh.5. 
®^  Eg the Musema Judement does not find a nexus between the criminal conduct and 
the armed conflict. 
^^n.54 in Ch.1, 558. 
Press Release of Major Nzuwonemeye ICTR/INFO-9-2-234En (25 May 2000). 
Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the ICC Statute protects peacekeepers 'as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law 
of armed conflict.' 
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Finally, by establ ishing that it does have jurisdiction over violations of common 
Art icle 3 and Addit ional Protocol II, the ICTR has successfully demonstrated that 
they exist, ie that they entail individual criminal responsibility under customary 
law. The Securi ty Counci l adopted the ICTR Statute, which might have been 
dr iven by events but still categorises this conduct as crimes and thus constitutes 
proof of states' opinio juris. The development has been confirmed further in 
proceedings before the ICTY; they have been included under Article 3 
violat ions of the laws and customs of war. Violations of common Article 3 and, 
to a point, of Addit ional Protocol II are found in the ICC Statute, which can also 
be regarded as proof of states' opinio juris. So even if the extreme view was 
taken that the Tadic Decision constituted an instance of progressive 
development , at least with regard to violations of common Article 3 and of 
Addi t ional Protocol II practice has demonstrated the existence of these 
offences.^' ' 
®^  That these offences figure in the ICTR Statute and in the ICC Statute might still prove 
insufficient for proceedings before the ICTY. The Celebici Judgement notes this, 'while 
recognising that these instruments were drawn up after the acts alleged in the 
Indictment", par.209. 
74 
C h a p t e r 4 : C o n s e q u e n c e s fo r the S u b s t a n t i v e L a w A p p l i c a b l e by 
t h e In te rna t iona l T r i b u n a l s (II) 
4.1 V i o l a t i o n s of t h e l aws a n d c u s t o m s of w a r 
The previous chapter on grave breaches and on violations of common Article 3 
and Addit ional Protocol II gave evidence as to the ' two- box' approach to 
international humanitar ian law, in particular to violations of international 
humani tar ian law. The ' two-box' approach to international humanitahan law has 
resulted in a corresponding two-fold approach to culpability: it depends on 
whether the of fences were commit ted in an international or an internal armed 
conflict. As will be noted in Chapter 5, this approach resulted in the character of 
the confl ict constitut ing an element of the offences. The result in practice was 
that confl ict classif ication became inevitable. Chapter 5 will also illustrate the 
drawbacks of conflict classif ication: it takes up a significant amount of t ime and 
effort in the conduct of proceedings and endangers the accused right to a trial 
wi thout undue delay. 
Consc ious of the problems posed by conflict classification, there is still a need to 
emphas ise its signif icance, in particular for the ICTY. 'As many modern conflicts 
involve a mix of international and internal aspects, the issue of conflict 
classif icat ion, an issue which is irrelevant to moral fault, but important to 
determinat ion of legal culpability for some international cr imes, may be of 
part icular importance to contemporary war crimes trials'.'' Thus, conflict 
classif ication can affect individual culpability; an accused may be acquitted of 
charges depending on the character of the conflict in which the crimes were 
commit ted. Hence it became a matter to take into consideration by the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP). To speed up proceedings and to ensure prosecution, 
off icials of the Tribunal sought ways to circumvent conflict classification. 
I have already noted the division of labour in the Statute between different 
Art ic les that define the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Genocide 
(Article 4) appl ies irrespective of conflict, whereas crimes against humanity 
^ n.8 in Ch.2, 769. 
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cover internal and international armed conflicts (Articles). Grave breaches 
(Article 2) apply only to international armed conflicts. Stemming from the Tadic 
Decision, Article 3 functions as a residual clause that covers all other violations 
of international humanitar ian law not already provided for by other Articles. 
In this section I will analyse means of getting round the process of conflict 
classif icat ion, including ways of preventing a classification of the conflict 
unfavourable to the Prosecution. I will have particular regard to Article 3 of the 
Statute and to how it has been argued to apply irrespective of the character of 
the conflict. I will also comment on the use of crimes against humanity as a tool 
to c i rcumvent having to determine the character of the conflict. In addit ion, I will 
analyse the content ion that successfully avoiding conflict classification 
demonst ra tes that there exists a single body of law applicable irrespective of the 
character of the conflict, ie one corpus of criminal law that covers both internal 
and international armed conflicts. 
Under Article 3, the ICTY has the power to prosecute individuals for violations 
of the laws and customs of war. The language in Article 3 has its origins in the 
1907 IV Hague Convent ion and Annexed Regulations. These texts were 
originally designed to apply to international armed conflict. The IMT at 
Nuremberg resolved that the rules contained therein were customary law and 
their breach entai led criminal responsibility, but this was only decided with 
respect to the Second Wor ld War, an international armed conflict. 
I will not repeat the reasoning on Article 3 put forward by the Appeals Chamber 
in the Tadic Decision. Suff ice it to say that international humanitarian law, the 
modern term for laws and customs of war, applies to international and internal 
a rmed confl icts. In addit ion, international humanitarian law encompasses 
Hague and Geneva law. For the purposes of violations in internal armed 
confl icts, Geneva law is less of a problem because it embodies standards 
explicit ly appl icable to internal armed conflicts: these standards are found in 
common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocol II. Hague law, on the other hand, 
remains silent about internal armed conflicts, with the exception of Article 19 of 
the 1954 Hague Convent ion on the Protection of Cultural Property. 
Moreover, the Tadic Decision determined that those Hague provisions in the 
actual text of Article 3 only appl ied to international conflicts. 'It can be held that 
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Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of humanitar ian law not 
fal l ing under Article 2 or covered by Art icles 4 or 5, more specifically: (i) 
v iolat ions of the Hague law on international conflicts' etc.^ Yet the Tadic 
Decision also concluded that Hague law was applicable to intemal armed 
confl ict (within l imitations i) and ii) observed earlier)^ and would come within the 
scope of Article 3. In addit ion to come within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
under Article 3, violations of international humanitarian law have to satisfy four 
conditions.'* Hence there exists a measure of uncertainty as to what Hague law 
standards have been extended to cover internal conflicts and which of the 
standards entail cr iminal responsibil ity for their breach. Article 8 of the ICC 
Statute can provide some guidance in this respect, though it remains far from 
conclusive, in part icular with respect to the jurisdiction of the ICTY. 
The first means of avoiding conflict classification under Article 3 involves 
construct ing charges that rely on mirror provisions for internal and intemational 
confl icts. 'One device (put into practice by the OTP) is to rely on what may be 
regarded as "common core" offences which are prohibited in both international 
and internal confl icts (...) 'We prefer to root Article 3 charges in analogous 
provisions of separate treaties applicable to both international and intemal 
conf l icts. . .A charge rooted in both of these provisions applies regardless of 
confl ict classif ication'.^ 
Fenrick, Senior Legal Adviser to the OTP, gives the Indictment in B/as/c/c as an 
example . Blaskic was the commander of the HVO in Central Bosnia. He was 
charged cumulat ively with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, crimes 
against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war.^ As to the last, 
he was also accused of violations of the laws and customs of war for conduct in 
breach of provisions on the protection of victims of armed conflict (Geneva law). 
For the t ime being, I am interested in the Article 3 charges concerning the use 
of proscr ibed methods of warfare (and therefore Hague law, segments of which 
^ Tadic Decision par.89. 
^ Section 2.2. 
Section 2.3. 
^ n.8 in Ch.2, 785. 
^ Blaskic Indictment n.46 in Ch.3. 
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can be found in the Addit ional Protocols). Two of these counts were: 
-Count 3: Violat ion of the laws and customs of war: unlav\/ful attack on civilians. 
Article 3 and customary law, Article 51(2) of Addit ional Protocol I and Article 
13(2) of Addit ional Protocol II. 
-Count 4: Violat ion of the laws and customs of war: unlawful attack on civilian 
objects. Article 3 and customary law and Article 52(1) of Addit ional Protocol I. 
In the Blaskic Judgement the Trial Chamber decided that the al leged crimes 
we re commit ted in an international armed conflict. Blaskic was found guilty on 
all counts. Kordic and Cercez, Blaskic's associates in the attack on Ahmici , 
have been served with a very similar Indictment. In the Kordic and Cercez 
Decision the Trial Chamber sanct ioned the inclusion, with a view to applying 
irrespective of conflict classif ication, of mirror provisions from the two Addit ional 
Protocols. It stated that 'to the extent that these provisions of the Addit ional 
Protocols echo the Hague Regulations, they can be considered as reflecting 
customary law. It is indisputable that the general prohibition of attacks against 
the civil ian populat ion and the prohibit ion of indiscriminate attacks or attacks on 
civil ian objects are general ly accepted obligations. As a consequence, there is 
no possible doubt as to the customary status of these specific provisions as they 
reflect core principles of humanitar ian law that can be considered as applying to 
all a rmed confl icts, whether intended to apply to international or non-
international conflicts'. ' ' 
Therefore the Blaskic Indictment is subtly constructed; it makes sure that the 
accused will not be acquitted of charges by a classification of the conflict 
unfavourable to the Prosecut ion. However this does not mean that in this case 
the character of the confl ict can be excluded altogether, for as long as there are 
grave breaches charges, there will be a need to decide on whether the conflict 
was international. 
It is interesting to look at a similar strategy that was relied on in the Celebici 
case. Bosnian Musl ims and Bosnian Croats were accused of violence against 
^ Kordic and Cercez Decision par.31. It also implied that these provisions of the 
Additional Protocols entailed individual criminal responsibility, ibid par.32. 
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Bosnian Serb detainees. No crimes against humanity charges were sought, 
even though these would have applied irrespective of the character of the 
conflict. The exclusion of cr imes against humanity in the Indictment responds to 
the c i rcumstance that, as regards Bosnian Muslims, the OTP 'has not sought 
Indictments on cr imes against humanity charges precisely because, to date, it 
has not found evidence of the policy factor sufficient to substantiate such 
charges. It has, of course, obtained Indictments against accused from other 
groups on cr imes against humanity charges'.^ 
The Celebici Indictment contained grave breaches charges concurrently with 
charges of violations of the laws and customs of war rooted in Article 3 'and 
recognised by common Article 3'.^ The accused were found guilty of grave 
breaches and of violations of the laws and customs of war. In the Celebici 
Judgement , not only did the Trial Chamber find that common Article 3 applied to 
internal and to international conflicts, but it also conf irmed that common Article 3 
came within the scope of Article 3. In addition, because the Tribunal was only 
deal ing with counts 'recognised by common Article 3', Article 3 itself appl ied 
irrespective of whether the conflict was internal or international. 'While common 
article 3 of the Geneva Convent ions was formulated to apply to internal armed 
confl icts, it is also clear (...) that its substantive prohibitions apply equally in 
si tuat ions of international armed conflict. Similady, and as stated by the Appeals 
Chamber , the cr imes fall ing under Article 3 of the Statute of the International 
Tr ibunal may be commit ted in either kind of conflict. The Trial Chamber 's f inding 
that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 was of an international 
nature does not, therefore, impact upon the application of Article 3'.''° Thus it 
was only necessary to prove that a conflict existed 'and that the alleged 
violat ions were related to this conf l ic t ' . " Yet as argued below under the 
special i ty doctr ine, this strategy may still not be sufficient to al low the Prosecutor 
to avoid charging grave breaches. 
So far I have noted that because grave breaches were argued in both of these 
cases, it was ult imately necessary to decide on the character, whether internal 
"n .8 in Ch.2, 779. 
^ The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, 
Indictment, Case No IT-96-21 (19 March 1996). 
^°Ce/e/)/c/Judgement par. 14. It is important to remember that violations of the laws and 
customs of war were charged concurrently to grave breaches. 
" Ce/eJb/c/Judgement par.285. 
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or international, of the conflict. Both Trial Chambers established that the conflict 
w a s international. In the Celebici Judgement, the Chamber arrived at this 
decis ion by adopt ing a more liberal approach to the character of the conflict than 
that held in the Tadic Judgement (Trial on the Merits). In the Blaskic 
Judgement , the determinat ion of the international character of the conflict 
s temmed f rom the Appeals Chamber 's f inding against the initial decision by the 
Trial Chamber in the Tadic Judgement (Trial on the Merits). The question 
remains as to why does the OTP insist on seeking grave breaches charges? I 
will a t tempt to answer this quest ion below. 
At present, however, I will introduce two additional means of properly 
c i rcumvent ing confl ict classif ication (rather than just trying to pin one or the other 
Art icle on the accused) found in two cases that did not rely on grave breaches 
charges. The first, the Kupreskic Judgement, dealt with crimes against 
humani ty; these apply irrespective of conflict classification. In addition the 
choice of charge il lustrates that some crimes remain to an extent unrelated to 
the conflict. The Kupreskic case involved six Bosnian Croats who participated in 
the attack on Ahmic i . The case is relevant to the present discussion because 
the Prosecut ion amended the Indictment. 
Initially the Indictment encompassed grave breaches and violations of the laws 
and customs of war.^^ Grave breaches ensued the need to embark on conflict 
c lassif icat ion. The O T P decided to amend the Indictment by substituting grave 
breaches charges for cr imes against humanity charges. I don't have the 
reasoning behind this decision, but I believe it is not too farfetched to suppose 
that it lies in connect ion with the troublesome Tadic Judgement (Trial on the 
Merits). The initial Indictment for Kupreskic was filed and kept secret upon 
conf i rmat ion by the Judge on November 1995. The Tadic Judgement (Trial on 
the Merits) was rendered on May 1997. Between this date and the next 
Judgement , the Ce/e /3 /c /Judgement (November 1998), where the Trial Chamber 
held that the conflict was international by adopting a less restrictive approach, 
there was only the Erdemovic Judgement (Appeals Chamber).""^ 
The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Vladimir 
Snatic, Stipo Alilovic, Drago Josipovic, Marinko Katara, Dragan Papic, Indictment, Case 
No IT-95-16 (November 1995). 
Erdemovic had initially pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. Erdemovic 
Judgement (Appeals Chamber). The Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) was not 
decided until 10 December 1998 and dealt with violations of the laws and customs of 
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On the other hand, the Amended Indictment (approved by the Judge on March 
1998) charged the accused wi th cr imes against humanity and violations of the 
laws and customs of war punishable by Article 3 and recognised by common 
Art icle 3.'''* Except for persecution (clearly and only a crime against humanity) 
the rest of the counts were brought concurrently. All charges applied 
irrespective of the character of the conflict. Therefore I arrive at the conclusion 
that the Prosecut ion amended the Indictment in order to pre-empt any finding 
that the conflict was internal, a f inding that would have rendered grave breaches 
charges inapplicable. Finding the internal nature of the conflict would have been 
consistent with the Tadic Judgement (Trial on the Merits). The consequence of 
excluding grave breaches charges was endorsed by the Chamber: 'as regards 
the nature of the armed conflict, it is not necessary for the purposes of this trial 
to determine whether the armed conflict was international or intemal, since the 
Indictment contains no counts relating to grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions'. ' '^ 
The amendment of the Indictment should be read together with of the rest of the 
Kupreskic Judgement . 'The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the evidence before it 
in this case, that this was not a combat operation. Rather, it was a wel l- planned 
and wel l - organised killing of civilian members of an ethnic group, the Muslims, 
by the military of another ethnic group, the Croats'.""^ For the purposes of the 
Tr ibunal 's jur isdict ion, the Judgement confirmed the existence of an armed 
conflict,^^ yet it emphas ised that this was not a military operation designed to 
pre-empt an attack by the Musl ims, and that the Defence was painting the wrong 
p i c t u r e . T h i s case highlighted how, in order to c ircumvent conflict 
classif icat ion, the O T P 'have used cr imes against humanity charges whenever it 
has been practicable to do so, including in connection with combat incidents'.''^ 
Though in the present case the Trial Chamber dispelled all doubt on this issue: 
this was not a combat operation.^" 
war. 
The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic, Amended Indictment, Case No IT-95-16 (9 February 1998). 




n.8 in Ch.2, 785. 
^° The attack was directed at the civilian population. The ICTY may have encountered 
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Stemming f rom the previous characterisation of the facts, the accused in 
Kupreskic were found guilty of cr imes against humanity.^^ There were no 
f indings of violations of the laws and customs of war; the Kupreskic brothers and 
cousin were found not guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence. The 
superiors, on the other hand, were found not guilty of violations of the laws and 
customs of war (murder and cruel treatment), for reasons of law.^^ What the 
Chamber (Cassese) meant by this was that even though there was sufficient 
ev idence to f ind them guilty, they had been improperly charged cumulatively for 
violat ions of the laws and customs of war (murder and cruel treatment) and for 
cr imes against humanity (murder and inhumane acts). Article 3 charges were 
d ismissed for having being charged erroneously. So in the end characterising 
the cr imes as unrelated to a combat operation was confirmed on the grounds of 
improper cumulat ive charges, rather than through more substantive reasoning. 
Finally, another technique for avert ing conflict classification is found in 
Furundzija. A pre-trial decision for this case also offers some clues as to why 
the Prosecutor will insist on including grave breaches charges. The accused 
was a commander of the Jokers (an HVO unit) who had been present at the 
rape and torture of a Bosnian Musl im woman . 
A lso in Furundzija the Indictment was amended. The initial Indictment contained 
three counts: a grave breach (torture and inhumane treatment), a violation of the 
laws and customs of war (torture) and a violation of the laws and customs of war 
(outrages upon personal dignity including rape).^^ The Defence filed a motion 
concerning the non-appl icat ion of the grave breach charge because the 
Indictment didn't argue as a general allegation the existence of an international 
conflict. Whi lst maintaining the international character of the conflict, 'the 
Prosecut ion declared that it would not pursue Count 12 of the Indictment in the 
interests of a fair and expedit ious trial and the judicial economy of the 
difficulties in this case because crimes against humanity were committed irrespective of 
combat, yet the ICTY Statute requires the nexus between crimes against humanity and 
armed conflict. The case emphasises the overlap between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in the Yugoslav context. 
(Persecution). The superiors were also found guilty of crimes against humanity 
(murder and inhumane acts). One of the accused was acquitted of all charges. 
Disposition, Kwpres/(/c Judgement. ^ 
ibid. ^ 
The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Indictment, Case No IT-95-17/1-PT (2 November 
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Trial Chamber'.^'' Hence what remained of the Indictment al leged Article 3 
charges, violat ions of the laws and customs of war.^^ 
For the purposes of this case, it was not necessary to prove the character of the 
conflict. During trial, the Defence al leged that there was no armed conflict 'in 
terms of front- lines and military objectives, but only that there was an attack by 
the HVO on c i v i l i a n s ' . T h i s is a particularly interesting claim in the light of what 
I have noted f rom the Kupreskic case. It is difficult to explain this obscure 
statement: the Defence might have been hinting at cr imes against humanity 
charges. This would leave the Prosecutor with the burden of proving that the 
single event (and he is a co-perpetrator as well) was part of a systematic or 
w idespread attack.^'' Though the widespread or systematic nature of the attack 
has been demonstrated for rape in proceedings before the ICTR {Akayeshu), for 
the ICTY w e will have to wait and see the decision in Kunarac and Kovac 
{'Foca).^^ The Chamber thus decided that 'it is immaterial whether the breach 
(of Article 3) occurs within the context of an international or internal armed 
conflict '. It further explained the nature of Article 3: 'more than the other 
substant ive provisions of the Statute, Article 3 constitutes an "umbrella rule".^^ 
Though in this case Article 3 charges were rooted in common Article 3, and, 
specif ical ly for rape also in Article 4 of Addit ional Protocol II, the Chamber did 
not look at these provisions. The Chamber looked at the prohibit ions on rape 
and torture in general , without reference to international or internal armed 
conflict. It decided that these prohibit ions covered all conflicts. It found that for 
rape and torture the prohibit ion had been adopted into customary law 
irrespective of conflict classification or even of the existence of conflict, though 
for the sake of jur isdict ion of the Tribunal it found the existence of an armed 
1995). 
Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) par.7, my emphasis. Count 12 was a grave 
breach (torture or inhumane treatment) recognised by Article 2(b) of the Tribunal 
Statute. 
7^e Prosecutor V Anto Furundzija, Amended Indictment, Case No IT-95-17/1 (2 June 
1998). 
Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) par.58. 
Though the terms 'widespread or systematic' are not present in the text of Article 5, 
the ICTY has taken the 'widespread and systematic' nature of the attack to be a 
requisite for crimes against humanity found in customary law. 
The Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovac, Third Amended Indictment, 
Case No. IT-96-23 (8 November 1999). 
Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) par. 133. 
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conflict.^" The Judgement has been upheld on Appeal . Visibly satisfied. Deputy 
Prosecutor Graham Blewitt commented: 'this was the first case involving a rape 
committed in the c o u r s e of a war. The case established that rape can 
consti tute a war cr ime of torture. So the trial chamber's original ruling was 
important not only for the Tribunal, but also for the development of intemational 
cr iminal law.... Another important element is that Furundzija did not actually 
commi t the rape himself, but was present aiding and abetting those who did'.^^ 
To an extent, the same approach was fol lowed in Martic (Rule 61 Procedure), 
wh ich involved Croat ian Serbs bombing Zagreb with cluster bombs. In this 
case, though, the Chamber limited itself to analysing the law applicable to 
internal and international armed conflict. On finding that it prohibited targeting 
civi l ians and civil ian objects in both contexts, it did not bother to go into conflict 
classif icat ion. It decided that it was unlawful whatever categorisation of the 
conflict.^^ 
In Furundzija {Trial on Merits), the Defence filed a pre-trial motion alleging that 
the International Tr ibunal had no subject-matter jurisdiction on the remaining 
counts of the Indictment. The motion was dismissed, but it is worth looking at 
the Decision of the Tribunal, because it tackled some relevant issues. It clarified 
the relation between Article 3 and other Articles. 'The norms prohibit ing 
conduct such as rape and torture of protected persons which are incorporated 
into Article 2 of the Statute, are of a specialised nature and only apply upon 
satisfact ion of the criteria set out in the Geneva Convent ions 1949. The norms 
prohibit ing such conduct in armed conflict, irrelevant of whether international or 
internal, are encompassed in Article 3. Article 3 contains the prohibitions of 
those serious violations of international humanitarian law which do not fall within 
the special ised provisions contained in Art icles 2, 4 or 5'.^^ It also dealt with the 
Defence content ion that torture and outrages upon personal dignity including 
rape were not covered by Article 3 of the Statute: 'Such acts are prohibited 
Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) par.258. In addition, it resolved that rape falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal explicitly as regards Article 5 on crimes against 
humanity, and implicitly for grave breaches, violations of the laws and customs of war 
and genocide. 
IWPR, Tribunal Update: Last week in The Hague no.185 (July 17-22 2000). My 
emphasis. 
Martic (Rule 61 Procedure) 
Furundzija Decision, par. 10. 
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under customary international law at all times'.^"* As I have explained, the 
Judgement subsequent ly fol lowed this line of reasoning. 
Finally, because the Prosecution continued to maintain that the conflict was 
international, the Chamber had to clarify the ambit of application of Article 3 
w h e n it was faced with the Defence's contention that torture and rape in an 
international armed conflict can only be prosecuted under Article 2 of the 
S t a t u t e . ' T h e Defence assert ion that torture and rape in an international armed 
confl ict (...) are grave breaches or nothing at all in an international armed 
conflict, is wrong. Rape and torture committed in circumstances which do not 
amount to grave breaches under Article 2 may fall under Article 3'.^^ 
In putt ing forward such arguments, however, the Defence might have been 
doing little more than fol lowing the reasoning by the Chamber on the relationship 
between grave breaches and violations of the laws and customs of war. 'There 
are also acts amount ing to serious violations of international humanitarian law 
which do not fall into the special ised categories: these are the violations of the 
laws or customs of war under Article 3. The relationship between Article 2 and 
3 can be descr ibed as one of concentr ic circles: grave breaches are a species of 
violat ion of the laws or customs of war. The Appeals Chamber held that when 
an act meets the criteria of a grave breach under Article 2 and therefore also 
Article 3, it falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the more specific clause, 
namely Article 2'.^^ 'All grave breaches are violations of the laws and customs 
of war. Theoretical ly, they can be charged as both if the criteria are satisfied. 
However, there is a general principle of international law (the doctrine of 
special i ty//ex specialis derogat general!) which provides that in a choice between 
two provisions where one has a broader scope and completely encompasses 
the other, the more specif ic charge should be chosen'. 
Were this line of reasoning to be fol lowed, rape in an international armed 
conflict, commit ted against a person protected by the Fourth Geneva 
Ibid, par.13. 
'If rape is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, then, the Defence argues, 
under the Appeals Chamber Decision, it cannot be prosecuted under Article 3 of the 
Statute because grave breaches can be prosecuted only under Article 2'. Furundzija 




Convent ion (if fol lowing the Celebici interpretation of the nationality requirement) 
wou ld necessari ly have to be brought under the more special provision, a grave 
breach. The Chamber avoided confirming or denying the argument: 'whilst it is 
theoretical ly possible that the offences in this case may have been committed in 
c i rcumstances such as to amount to grave breaches, the Prosecution has 
chosen to go to trial on the Article 3 charges. That choice between two 
provisions having been made, it is not the role of the Trial Chamber to intrude 
upon the Prosecut ion's discretion'.^^ It played with the amendment of the 
Indictment whereby the Prosecution had dropped the grave breaches charge. 
In this sense it is easy to see why the Prosecution might insist on alleging grave 
breaches notwithstanding having to trawl through conflict classification. 
Fol lowing the Judges ' (Cassese's) lex specialis approach as explained above, 
the Prosecut ion may have no other choice. There will be cases that involve 
international confl icts and protected persons, and the conduct will have to be 
prosecuted as a grave b r e a c h . H e n c e there will be limits to the Prosecution's 
discret ion. On the other hand, there might be a number of advantages in 
al leging grave breaches charges. First, grave breaches appear explicitly in the 
Statute, unlike violations of common Article 3 and Addit ional Protocols I and II. 
The latter come within the ambit of Article 3, which means that their character 
as customary law, together with individual criminality for their violation has to be 
demonst ra ted. In the second place, conduct defined in the grave breaches 
provisions is more specif ic in nature and also more specific as to the kinds of 
vict ims and perpetrators involved. This is why grave breaches are considered 
lex specialis. By looking at the Celebici Indictment it is easy to illustrate this 
advantage of grave breaches. All grave breaches charges there were brought 
concurrent ly with Article 3 charges (violations of the laws and customs of war 
recognised by common Article 3). Yet there is one charge that remained without 
its Article 3 equivalent. This is a grave breach charge of 'unlawful confinement 
of civil ians'. This crime, which is more specific, does not appear in either 
ibid par.12. 
'Nevertheless, the situation at hand is not one where the Trial Chamber is faced with 
different charges under separate articles of the Statute. The Prosecution has already 
made a choice'. Furundzija Decision par. 16. 
^° Judges of the ICTY have been known to encourage the Prosecutor to charge 
genocide when the Prosecutor was 'taking the easy way out' by charging crimes against 
humanity. This was the case in Karadzic and Mladic (Rule 61 Procedure). There is no 
reason why they could not adopt this same attitude to encourage the Prosecutor to 
charge grave breaches in cases where the Prosecutor had been content in charging 
86 
Articles or in common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II. So it either had to be 
brought as grave breach charge or not charged at all.'*'' 
But do the advantages of grave breaches still pose enough incentive for the 
Prosecutor to have to prove an additional element, the international character of 
the conflict? As described above, the Prosecutor may have no other choice and 
may be encouraged by the Judges not to opt for the easy way out. Yet in the 
ICTY there is still a feeling that grave breaches, a very useful instrument for the 
prosecution of offenders is being depreciated in view of the possibility of 
applying charges under Article 3 irrespective of the character of the conflict."^ 
That such an instrument should not be lost is of some importance; one can 
understand why the Security Council referred to grave breaches provisions in 
the ICTY Statute because to an extent they resemble an internationally 
accepted criminal code. In addition, and though this is outside the scope of this 
thesis, grave breaches could involve the responsibility of the state. In any case, 
and finally, the Prosecutor might nowadays feel happier about alleging grave 
breaches after the Appeals Chamber adopted a more liberal approach as to the 
international character of the conflict in the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on the 
Merits). 
It has been demonstrated that there are numerous mechanisms available to 
avert bothersome conflict classification. In this sense it is possible to speak in 
terms of the OTP's 'accommodation techniques'. The OTP can rely on Article 3 
charges rooted in mirror provisions of treaties that cover internal and 
international conflicts respectively, or rooted in common Article 3, or in other 
principles of Hague law applicable to internal conflicts as fixed by Tadic and 
confirmed (to an extent, as we shall see below) by Article 8 of the Statute of the 
violations of the laws and customs of war based on CAS. 
''^  There are additional examples of this, such as deportation. Count 2 and count 3, The 
Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic, Milan Simla, MIroslav Tadic, Stevan Todorovic and SImo 
Zaric, Second Amended Indictment (redacted version), Case No IT-95-9 (25 March 
1999). On the other hand there might be violations of the laws and customs of war that 
have no grave breach equivalent, such as bombing civilian targets, charged on the 
Martic ('Zagreb') Indictment as a violation of the laws and customs of war. The 
Prosecutor V Milan Martic, Indictment, Case No IT-95-11 (25 July 1995). 
''^The Prosecution may decide to charge serious violations of the laws and customs of 
war instead of grave breaches when it believes that convictions on grave breaches 
might be too hard to come by because of the contested nature of the conflict or of the 
victims as protected persons. The Indictments drawn up during 1998, between the 
Tadic Judgement (Trial on Merits) and the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits) reflect 
this preference. 
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International Criminal Court. The key to circumventing this requirement is not to 
seek grave breaches charges: and there is an argument that this is not desirable 
in the long run. 
Equally, other alternatives are to use crimes against humanity charges when the 
conduct is part of a broader pattern, or to argue that the prohibition of the 
conduct in question applies in all circumstances, like in Furundzija. The 
advantage as to the latter approach is that the Defence is bound to argue (once 
it has argued that there was not an international armed conflict, but that it was 
internal, to pre-empt prosecution for grave breaches) that there was no armed 
conflict {Tadic Decision and Kupreskic Judgement). On the other hand, 
opposing that argument (moreover as the threshold for the offence to be linked 
to the armed conflict is quite low) is going to be easier than determining the 
nature of a complex conflict. 
The Chamber's assertion in the Furundzija Judgement (Trial Chamber) that 
under customary law prohibitions on rape and torture apply in all circumstances 
could represent an instance of criminalisation of human rights violations. In 
connection to this, (and also because he decided the Furundzija Judgement 
(Trial Chamber) and the Kupresl<ic Judgement), Cassese maintains that there is 
one single corpus of law applicable to both international and internal conflicts.''^ 
Does the attempt by the OTP to circumvent conflict classification confirm his 
view? I concede that there could be some indication of a single body of law. 
However when questioning whether this contention is sustained by practice, the 
answer is no. The ICC Statute provides no evidence of a single body of law, as 
it divides Article 8 (War Crimes) in sections depending on whether they apply to 
internal or international conflict. In answer, Cassese maintains that Article 8 is a 
retrograde provision.'*'' Whether this is so will be analysed in the following 
section. 
There is in my view not enough evidence for a single body of law, precisely 
because states don't want one. Treaty-based international humanitarian law 
has evolved on two tracks as a result of the preferences of states'.''^ Customary 
A. Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections' (1999) 10 EJIL 144, 150. 
' ' ^b id 150. 
n.8 in Ch.2, 784. 
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law (confirmed by judicial decisions such as Nicaragua and Tadic) does apply 
irrespective of the character of the armed conflict only to a very limited extent, 
probably only as far as common Article 3 is concerned. And, as will be noted 
below, the possibility of eluding conflict classification by relying on charges 
brought under common Article 3 will not be open for the International Criminal 
Court. 
4.2 War crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
The ICC will have jurisdiction over aggression, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The Article on aggression is at present an empty 
provision: states need yet to agree on a definition. The incapacity of the Court 
to try aggressors affects the ambit of enquiry of this thesis: planners of 
aggression will not be tried whilst the subordinates could stand accused of war 
crimes. 
In this section I will examine two questions on Article 8 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which is entitled 'War Crimes'. The first question is 
whether violations of international humanitarian law in internal conflicts have 
been included within Article 8. I will also analyse to what extent their inclusion 
confirms the Tadic Decision. The second question concems war crimes in 
general: whether Article 8 of the Statute reflects current international law. The 
answer to this second question will indicate whether states at the Rome 
Conference were intent in codifying customary law or just wished to create a 
regime between states parties to the Statute. 
Article 8 consists of a very long list of crimes. The development of penal 
aspects of international humanitarian law has shifted back and forth between a 
preference for more or less comprehensive lists of crimes and brief references 
to the laws and customs of war'.''® Two of its sections comprise provisions that 
apply to international conflict; the remaining sections apply to noninternational 
conflicts.'*'' The inclusion of two different thresholds (Article 8(2)(d) and Article 
' '^n.54in Oh.1,563. 
'^^Article 8(2)(a) and (2)(b), and Article 8(2)(c) and (2)(e) respectively. Article 8(1) 
applies to all war crimes. 
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8(2)(f)) of states' safeguards for crimes in internal conflicts confirms the 
Tribunal's characterisation of conflicts in Al<ayeshu. In intemational 
humanitarian law, a 'clear distinction as to the thresholds of application has been 
made between: 1. situations of international armed conflicts, in which the law of 
armed conflict is applicable as a whole, 2. situations of noninternational 
(internal) armed conflicts, where common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II are 
applicable and 3. noninternational armed conflicts where only common Article 3 
is applicable'...'Situations of internal disturbances are not covered by 
international humanitarian law'.'^ ^ 
Article 8 is an exhaustive list of crimes: there is no possibility of including further 
war crimes except by amending the Statute. It does not contain a generic 
formula 'giving the Court the possibility of exercising jurisdiction over other 
crimes that may emerge as crimes under customary law in the future'."^ Another 
characteristic worth noting is that the sections on the laws and customs of war^° 
make no distinction between Hague and Geneva law. This has been 
understood as 'a completely novel approach, which has no basis in customary 
law'.^V Finally, as regards the content of the provisions in Article 8, these 'vary 
in specificity, some enunciating very detailed actions which constitute war 
crimes and others containing rather vague descriptions of justiciable conduct'. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most significant development is that Article 8 
confirms that the class of war crimes has been extended to cover violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the context of an intemal conflict. 
Where do the provisions on internal conflicts have their origin? Article 8(2)(c) is 
taken straight from common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
The origin of Article 8(2)(e) is less clear. The category of 'other violations of the 
laws and customs of war applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character' 'is largely derived from the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, which specifically protects victims of non-international 
Akayeshu Judgement par.601. The exclusion of these situations from the jurisdiction 
of the ICC is also envisaged in Article 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(f). Article 8(3), on the other hand, 
is similar to Article 3(2) of APII. 
Human Rights Watch, 'Summary of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute' (September 
1998). 
^"Article 8(2)(b) for international conflicts and 8(2)(e) for noniternational conflicts. 
Defence view Kordic and Cercez Decision par. 7. 
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c o n f l i c t s ' . B u t it doesn't correspond exactly to the Protocol; it leaves out some 
of its provisions, and includes others not envisaged by Protocol II. Thus, 
'violations of the laws and customs of war' applicable to noninternational armed 
conflict derive largely from Additional Protocol II and customary law.^" Yet 
because most of Additional Protocol II is included, however, this provision 
confirms the views about Additional Protocol II held in proceedings before the 
ICTR. 
Are the provisions for internal armed conflict identical to those applicable in 
international armed conflict? Clearly not. Even statistically it is possible to tell 
the difference: 34 provisions encompass offences in international conflicts as 
opposed to 16 for internal conflicts. Even though 'the Statute makes enormous 
progress in minimising differences in war crimes committed in conflicts of an 
international versus non- international character, and redressing the disparate 
treatment of crimes committed in internal armed conf l i c ts ' , the exclusions for 
internal armed conflicts are significant. The Court will be able to prosecute 
crimes 'such as attacks causing incidental civilian losses, starvation of civilians, 
or the use of prohibited weapons, only when committed in international but not in 
non- international armed conflict'.^® 
What I want to find out is whether those violations of the laws and customs of 
war that have been included for international conflicts but have been left out for 
internal conflicts belong to the principles that Tadic resolved apply by customary 
law to internal conflicts. These principles were settled in par. 127: 'it cannot be 
denied that customary rules have developed to govern internal strife. These 
rules... cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular 
from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural 
property, protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in 
hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international 
armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities'. If in doubt 
as to whether the Tadic Decision actually decided that breaches of these 
principles entail criminal responsibility, it is useful to recall the following: 'all of 
these factors confirm that customary international law imposes criminal liability 
^^n.Sin Ch.2, 50-51. 
^^UN Dept of Public Information May 1998 'Crimes within the Court's jurisdiction'. 
^ % . 3 i n Ch.2, 51-52. 
ibid 57. 
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for serious violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by other general 
principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for 
breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means and 
methods of combat in civil strife' (par. 134). 
Article 8(2)(c) comprises the content of common Article 3. It applies only to 
noniternational armed conflicts. This limitation to noninternational conflicts does 
not reflect customary law as expressed by the ICJ in Nicaragua and by the ICTY 
in numerous rulings. However, most of the violations within common Article 3 
are comprised by grave breaches in Article 8(2)(a) to apply to intemational 
conflict. A violation of common Article 3, 'humiliating and degrading treatment', 
is on the other hand expressly found in Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) on serious violations 
of the laws and customs of war in international conflicts. Common Article 3 is 
thus covered entirely for international conflicts, but the advantage present in 
avoiding conflict classification by means of this provision is lost. 
As I have noted earlier, rules protecting victims of armed conflicts and rules 
regarding means and methods of warfare attract individual criminal responsibility 
according to par. 134 of the Tadic Decision. I will assume for the sake of 
argument that these rules correspond to the principles outlined in the paragraph 
mentioned earlier (par. 127).^'' Hence I will compare the Tadic Decision's par. 
127 on the one hand. I will compare it those violations of the laws and customs 
of war that according to the ICC Statute do not cover internal conflict, i.e.: 
violations of the laws and customs of war that only apply to international conflicts 
(Article 8(2)(b)). By comparing these two I will demonstrate that Article 8 (2)(e) 
is more restrictive than Tadic. 
Those provisions that appear in Article 8 (2)(b) (international conflicts) but do not 
appear in Art 8(2)(e) (internal conflicts) are the following. I have classified them 
under the headings of the principles enunciated in Tadic (i.e.: allegedly those 
principles that have been extended by customary law to apply to internal 
conflicts). (I have also put in brackets the violation of the laws and customs of 
n.49. 
^^We can safely assume that if we look at UNGA Resolutions 2444 and 2675, which the 
Tadic Decision par.110-112 cites as evidence of opinio juris for the application of 
provisions to internal and international armed conflicts. GARes 2444, UNGAOR, 23^^ 
Session, Supp.no.18, UNDoc.A/7218 (1968). GARes 2675, UNGAOR, 25*^ Session, 
Supp.no.28, UNDoc.A/8028 (1970). 
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war applicable to international conflicts that is not included in the idem provision 
for internal conflicts): 
1. Protection of civilian objects, including cultural property: though protection of 
cultural property is included, this is not the case for attacks on civilian 
objects (8(2)(b)(i)). 
2. Protection of civilians from hostilities (in particular from indiscriminate 
attacks): the provision on incidental loss of life/ principle of proportionality 
(8(2)(b)(iv)) and the one prohibiting the use of human shields (8(2)(b)(xxiii)) 
are not incorporated for internal conflicts. 
3. Protection of those taking no active part in the hostilities: Killing a combatant 
who has surrendered (8(2)(b)(vi)) is not envisaged as a crime for intemal 
conflicts. 
4. Prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international conflicts: In this 
respect there are the most serious discrepancies. The employment of 
poisonous weapons (8(2)(b)(xvii)), of poisonous gases (8(2)(b)(xviii)), of 
dumdum bullets (8(2)(b)(xix)), weapons that cause superfluous and 
unnecessary injury (8(2)(b)(xx) are not embodied in the rules on intemal 
conflict. As to the ban on certain methods conducting hostilities, also not 
included are attacks and bombardment of villages (8(2)(b)(v)). 
Therefore the Tadic Decision is broader in scope than the violations of the laws 
and customs of war applicable to internal conflicts envisaged by the ICC 
S t a t u t e . T h e contention that for intemal conflicts Article 8 by-passed Protocol 
II to include Tadic cannot be maintained. However, it is true that the ICC's 
violations of the laws and customs of war in internal conflicts are broader in 
scope than Additional Protocol II, though only slightly so.^^ Some commentators 
For more lenient views see Darryl Robinson and Herman von Hebel, 'War Crimes in 
Internal Conflicts: Article 8 of the ICC Statute' (1999) 2 YIHL 193. 
What about APII, though, is it very different from Article 8(2)(e)? The ICC Article 
8(2)(e) is broader than APII (provisions that are not found in APII but appear in Article 
8(2)(e),are (ii), (iii), (ix), (x), (xii)). Whereas in the negative the difference is not so 
obvious because all of APII can be found in Articles 8(2)(c) (as far as APII develops the 
rules in CAS) and 8(2)(e). The exceptions are: 'slavery', 'collective punishments', 
'dangerous forces' 'terrorism' and 'starvation of civilians'. Of these however, none are 
present in the equivalent provisions for international conflicts (Article 8(2)(a) and (2)(b)), 
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have remarked that this provision starts to resemble Additional Protocol I more 
than it resembles Additional Protocol II, but this is probably an exaggeration. 
From the contrary perspective, most of Additional Protocol II is contained within 
the sections of Article 8 that cover internal conflicts. The most notable exception 
is starvation as a method of warfare (included for international conflicts). In 
short, therefore, the rules on internal armed conflicts embodied in Article 8 of the 
Statute are broader than Additional Protocol II. They are however more 
restrictive than the ones enumerated by the Tadic Decision in its determination 
that some norms have been extended by customary law to cover internal 
conflicts that carry the individual responsibility of the perpetrators. Therefore it is 
necessary to have regard for the following reasoning; customary law since the 
Tadic Decision has not changed, or at least, has not diminished. So if Article 8 
of the ICC Statute is narrower than the law established in the Tadic Decision, 
and if Article 8 reflects customary law, the question must be addressed whether 
the Tadic Decision represented an exercise in judicial discretion. In other words, 
was the Tadic Decision wrong? The other possibility, to be addressed below, is 
that the ICC Statute does not represent customary law, or at least does not 
cover customary law in its entirety. 
In Article 8 the 'two- box' approach is perpetuated. The consequence of 
perpetuating this approach is that conflict classification appears inevitable. Yet, 
if Article 8 confirms that violations of international humanitarian law in intemal 
armed conflict are war crimes, would it have been possible to write only one 
provision for both types of conflicts? 
Insofar as Article 8 separates the law applicable to international armed 
conflict from that applicable to internal armed conflict, it is somewhat 
retrograde, as the current trend has been to abolish this distinction and 
to have simply one corpus of law applicable to all conflicts. It can be 
confusing -and unjust- to have one law for international armed conflict 
and another for internal armed conflict^" 
I believe that this step has not yet taken place. The reasons have been 
explained previously. A number of obstacles stand in the way: the notion of 
except for starvation of civilians as a method of conducting warfare. 
^°n.43, 150. 
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protected persons for grave breaches, and also that principles of Hague Law 
have not been directly adapted to internal armed conflict, but suffer from the two 
limitations established by the Tadic Decision.®^ For this reason adopting a 
single identical provision to deal with the two types of conflict risks toning down 
the protection afforded by provisions in international armed conflicts by adopting 
a common denominator. It becomes clear in the Statute that states are still of 
the opinion that the two types of conflict should be treated differently; moreover, 
states are also less willing to accept restrictions on the conduct of intemal 
conflicts. As a consequence, more daring provisions might have proved 
unacceptable to states. In this sense Wedgewood, identifies the problem in 
Rome in terms of 'the conflict between establishing broad jurisdiction and 
developing the law'.®^ 
Finally, a jurisdictional aspect that affects the prosecution of crimes in intemal 
conflicts is third party jurisdiction. 'Thus, the final text gives undue shelter to the 
very civil wars... Instead, third-party jurisdiction is reserved for international 
wars, where the state in whose territory the offence occurred is likely to 
consent...it will leave third- party nationals vulnerable only in one kind of 
conflict'.' ' 
The second question to take into consideration is whether Article 8 is declaratory 
of current international law, or it is more restrictive or even constitutes an 
instance of progressive development. To determine this I will be looking at war 
crimes committed in international and intemal conflicts. The first issue is 
resolving if the Statute includes all violations. 'The statute is far from 
comprehensive, having omitted various provisions of Hague and Geneva law'.''' 
In addition, because the Statute is concerned with the most serious violations of 
international concern it is not comprehensive by definition. I will focus on 
particular offences to find out whether, as Human Rights Watch maintains, 'in 
several places the ICC formulations are different from and more restrictive than 
the established definitions on which they are based'.'^ 
®^ Tadic Decision par.94. 





There are definitions that do not correspond to existing intemational law. Some 
are more restrictive than current international law. Of these, two stand out 
because of their particular significance; the definition of the principle of 
proportionality in relation to incidental civilian losses and the provisions on 
prohibited weapons. None of them apply to internal armed conflicts, which 
makes their definition and application even more restrictive, in comparison to 
what I have remarked about the Tadic Decision and the rest of the ICTY's 
jurisprudence. 
For attacks that cause incidental civilian losses, there has been a reformulation 
of the principle of proportionality. Roth explains the process in the following 
terms: 'of special concern was the so-called rule of proportionality under 
international law, which prohibits a military attack causing an incidental loss of 
civilian life that is "excessive" compared to the military advantage gained (...) To 
avoid prosecutions in such borderline situations, US negotiators successfully 
redefined the proportionality rule to prohibit attacks that injure civilians only 
when such injury is "clearly excessive" in relation to the military advantage'. 
The US worries concerning war crimes did not stop at this. The main objection 
stemmed form the fact that, whilst genocide and crimes against humanity are by 
nature widespread or systematic, a single act can constitute a war crime.^^ A 
compromise was reached with the inclusion of Article 8(1). 
Article 8(1) places the requirement that prosecution of war crimes will be 
directed in particular against those acts 'as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes.' Yet it is not a limitation because it is 
not exclusive: the text uses the expression 'in particular'. It has to be seen in 
conjunction with Article 1 of the Statute, which specifies that the ICC has 
jurisdiction over 'the most serious crimes of international concem'. The 
reasoning behind Article 1 is the regime of complementarity; the Court is 
intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems. In addition, 
the 'policy/large-scale' requisite of Article 8(1) is also not a requirement for 
prosecutions outside the ICC. 
K. Roth, 'The Court the US Doesn't Want' The New York Review (19 November 
1998), 46. 
®^  'Because genocide and crimes against humanity involve by their very nature 
widespread or systematic atrocities, the United States today is unlikely to commit them. 
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The provisions on proscribed weapons are also restrictive. The inclusion of 
nuclear attacks was contested by the nuclear powers: it was then that less 
developed states opposed the inclusion of chemical and biological weapons 
(poor man's weapons). 'It seems inconsistent not only with human rights norms, 
but also with the purposes of the Statute (...) for use of poisonous arrows or 
dummy bullets to be justiciable, but use of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction deemed outside the scope of the Court'.'^ In addition, the 
prohibited weapons provisions have no effective catch- all clause on means of 
warfare that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, or which are 
inherently indiscriminate. However, even the use of those prohibited categories 
of weapons that were finally included (poisonous gases, dumdum bullets and 
poisoned weapons) does not cover internal armed conflicts. The reason behind 
this exclusion might be because these are crimes that can also be committed 
against enemy combatants. In the case of rebels, governments want to be able 
to deal with them through all available means. 
The so- called innovative provisions also cover internal conflicts. These include 
provisions that explicitly envisage crimes of sexual violence. As a result of the 
inclusion of crimes of sexual and gender violence 'no longer will these crimes 
have to be defined only as crimes against honour or as part of some other 
category'.'^ Also innovative is the crime of 'conscripting or enlisting' children 
under 15. The language was changed from the initial 'recruiting' at US 
insistence. It is limited in international armed conflicts to "national" armed 
forces.^° It also applies to internal armed conflicts, for conscription in 'armed 
forces' or 'groups'. Finally, attacks on UN personnel are also comprised by 
Article 8, and therefore considered war crimes. Attacks on UN personnel had 
already appeared in a conventional instrument, but their character as war crimes 
was unclear.^^ 
The Statute of the ICC 'may be considered from the viewpoint of treaty law, qua 
a multilateral international treaty, or it can be viewed from the perspective of its 
contribution to international criminal law, both substantive and procedural'. 
But the United States might commit a war crime', n.66, 46. 






The exclusion of some norms of international humanitarian law, the adoption of 
more restrictive definitions and of innovative norms might indicate that states 
were not so keen in codifying customary law, but wished instead to establish a 
regime between the parties to the Statute. 
Further, to find out if the Rome Statute is declaratory of customary law it is 
convenient to look at other provisions of the Statute, at some that relate 
specifically to war crimes. Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) contain the expression 
'within the framework of international law'. What does this mean, and why was 
this provision included? Though obscure, I believe that this clause allows 
recourse to be had to other, more specific provisions of international 
humanitarian law that are uncontested customary law, such as the 1925 Gas 
Protocol, in order to aid interpretation of Article 8 should some of its provisions 
prove unclear. 
Another issue that affects war crimes directly is the option that states have of 
declaring that the Court has no jurisdiction over war crimes for 7 years after the 
coming into force of the Statute (Article 124). Though this issue concerns 
jurisdiction, it is an important provision because it distinguishes war crimes from 
the other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. The opt-out clause 'appears 
to send the message that war crimes are not as serious as the other core crimes 
mentioned in the S t a t u t e ' . S o m e commentators view the opt-out clause as a 
reservation.^'^ What was the reason behind the inclusion of this clause? Roth 
proves enlightening: 'the United states, joined by France, also proposed that 
governments be allowed to join the ICC while specifying that their citizens would 
be exempted from war crimes prosecutions (...) the Rome delegates rejected it. 
But as a compromise, the treaty allows governments to exempt their citizens 
from the court's war crimes jurisdiction for a period of seven y e a r s ' . T h i s is yet 
another example of governments trying to shield their servicemen from standing 
trial for war crimes.^^ 
In each of the Articles that determine the subject- matter jurisdiction of the Court 
there appears the expression 'for the purposes of this Statute'. This expression 
M. C. Roberge, 'The New International Criminal Court: a Preliminary Assessment' 




supports the notion that the Statute does not seek to codify existing customary 
law. This notion is further confirmed by the 'saving clause'. Article 10. It 
confirms that customary law will not be affected by the definitions in the 
Statute.^^ As noted, though, it could only affect it by making it more restrictive. 
However, there is the question of reconciling this with the principle of legality, 
recognised in the Statute in Article 22. Closely related is the question as to 
whether provisions more restrictive than customary law violate or not the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. If the conclusion is reached that the Rome 
Conference was more preoccupied about securing membership to the Statute 
than about codifying customary law, it will still be necessary to look at whether 
this satisfies the principle of legality. What cannot be overlooked is that offences 
in the Rome Statute entail the criminal responsibility of individuals. 
Hence the Statute itself seems to support the existence of 'two possible regimes 
of corpora of international criminal law, one established by the Statute and the 
other laid down in general international criminal law. The Statute also seems to 
presuppose the partial coincidence of these two bodies of law: they will probably 
be (...) identical (...) but there will be areas of discrepancy'.^^ Clark is of similar 
opinion: '(the Statute) is essentially an instrument giving jurisdiction to a court 
over selected crimes that are already well -established in general customary 
law' and Article 10 is a savings clause that tries to preempt 'backsliding on 
current achievements or freezing efforts in other forums to engage in 
progressive development of the r u l e s ' . F o r Clark, the Statute consists of a 
'particular jurisdictional statement'. Once the Court is running, however, there is 
the possibility of customary law falling into line with the Statute, as is normally 
the case in the interplay between multilateral treaties and customary law, 
because state practice, the source of custom, tends to follow the treaty. 
In any event, Article 8 of the Statute confirms that violations of international 
humanitarian law in internal conflicts are war crimes. So even though the 
Statute might not reflect all of customary law, and is regarded as a jurisdictional 
statement, the ICC Statute could still be viewed as evidence of states' opinio 
juris. States for the most part will be estopped from denying the criminality of 
^^n.43, 171. 
The ICRC and Human Rights Watch agree on the importance of the 'saving clause', 
n.73 and n.49. 
^%.43, 157. 
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violations in internal conflicts. Though this might be a somehow optimistic 
conclusion, for current events show that these crimes are not being prosecuted, 
as in Sierra Leone. Following on from this, there might still be -marginally-
some attacks on the premise that internal atrocities have been criminalised. 
That is 1. There might still be some more motions in the ICTY and 2. There 
might be some attacks from outside because not every state a) is party to the 
Statute, and b) some states will not have implemented this trend in their national 
law, though recourse may be had to custom for these situations. 
Cited in n.3 in Ch.2, 58. 
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Chapter 5:The Implications for Culpability 
5.1 The 'two-box' approach to culpability 
The customary process of criminalising violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in internal conflicts began before the Decision in Tadic. Yet this 
Decision was fundamental to dispelling the doubt that surrounded war crimes 
committed in internal conflicts; as a decision by an International Tribunal, it 
established these violations as offences in international law. The Statute of the 
ICTR already reflected this development. Subsequent proceedings before the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals both confirmed and fleshed this development. It found its 
ultimate confirmation in the inclusion in Article 8 "War Crimes" of the ICC Statute 
of violations of international humanitarian law committed in intemal conflicts. 
The by-product of this process was that, though there was an approximation 
between law applicable to international and to internal conflicts (because 
violations were now criminal in both contexts), this did not mean the surge of a 
single corpus of law applicable to violations of the law of armed conflict in 
general. Quite the contrary, the character of the conflict became (or remained) 
an element of war crimes, which needs to be proved. In this sense, what the 
Tadic Decision established concerning grave breaches was as important as its 
determination of jurisdiction, under Article 3 of the Statute, over offences 
committed in internal conflicts. That grave breaches cannot be applied to 
internal conflicts constituted part of the package deal that obliges the ICTY to 
consider the character of the conflict an element of the crimes. In this sense the 
status of protected persons of the victims is another element of grave breaches.'' 
^This element of grave breaches has been analysed in section 3.2. To an extent, the 
notion of protected person is also an element of CAS. But in the latter case the test is a 
factual one, ie were the victims not taking active part in the hostilities, whilst for grave 
breaches it also constitutes a legal test, eg were the victims nationals of the party in 
whose hands they found themselves. I have chosen to focus only on the character of 
the conflict as an element of the crimes, rather than look also at the notion of protected 
persons as an element of the crimes. I have chosen to focus on the character of the 
conflict because it is an element of the crimes for all war crimes found in Article 8 of the 
ICC Statute, whilst protected persons are only an element of the crimes as far as grave 
breaches (Article 8(2)(a)) and, to the extent mentioned, CAS (Article 8(2)(b)) are 
concerned. 
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It is submitted that the 'two-box' approach to international humanitarian law 
resulted in the 'two-box' approach to culpability. The latter resulted in having to 
prove the international (or internal) character of the conflict as an element of the 
offence. This meant that there would be conduct that was criminal or not 
depending on the context in which it was committed. Thus, the accused could 
be deemed guilty or not guilty of an offence depending on whether it was 
committed in an international or an internal conflict. To an extent the character 
of the conflict as an element of the crimes is but a function of the 'two-box' 
approach to international humanitarian law. 
Many practical questions arise from this 'two-box' approach to culpability, not 
least the possibility of inconsistent treatment for the accused. This chapter will 
be looking at these issues and at whether this approach to culpability is 
desirable, or whether it raises questions that are indifferent to moral fault and 
thus awkward to consider under the heading of culpability. This chapter will also 
comment on whether such approach is actually feasible. To this end I will 
mention the thresholds of applicability that distinguish international from internal 
conflicts, and internal conflicts from civil strife or unrest. 
5.2 The character of the conflict as an element of war crimes. 
There is ample evidence that the character of the conflict became, if it was not 
already (before, conduct committed in internal conflicts was not criminal in 
international law), an element of war crimes. The evidence provided by the 
ICTY Statute consists of a division of labour between the different Articles; in 
particular one of the conditions that need to be satisfied to apply Article 2 on 
grave breaches is the existence of an international conflict. On the other hand, 
Article 3 on violations of the laws and customs of war applies, in principle, to 
internal and to international conflicts. In fact, it applies irrespective of the 
character of the conflict,^ with one exception. One of the strategies adopted by 
the Prosecutor in drawing up charges consisted of relying on the provisions of 
the Additional Protocols. Article 3 does not apply irrespective of the character 
of the conflict when charges are rooted in the provisions of the Additional 
Protocols. In this case the Tribunal needs to determine if either of the two 
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Protocols applies attending to the character of the conflict. In any case we have 
yet to see an example of this charge because, notwithstanding the disposition in 
the Blaskic Judgement,^ the Chamber decided that it need not apply Additional 
Protocol I because the conduct in question was already covered by Article S.'* 
Despite the devices employed by the Prosecutor to avoid engaging in conflict 
classification, it was still necessary to determine the character of the conflict (or, 
what is the same thing, whether there was an international conflict) when 
charges on grave breaches were brought against the accused. 
There is less evidence in proceedings before the ICTR of the character of the 
conflict constituting an element of the crime because the choice of law in the 
ICTR Statute pointed to the internal character of the conflict. Also because the 
ICTR has been more concerned with finding evidence of genocide and crimes 
against humanity. Nevertheless, the ICTR has had to demonstrate the 
existence of an internal armed conflict as a condition for Article 4 of the ICTR 
Statute. It has done so by finding that the conflict satisfied the material 
requirements of Article 4 (the requirements for the application of Additional 
Protocol II, as common Article 3 was subsumed within it), which constitute the 
minimum threshold between internal conflict and civil strife. 
Finally, the last piece of evidence submitted and which at the same time 
constitutes the confirmation of the character of the conflict as an element of the 
crimes is the Final Draft Text of the Elements of the Crimes of the Preparatory 
Commission for the International Criminal Court.^ All the crimes contained in 
Article 8(2)(a) (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) have as an element 
of the crimes that 'the conduct took place in the context and was associated with 
an international armed conflict'. Likewise for the crimes found in Article 8(2)(b) 
(other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international 
armed conflict). Article 8(2)(c) (serious violations of Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions), on the other hand, requires that 'the conduct took place 
^eg CAS. The contention still needs to be proved for violations of Hague law 
^ The Trial Chamber 'finds Tihomir Blaskic guilty of (...): a violation of the laws or 
customs of war under Article 3 of the Statute and recognised by Article 51(2) of API: 
unlawful attacks on civilians (count 3); a violation of the laws or customs of war under 
Article 3 of the Statute and recognised by Article 52(1) of API: unlawful attacks on 
civilian objects (count 4)'. Disposition, S/as/(/c Judgement. 
^ B/as/(/c Judgement, par.170. 
^ Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court 'Addendum: 
Finalised draft text of the Elements of the Crimes', PCNICC/ 2000/1 NF/3/Add.2 (6 July 
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in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an 
international character'. The crimes contained in Article 8(2)(e) (other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in noninternational armed conflict) 
do too.^ 
Thus, the two box approach to international humanitarian law had as a result a 
'two-box' approach to culpability that was adopted by the ICC Statute. The Final 
Draft Text of the Elements of the Crimes is yet to be accepted by the Assembly 
of States Parties once the ICC Statute comes into force. Yet the Final Draft Text 
only reflects the 'two-box' approach preferred by states at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference. The Conference would have been the best occasion to get rid of 
this approach and institute a single corpus of law for violations in internal and 
international conflicts; still states' preferences prevailed. The Final Draft Text 
also confirms that under Article 8 of the ICC Statute it is not possible to apply 
common Article 3 irrespective of the characterisation of the armed conflict. The 
Judges and Prosecutor of the ICC will not have recourse to this strategy to avoid 
engaging in conflict classification. Yet the Statute contains assurances that 
nothing therein will affect existing customary law. It is outside the scope of this 
thesis to determine whether the applicability of common Article 3 to internal and 
to international conflicts belongs to customary law, though the ICTY seems to 
believe it does. In any case, if the ICC Statute is regarded as proof of states' 
opinio juris, then it is necessary to conclude that states decided to keep the 
distinction between crimes committed in international conflicts and crimes 
committed in internal conflicts.'' 
I have yet to deliver the argument that the character of the conflict is an issue 
independent to moral fault and as such should not be considered when deciding 
culpability. At present it is appropriate to focus on the process. In procedural 
terms the direct consequence of having the character of the conflict as an 
element of war crimes is the need to engage in the process of conflict 
classification. It is premature to speculate on how the ICC will deal with this 
need. However, experience before the ICTY demonstrates that the process of 
2000). Cited as Final Draft Text. 
^ The previous Report, the Report by the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court on 'Elements of Crimes', PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1/Add.2 (22 December 
1999) also employed this approach. 
^Equally, states decided to keep the distinction between crimes committed against 
protected persons and crimes committed against persons not covered by this protection. 
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conflict classification is lengthy and taxing, and that the character of the conflict 
has to be decided anew in every case. I will deal with each of these aspects in 
turn. 
There have been instances where, in the 'interests of justice', the Prosecutor for 
the ICTY dropped grave breaches charges to avoid engaging in conflict 
classification with a view to expedite trial proceedings.® Determining the 
character of the conflict takes an inordinate amount of time, and heaps of 
documentary and expert evidence. 'Indeed, the production of evidence related 
to conflict classification may take up a greater percentage of trial time than the 
presentation of evidence related to the moral fault of the accused'.^ In addition 
obtaining this evidence may prove an obstacle for the ICC, as it will have to rely 
on the co-operation of states. The ICTY has experienced difficulties in this area, 
and for the ICC things will be harder rather than easier. 
The length of proceedings before the ICTY was a matter that preoccupied 
former Tribunal's President Judge McDonald. Their length was 'in part a result 
of the fact that the legal norms that are to be applied require development, with 
many rulings of first impression (...) Moreover, the trials involve factually 
complex and difficult issues, requiring numerous witnesses as well as extensive 
documentary evidence. And yet the Tribunal's Statute, like the ICC Statute, 
guarantees the accused the right to not only a fair trial but also to an expeditious 
thai. Expeditious trials are important not only for the accused, who is generally 
in detention, but also for other accused in detention awaiting trial'.''° She was 
'concerned about the effect it has on the people in custody. They are presumed 
to be innocent'.^'' 
The difficulties for the ICTY do not stop here. The length of proceedings caused 
by the need to engage in conflict classification is exacerbated by the fact that the 
character of the conflict needs to be decided for every case where grave 
breaches were put forward. That it has to be decided anew for every case 
supports the submission that the character of the conflict constitutes an element 
"Section 4 .1 . 
^n.Sin Ch.2, 769. 
^° 'Remarks made by Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY, to the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court New York', ICTY Press 
Release, JL/P.I.S./425-E (30 July 1999). 
IWPR, Tribunal Update: Last Week in Tlie Hague no.152 (November 15- 20, 1999). 
105 
of war crimes. It also means that the accused has a right for his evidence to be 
heard. We have already seen the strategies adopted by the Office of the 
Prosecutor to avoid conflict classification relying on Article 3. In addition, a 
number of procedural suggestions were put by the forward by the OTP to enable 
the ICTY to take note of the character of the conflict and thus avoid having to 
determine it for every case. Amongst this was the notion of res judicata. There 
also appeared the possibility of taking judicial notice.''^ Finally, another 
possibility is found in the doctrine of precedent (stare decisis); I will investigate 
whether it has been used as a tool to decide the character of the conflict. 
The notion of the character of the conflict as res judicata was first raised by the 
Defence in the Celebici case. The Defence affirmed that the Prosecutor could 
not argue the international character of the conflict, as the Tadic Judgement 
(Trial on Merits) had already decided that the conflict was not international.''^ 
Yet res judicata only binds parties to the proceedings in question: its justification 
is the need for finality in litigation. In Celebici, therefore, the Defence sought to 
argue that the Prosecutor had been a party to the proceedings in the Tadic 
Judgement (Trial on Merits).""* The Chamber in the Celebici Judgement 
dismissed this reasoning. It correctly interpreted the notion of res judicata as 
being 'limited, in criminal cases, to the question of whether, when the previous 
trial of a particular individual is followed by another of the same individual, a 
specific matter has already been fully litigated'.''^ In addition, the Prosecutor 
would, in the case of the Tribunal and other judicial systems, always be a party 
to the criminal proceedings: it was clear the doctrine is 'not applied so as to 
prevent the prosecutor from disputing a matter which the prosecutor has argued 
in a previous, different case'.""^ Most importantly, the Chamber established that 
it was 'certainly not bound by the Decisions of other Trial Chambers in past 
cases and must make its findings based on the evidence presented to it (...) 
Even should the Prosecution bring evidence which is largely similar to that 
presented in a previous case, the Trial Chamber's assessment of it may lead to 
Though closely related (in the sense that it is possible to take judicial notice of an 
aspect that has been decided conclusively for the parties), they are not the same thing; it 
will become clear below. 
It derived this conclusion from the determination that Article 2 on grave breaches was 
inapplicable because the victims did not have the character of protected persons. 'The 
Defence asserts that this was partly on the basis that they did not find there to have 




entirely different results', as it did for the present case.'*'' I will look at the 
doctrine of binding precedent below. It is worth noting that the Chamber 
decided, in particularly strong terms, that the character of the conflict was not 
res judicata. 
A motion for taking judicial notice of the international character of the conflict 
was raised by the Prosecution in the S/7r7/c Decision. The Prosecutor requested 
the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of the international character of the 
conflict, as a fact of common knowledge under Rule 94(A), or as an adjudicated 
fact under Rule 94(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It must be 
remembered that the motion in Simic was decided prior to the Tadic Judgement 
(Appeal on Merits), though after the Celebici Judgement. Remarkably, the 
Prosecution wished the Chamber to take judicial notice of the international 
character of the conflict as an adjudicated fact, basing itself on the same 
evidence that had been alleged by the Defence in Celebici to allege quite the 
contrary: that the conflict was internal. The purpose of taking judicial notice is 
'judicial economy', and in the particular case, the request was 'aimed at 
permitting the application of the counts of the Indictment based on the grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions'.''® The Defence contested the proposal, 
alleging that the international character of the conflict was not an adjudicated 
fact and that taking judicial notice of it 'would jeopardise the rights of the 
accused (...), in particular their right to a fair trial and right to examine or have 
examined the evidence presented by the Prosecutor'. The Chamber admitted 
as much, 'that a balance should be struck between judicial economy and the 
right of the accused to a fair trial'. It subsequently dismissed the motion. The 
Chamber established that the character of the conflict remained a contentious 
issue: the accused had the right to have the evidence heard. Thus judicial 
notice was out of the question. The Chamber also decided that Rule 94 (A and 
B), which envisages the possibility of taking judicial notice, 'is intended to cover 
facts and not legal consequences inferred from them, that the Trial Chamber 
can only take judicial notice of factual findings but not of a legal characterisation 
as such' and that the decision on the character of the conflict was a legal 
consequence inferred from facts. Accordingly, the Chamber took judicial notice 
ibid par.228. 
ibid par.228. 
Simic Decision. This and the Kvocka Decision do not indicate paras. 
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propria motu of the date when Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence 
and the date it was recognised by the EC. 
It is interesting to contrast the previous outcome with the Decision on Judicial 
Notice in the Kvocka case.^^ In this motion the Prosecution and the Defence 
had agreed on taking judicial notice of a number of issues that figured in an 
annex;^° amongst these was the widespread nature of the attack on a civilian 
population. The agreement was aimed at expediting proceedings. The difficulty 
was getting all the accused to agree because 'if judicial notice is taken of the 
facts from Tadic, such decision should apply to all accused.' Though they did 
finally agree, an argument put forward by some of the accused was that 
admission and judicial notice of these issues, which according to the 
Prosecution constituted the elements for the applicability of Article 3 and 5, 
amounted to a guilty plea. The Chamber dismissed the argument because it 
considered that the Prosecutor still had to discharge the burden of proof to find 
the accused criminally responsible. Notwithstanding the Simic Decision, the 
Chamber in the Kvocka Decision accepted the possibility of taking judicial notice 
of legal consequences. It decided that 'even if Rule 94 is concerned only with 
judicial notice of facts and documentary evidence, no provision in the Statute 
and the Rules forbids the Trial Chamber, having taken account of the rights of 
the accused, from drawing legal conclusions based on facts thereby established 
beyond a reasonable doubt'. The Chamber then did two things: it took judicial 
notice of the agreed-upon facts and 'decided that at the times and places 
alleged in the Indictment, there existed an armed conflict; that this conflict 
included a widespread and systematic attack against notably the Muslim and 
Croat civilian population; and that there was a nexus between this armed conflict 
and the widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population and the 
existence of the Omarska, Keraterm and Tronpolje camps and the mistreatment 
of the prisoners t h e r e i n ' . I n this case the Chamber did not face the question of 
having to take judicial notice of the character of the conflict, because the 
accused were charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws 
Kvocka Decision. 
^° Initially by reference to the Tadic Judgement (Trial Chamber), and already granted in 
Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, Prosecutor v 
Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radio and Zoran Zigic, Case no IT-98-30 (19 
March 1999). After the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits), with reference to the 
Appeal. 
^^These are the constitutive elements of Article 5 (crimes against humanity), except for 
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and customs of war.^^ Thus, we cannot conclusively say on the evidence 
provided by this decision that there exists the possibility of taking judicial notice 
of the character of the armed conflict, as it was not an issue. However, if judicial 
notice can be taken of the widespread and systematic nature of the attack for 
crimes against humanity, there is no reason why the same cannot be done for 
the character of the conflict. 
Differences between the S/>r?/c and Kvocka Decisions exist that guaranteed 
different outcomes. First, in the Simic Decision the Defence contested the 
motion, whilst in the Kvocka Decision the Prosecution and the Defence had 
agreed as to what facts the Tribunal should take judicial notice of. Secondly, the 
Kvocka Decision dealt with the same time period and geographical area of Tadic 
case: the Indictment 'charges the accused with violations of the laws and 
customs of war and crimes against humanity in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
Prijedor municipality and in particular in the Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje 
camps between 26 May and 30 August 1992; and (...) the accused Dusko Tadic 
was convicted of crimes committed in the same places between 23 May and 31 
December 1992, and his appeal is completed and his conviction has now 
become final'. The existence of a completed appeal is significant.^^ Also, that 
two cases concern a very similar period (in time and geographical location) is 
not unusual for the ICTY. Accused turn up in the Tribunal when proceedings 
have already started for others in the same Indictment: there is the possibility to 
defer proceedings temporarily and join trials. But when cases are at an 
advanced stage, trials will not be joined and different trials will deal with the 
same set of f a c t s . T h i r d , the Kvocka Decision was decided on June 2000. 
The idea of taking judicial notice to expedite trials had been floated previously, 
as evidenced by the Simic Decision. Nevertheless, on February 2000 a group of 
experts appointed by UN Secretary-General issued a report suggesting scope 
for improvement in the Tribunal's conduction of trials. The Report suggested 
that in order to expedite trials 'the defence and prosecution parties should 
attempt to resolve contested issues between themselves rather than resorting to 
the usual procedure of presenting a motion before the court (...) Judges could 
require the parties to rule on undisputed issues to eliminate the need for the 
the actus reus. 
The Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radio, Zoran Zigic, Amended 
Indictment, Case No IT-98-30-PT (31 May 1999). 
"^^ The S/A77/C Decision was rendered before the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits). 
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introduction of a potentially massive amount of evidence. Also the parties could 
reduce the time needed for clarifying background information already 
established in another trial'. 
So far it has been noted that the character of the conflict cannot be considered 
res judicata and that to date no judicial notice has been taken thereof. However, 
one can only wonder whether the outcome in these instances would have been 
different if there had been, as there is now, a conclusive decision on the issue 
by the Appeal Chamber. As explained, the existence of a concluded appeal was 
of significance in the Kvocka Decision. This hypothesis introduces the 
possibility of applying the doctrine of binding precedent to the determination of 
the character of the conflict. The approach was adopted in the Aleksovski 
Judgement (Appeal Chamber), which followed the decision on the international 
character of the conflict in the 7acf/c Judgement (Appeal on Merits). In the 
Aleksovski Judgement the Appeals Chamber in decided that because the facts 
concerned a similar time frame to the Tadic case, then the conflict was 
international unless a separate internal conflict could be proved. In applying 
stare decisis the Chamber in the Aleksovski Judgement (Appeal Chamber) had 
regard for various different possibilities: if the decisions of a Trial Chamber bind 
another Trial Chamber (the Celebici Judgement left very clear that it was not the 
case and the Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski Judgement concurred), if the 
Trial Chamber must follow decisions of the Appeals Chambers decisions (yes), 
and whether the Appeals Chamber is bound to follow it's own decisions. As to 
the last, it decided that the Appeals Chamber would follow its own decisions 
unless it would render an unjust outcome for the individual defendant.^^ Judge 
Hunt (concurring) rightly viewed the issue in the following terms: 'there has 
always been a special need for certainty in the criminal law. There is, however, 
a tension existing between that special need and another special need in the 
criminal law: the need for flexibility where adherence to a previous decision will 
create injustice. Both of these special needs apply equally to international 
criminal law as well'.^'' 
^''Eg Blaskic and Kordic and Cercez cases. 
IWPR, Tribunal Update: Last Week in The Hague no. 163 (February 7- 12 2000). 
®^ Declaration of Judge Hunt on the /\/e/csovs/(/Judgement (Appeals Chamber) par.8-9. 
ibid 4. 
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Having demonstrated that the character of the conflict is an element of the 
crimes, that the process of conflict classification is lengthy and has to be 
undertaken in every case where charges of grave breaches are brought, it is 
necessary to enquire whether it makes any difference to the individual accused 
to be charged of crimes in an internal or in an international conflict. 
Theoretically, the potential for inconsistent treatment appears obvious: an 
accused is charged with a grave breach, the conflict is found by the Tribunal to 
be internal, and the accused walks free. 
This scenario tends to disturb commentators because they regard the character 
of the conflict as an external element indifferent to moral fault that should have 
no incidence in the culpability of the accused. What it is that we want to punish 
perpetrators for? Criminal lawyers would answer that we wish to punish them 
for the criminal conduct (and not for the context within which it was committed). 
Perhaps the most vehemently held views were those expressed by Judge 
Rodrigues in the Aleksovski Judgement (Trial Chamber). I have already 
commented that in his opinion restricting grave breaches to international 
conflicts represented unacceptable means of respecting the sovereignty of 
states. In addition he objects to the character of the conflict as an element of 
the crime, for he concludes that it is not a factor that the accused takes into 
consideration when deciding whether or not to commit a war crime. He thus 
indicates that it is an element independent to moral fault. 'The characterisation 
of the conflict is not a consideration in the mind of a person, be it a man or 
woman, who is preparing to commit a crime which might be characterised as a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions'.^® 
At first impression, the international or internal nature of the conflict does not 
manifestly drive an individual towards refraining or not from committing a war 
crime. However, though it does not answer Judge Rodrigues' objections, the 
element of the crime is the character of the conflict and not the accused 
knowledge of it. It may impose an additional hurdle on the Prosecutor, namely, 
to prove the international character of the conflict, but the additional element is 
by no means a mental element. Thus, though lengthy, it may be easier to prove 
with the aid of documentary and expert evidence. This view is confirmed by the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues on the >A/e/(sovs/(/Judgement (Trial Chamber) 
par.48. 
I l l 
Final Draft Text of the Elements of the Crimes. In stating the elements of war 
crimes, it says by way of introduction: '-There is no requirement for a legal 
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its 
character as international or noninternational. -In that context there is no 
requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the 
character of the conflict as international or noninternational'. On the other hand, 
this may not be strictly true concerning Article 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c). For these the 
Final Draft Text requires that the accused have knowledge that the crime was 
committed against protected persons. For 8(2)(a) grave breaches, not only is it 
required that 'such person or persons -the victims- were protected under one or 
more of the Geneva Conventions of 1949', but also that 'the perpetrator was 
aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.' As 
for 8(2)(c) the requirement that 'such person or persons were either hors de 
combat, or were civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no 
active part in the hostilities' is compounded by the requirement that 'the 
perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established this status'. 
An additional argument in support of the view that it is undesirable to consider 
the character of the conflict as an element of the crimes is the consequences it 
entails for legal certainty. There are two angles to this. First, the character of 
the conflict might not be authoritatively adjudicated till after the criminal conduct 
takes place: it remains uncertain until a Tribunal decides upon it. Secondly, 
there is a need to consider the principle of legality for the individual accused. 
The development of the law of criminality of acts in internal armed conflicts has 
reduced the problem but, to the extent that there is a difference of substantive 
standards, might not a commander say, 'because this is an internal armed 
conflict, we may fight this way (which we could not if it were an international 
armed conflict)? The difficulty is increased if, after the commander makes this 
evaluation of the law he can apply, the Tribunal decided in proceedings against 
him that those acts were criminal also when committed in internal conflicts. This 
could constitute an unfair outcome for the commander, quite separate from the 
possibility that the Tribunal could decide a posteriori, and contrary to the 
evaluation made by the commander, that the conflict was international and not 
internal. 
On the contrary, the counterarguments to Judge Rodrigues' view are scarce. 
Keeping the character of the conflict as an element of the crimes appears 
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cumbersome and unnecessary, derived from the normative immaturity of 
international criminal law. Yet irrespective of these objections we might be 
facing a limit that cannot be trespassed, as illustrated in Judge Shahabundeen's 
Declaration on the Blaskic Judgement concerning protected persons.^^ Why 
have states chosen to retain in the ICC Statute the character of the conflict as 
an element of the crimes when it is contended that it is morally indifferent? A 
possible answer is that perhaps they don't believe it is morally indifferent. 
States may have reserved themselves the possibility of behaving more harshly 
towards their own nationals than they would towards protected persons in an 
international armed conflict. They want to have less limitation in dealing with 
conflicts within their territories.^" Perhaps they are willing to admit the criminality 
of violations in internal conflicts, but not to the point of equating them to 
international conflicts. Evidence can be sought in the ICC Statute as reflecting 
opinio juris of states. 
In practice, there is little evidence of inconsistent treatment. The theoretical 
arguments tend to fade into oblivion and the scenario previously described 
remains unlikely. The first practical issue to consider is whether the potential for 
inconsistent application is reflected on sentencing. The question is whether it 
makes a difference to sentencing if the accused is charged with crimes 
committed in one context and not in the other. There are very few examples in 
the ICTY's practice and I will look at two. 
The Tadic Second Sentencing Judgement (Trial Chamber) after the Appeals 
Chamber had established for Tadic the international character of the conflict 
seems at first to support the thesis that convicting on the basis of crimes 
depending on the context in which they were committed is reflected in 
sentencing. To recapitulate, Tadic had initially been convicted of crimes against 
humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war {Tadic Judgement (Trial 
on Merits). The Trial Chamber had ruled Article 2 (grave breaches charges) 
inapplicable because the victims did not have the character of protected 
persons. After this determination it did not go further, leaving the nature of the 
conflict as ambiguous. Tadic was sentenced to 20 years {Tadic First Sentencing 
Section 3.2. 
In this way, states may claim the right to use force against their own nationals that they 
would not use in an international conflict. This argument highlights the distinction 
between human rights law and international humanitarian law. Notwithstanding a 
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Judgement (Trial Chamber)). Both the Defence and the Prosecutor appealed 
and, on appeal, the Chamber found that the character of the conflict was 
international, and the victims protected persons. Thus charges under Article 2 
were deemed applicable and Tadic was also convicted of these charges, on top 
of violations of the laws and customs of war {Tadic Judgement (Appeal on 
Merits). Sentencing then returned to the Trial Chamber, which increased 
Tadic's sentence in 5 years, from 20 to 25 (Tadic Second Sentencing 
Judgement (Trial C h a m b e r ) ) . T o this extent it would seem that the character 
of the conflict does matter for sentencing. However, this fails to take into 
account other findings in the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits). The 
Chamber found Tadic guilty on the evidence and applying the doctrine of 
common purpose of killing five men. This count had been brought as a crime 
against humanity (murder) and on appeal Tadic was found guilty. This 
additional count is what increased Tadic's sentence, moreover as it was a crime 
against humanity.^^ In addition, the conduct that was now admitted as grave 
breaches had already been charged -and Tadic convicted of it- as violations of 
the laws and customs of war.^^ 
/ 
The practical evidence in the Tadic case for the relevance of the character of the 
conflict is thus slim. The case in Aleksovski equally offers little evidence. In 
much the same fashion, the grave breaches charges against Aleksovski were 
dismissed following the Tadic Judgement (Trial on Merits). On appeal, following 
the Tadic Judgement (Appeal on Merits), the conflict was found to be 
international and the victims protected persons, and thus grave breaches were 
applicable. The Appeals Chamber in the Aleksovski Judgement (Appeal 
Chamber), however, decided not to add this conviction for grave breaches on 
top of the conviction for violations of the laws and customs of war because they 
concerned the same facts: 'thus, even if the verdict of acquittal were to be 
degree of overlap, they protect different values and employ different methods. 
^Yater the Tadic Sentencing Judgement (Appeal Chamber) decreased the sentence to 
20 years on the basis that the Second Sentencing Judgement (Trial Chamber) had not 
taken into consideration the place of Tadic in the hierarchy -he was, in the words of the 
Defence, 'a tadpole in a pool of sharks'. IWPR, Tribunal Update: Last Week in The 
Hague no. 161 (24- 29 January 2000). 
The question as to whether crimes against humanity should receive a higher sentence 
than war crimes was the cause of much heated debate in the ICTY. Though it 
contradicted a previous ruling by the Appeals Chamber in the Erdemovic Judgement 
(Appeals Chamber), the matter has been authoritatively decided in the Tadic Sentencing 
Judgement (Appeal Chamber). It decided that they should receive the same sentence. 
Grave breaches and violations of the laws and customs of war are considered equally 
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reversed by a finding of guilt on these counts, it would not be appropriate to 
increase the Appellant's sentence'.^'* It is to be expected that the consideration 
of the principle of non bis in idem played a part. 
Therefore it is possible to appreciate how the character of the conflict as an 
element of the crime does not in practice hold such determinative value. The 
conclusion is also supported by the strategy employed by the Prosecutor to 
prevent the acquittal of the accused in the event of a non-favourable 
classification of the conflict. This strategy constitutes the practice of concurrent/ 
cumulate or alternative charges, where mirror provisions will be employed. The 
character of the conflict will not be determinative because it will always be 
charged in the alternative. However one cannot be sure that this method of 
charging will be open to the ICC, for it was a contentious issue in the ICTY. The 
Tribunal decided it did not violate the principle of non bis in idem in a number of 
early decisions. In the Defence Motion on the Form of the Indictment in the 
Tadic case, the Chamber understood that these considerations were relevant 
only in deciding the penalty, and declined to say much else. 'This is a matter 
that will only be at all relevant insofar as it might affect penalty (...) What can, 
however, be said with certainty is that penalty cannot be made to depend upon 
whether offences arising from the same conduct are alleged cumulatively or in 
the alternative. What is to be punished by penalty is proven criminal conduct 
and that will not depend upon technicalities of pleading'.^^ First, though it will 
guarantee that the accused does not escape conviction because of the 
character of the conflict, concurrent charging does not obviate the need to go 
through conflict classification. Second, in order to determine which charges are 
applicable we will have to be able to classify the conflict on the basis of some 
objective criteria: these are the thresholds of applicability. 
Considering that the character of the conflict has to be determined at every 
stage, the question is whether it is possible to do so. Are there objective 
grave and the sentence is the same. 
/\/e/(sovs/c/Judgement (Appeals Chamber) par. 153. 
^^Decision on Defence Motion on Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, 
Case No IT-94-1 (14 November 1995) par. 17. This reasoning was followed in the 
Decision on Motion by the Accused Zejnil Delalic Based on Defects in the Forni of the 
Indictment, Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, and Esad Landzo, 
Case No IT-96-21 (2 October 1996) par.24. Having said this, it is necessary to 
remember that the commanders in the Kupreskic Judgement were acquitted on 
particular counts because they had been erroneously charged. Section 4.1. 
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parameters to distinguish between an international and an intemal conflict? 
There are two thresholds to take into consideration. In the first place, the higher 
threshold: the threshold between international and internal conflicts, because it 
is with respect to this threshold that the character of the conflict becomes 
significant in determining the culpability of the accused. Secondly, the lower or 
minimum threshold, between an internal conflict and peacetime.^^ This 
threshold is important in the sense that it determines when conduct ceases to be 
liable to be classified as a war crime (for now violations of international 
humanitarian law applicable to internal conflicts are criminal in international law). 
The higher threshold has already been tested in proceedings before the ICTY. 
Though essentially a legal test, before the ICTY factual considerations loomed 
large; most of the issues turned on whether the evidence satisfied the test. In 
this manner, the upper threshold was in proceedings before the ICTY a 
contentious issue and the cause of heated debate. Yet even if the Judges 
agreed on the test to be applied to find the existence of an international conflict, 
they tend to disagree on the evidence, ie on whether the facts did satisfy at all 
the test or not.^^ 
Whilst the upper threshold constitutes essentially a legal test, the minimum 
threshold is concerned with the level of violence. The intensity of the conflict is 
not the determinative factor in deciding whether a conflict is international or 
internal -it is whether the participants are two or more states or agents of those 
states. However, the distinction between an internal armed conflict and a mere 
disturbance is a matter of the material intensity of the conflict. The intensity of 
the conflict is reflected in the factors for Additional Protocol II to apply.^^ The 
^^Note: peacetime is used in the sense that there is no armed conflict. This does not 
mean that the situation is stable, there can be violence (or even genocide) which does 
not make it to the minimum threshold. 
Eg Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald on the Tadic Judgement 
(Trial on Merits) and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues on the Aleksovski 
Judgement (Trial Chamber). That these questions tend to revolve around questions of 
facts is one of the reasons why this author has declined to go into more detail. 
^^These requirements are found in Article 1(1) of APII. The ICTR identified them as 
follows: (i) an armed conflict takes place in the territory of a High Contracting Party, 
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised arnied groups; 
(ii) the dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups are under responsible 
command; (iii) the dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups are able to 
exercise such control over a part of their territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations; and (iv) the dissident armed forces or other 
organised armed groups are able to implement APII. Rutaganda Judgement par. 95. 
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lower threshold, on the other hand, has not yet been authoritatively decided. It 
is expected that the ICC will have to deal with this issue.^^ 
39 
The ICC Statute provides for the distinction between internal violence and internal 
conflicts, in the sections (d) and (f) of Article 8(2). However the Final Draft Text of the 
Elements of the Crimes by also makes clear that these are not elements of the crimes, 
but states' safeguards. They indicate what level of violence is outside the scope of 
Article 8. 
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C o n c l u s i o n 
This work has explained the process by which violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in internal armed conflict can now be regarded 
under customary law as entailing the criminal responsibility of the individual. As 
illustrated throughout, the process is the result of state practice, or even the 
result of the judicial determination of states' opinio juris in an area where op/>?/o 
juris is understood to be as significant as state practice in finding out what the 
law is. Demonstrating the criminality in customary law of war crimes committed 
in internal conflicts, a development confirmed by the Tadic Decision and 
followed subsequently (in proceedings before the ICTR, and in the Statute of the 
ICC) has involved confronting claims of retrospective application of the law. In 
short, it has involved distinguishing what is customary law from what is not. To 
the extent that the Ad Hoc International Tribunals have successfully answered 
claims of retrospectivity, it is possible to affirm the existence of established 
categories of crimes against international law. Individuals are tried on the basis 
of these categories and not by applying a 'bad man' definition. 
The question to be faced is whether the criminalisation of violations of 
international humanitarian law in internal conflicts by this process has 
maintained a degree of coherence among crimes under customary law. It is 
perhaps difficult to justify coherence in moral terms, such as retaining the 
character of the conflict as a distinguishing element of the crimes, when the 
morality of the conduct constituting the substance of the crime seems 
independent of the context in which it was committed. Thus, though violations of 
international humanitarian law in internal conflicts are now criminal offences, the 
distinction between internal and international conflicts has been kept. This 
distinction has been questioned throughout the thesis, but that such distinction 
stems from states' preferences has also been taken into consideration. 
Nonetheless the distinction remains important if we are to root the categories of 
crimes in state practice or even in op/>7/o juris, rather than on what the Judges 
themselves believe constitutes the obnoxious behaviour that ought to be 
suppressed. These are the identified limits on how progressively Judges can 
apply the law in order to condemn the conduct presented to them. If 
International Tribunals were to disregard the principle of legality they would be 
defeating their purpose. However, short of applying a concept of common law 
118 
crimes (a device largely rejected in common law systems), it has to be 
understood that in the area of international criminal law the scope for judicial 
determination by the Tribunals, a sort of fine-tuning of the offences, remains 
broad. Particularly when we can appreciate how the Judges have made use of 
the Statutes to allow them to extract the maximum reach of the law contained 
therein. Perhaps the Tadic Decision constitutes the best example, for, even 
acknowledging that the customary development of international humanitarian 
law applicable in internal conflicts had occurred before the Yugoslav conflict, the 
question remains whether the Statute of the Tribunal actually guaranteed 
jurisdiction over these offences. 
Thus, the customary development of the law of war crimes has retained a 
distinction based on the character of the conflict; to this extent the character of 
the conflict constitutes an element of war crimes. In this connection there are 
issues that need further clarification by the Tribunals. The thresholds of 
applicability need to be determined. The higher threshold of internal armed 
conflict, which distinguishes between intemal and intemational conflicts, has 
been tested authoritatively and decided in the 7acf/c Judgement (Appeal on 
Merits). However in the Yugoslav context the facts of the conflict loom so large 
that this test might not be readily applicable to other circumstances. The 
minimum threshold that distinguishes internal conflicts from situations of civil 
unrest remains to be tested. Unlike the higher threshold, for the minimum 
threshold the intensity of the conflict constitutes a determinative factor. It is 
anticipated that drawing this line will be contentious. Rather than an instance of 
states delegating sovereignty to the Tribunals, however, it will be a matter of 
states delegating the ability to decide where sovereignty ends. 
In connection with the minimum threshold it is submitted that crimes against 
humanity have not remained indifferent to customary development, but have 
developed to apply irrespective of the existence of an armed conflict (whether 
internal or international). The category of crimes against humanity thus applies 
to conduct occurring in circumstances that do not exceed the minimum 
threshold. It also applies when, as in Rwanda, the nexus between the imputed 
conduct and the armed conflict is insufficient. During armed conflict, in particular 
in the Yugoslav context, it has been noted that the overlap between war crimes 
and crimes against humanity is significant. This is nowhere better reflected than 
in the Prosecutor's choice of charges and in assessing the accused culpability 
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for sentencing before the ICTY. The rationalisation of the categories of crimes 
that was expected from the Tribunals might not be possible when they are faced 
with complex armed conflicts. Regard must also be had for the contention that 
crimes against humanity will be more significant than war crimes in the future. 
This argument points at the absence of convictions on war crimes charges 
before the ICTR. It is held, essentially, that the ICC will be concerned with one 
category of crime: crimes against humanity (genocide is a species of this 
category). It will be concerned with crimes committed against civilian 
populations fundamentally, but not only, for discriminatory reasons. 
Even though crimes against humanity and war crimes do overlap in situations of 
conflict, crimes against humanity cannot at present replace war crimes. It would 
constitute a mistake to dismiss the category of war crimes before crimes against 
humanity. There will be instances when war crimes retain their relevance, 
particularly concerning means and methods of warfare, specifically in the choice 
and use of weapons. Yet to an extent the requirement in the ICC Statute that 
the crimes before it must be crimes of major international concern will mean that 
single acts, and thus some war crimes charges, are outside of its jurisdiction.^ 
On the other hand crimes against humanity must be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack. Yet they can still comprise single acts, because that they are 
part of a widespread or systematic attack does not mean that each crime must 
be a pattern of activity: 'a single act has comprised a crime against humanity 
when it occurred within the necessary context'.^ 
In addition war crimes will remain relevant for domestic courts to try instances 
that do not make it to the ICC threshold, and for states to make the most of the 
complementarity regime embodied in the ICC Statute. In this respect, a final 
issue that still needs to be clarified in order to complete the determination of the 
legal regime of war crimes is what type of judicial jurisdiction, and even 
enforcement jurisdiction, applies to war crimes in internal conflicts. As war 
crimes in internal conflicts entail individual criminal responsibility under 
customary law, states other than the territorial state may have the power to try 
defendants, to the extent that it can be possible to argue that the crimes are 
crimes of universal jurisdiction. This power to prosecute does not go as far a 
^ Article 8(1) of the ICC Statute is also significant in this respect. 
^ Kupreskic Judgement, par.808. 'An isolated act, however - i.e. an atrocity which did 
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constituting a duty to do so, as is the case for grave breaches; it does not attach 
either the detailed enforcement regime found for grave breaches. In this sense 
we can see that the criminalisation of offences in internal conflicts through 
customary law may have left these questions on jurisdiction unanswered. In 
addition, and though the main focus has been on individual criminal 
responsibility, questions of state responsibility could also arise for offences in 
internal conflicts, in particular in connection to the victims' claim for 
compensation if state officials are the wrongdoers. 
Therefore, as illustrated throughout this work, determining that particular 
conduct entails individual criminal responsibility under customary law is not the 
end of the process, but rather the first step. The decentralised nature of the 
international system, compounded by the deficiency that International Tribunals 
do not belong in complete systems of law, results in having to subsequently 
discern the whole legal regime applicable to the offences. For war crimes in 
internal conflicts questions need to be addressed such as the thresholds of 
applicability of the offences and the type of jurisdiction that the offences attach. 
not occur within such a context - cannot.' ibid par. 10. 
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